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1941–1991

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James A. Baker, III

AMERICA IN ASIA: EMERGING ARCHITECTURE FOR A PACIFIC COMMUNITY

In Asia as in Europe we are in the midst of the first transformation of the international system this century that is not the direct result of global conflagration. This rare moment presents us with new possibilities for reshaping international relationships in Asia to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world.

President Bush's trip to East Asia marks a point in time when disparate historical lines are intersecting: the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor; the end of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation; and the prospect of laying to rest the Vietnam War era. The end of 1991 should see the closing off of several tragic, defining episodes of the American experience in Asia and open a new chapter of U.S. engagement in the region as we approach the 21st century.

I have presented elsewhere the administration's ideas about the new post-Cold War architecture of the Euro-Atlantic community.[1] But America's destiny lies no less across the Pacific than the Atlantic. We have fought three major wars over the past half-century in the Asia-Pacific theater. U.S. economic involvement and defense commitments in the region have been—and remain—defining realities. We also have large and growing interests in the human and material development of the region, as well as in its security. Our success in forging a new international system will require sustained engagement in this diverse and dynamic part of the world, just as it does in Europe and the Americas.

The global trends that are reshaping Europe and the Soviet Union have also been at work in the Asia-Pacific region: the

[1]See James A. Baker, III, "A New Europe, A New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New Era," speech to the Berlin Press Club, Dec. 12, 1989; and "The Euro-Atlantic Architecture: From West to East," speech to the Aspen Institute, Berlin, Germany, June 18, 1991.

James A. Baker, III is Secretary of State.

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bankruptcy of communism as an economic and political system; a movement toward democracy and market-oriented economics; global economic integration of markets for trade, capital and information; and the emerging recognition that transnational challenges in such areas as narcotics, the environment and migration are important components of a comprehensive approach to security. At the same time the dark countertrends that President Bush pointed to in his September 1991 speech to the U.N. General Assembly are also evident in Asia: the reemergence of ethnic rivalries, nationalist aspirations and territorial or political disputes which were suppressed during the Cold War years.

II

These global factors for change are playing themselves out in Asia amid the region's particular historical, cultural and political circumstances. In contrast to central and eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., where change has been driven by the failure of a system of political economy, much of the ferment in Asia is a product of the region's unique and dramatic economic success. Barely twenty years ago East Asia was engulfed in war and great-power confrontation, burdened with poverty and challenged by insurgent communist movements. Our trade with the region in the early 1970s was less than that with Latin America.

But the subsequent two decades brought unrivaled progress. Throughout the 1980s East Asia led the world in the innovations of a new economic age. Japan emerged as an economic superpower. New industrial economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore achieved rapid high-technology growth. China opened economically. And the Philippines, Korea and Taiwan each took strides toward democracy. As a result the combined economies of East Asia are now roughly equal in size to that of the United States.

International political developments have also contributed to a more positive environment. These include the Sino-Soviet rapprochement, the opening of Soviet relations with the Republic of Korea, the admission to the United Nations of both Korean states, the birth of a democratic Mongolia and a political resolution of the Cambodia conflict based on a U.N. settlement plan. The latter, if realized, will bring a new era of peace to Indochina.

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For all the region's progress, however, some legacies of the past could impede a promising future. The heavily armed standoff on the Korean peninsula is still one of the world's most dangerous flashpoints, a confrontation now intensified by the ominous threat of nuclear proliferation. In Burma the tyranny of a brutal military dictatorship endures, despite the clear expression of popular will in the elections of 1990 for civilian democratic government. China, along with the other residual communist regimes in Asia, continues to resist democratic political reform. And despite President Gorbachev's historic visit to Tokyo last April, the dispute over Japan's Northern Territories remains an impediment to a major improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations.

These Asian realities—the elements of a promising future and the difficult remnants of times past—now shape the challenges before us. The successes of our policies and those of our friends in the region mean that many of our partners have also become robust economic competitors. Allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia have become important political and economic players in the emerging international system.

Given the challenges and opportunities we now face in Asia, a viable architecture for a stable and prosperous Pacific community needs to be founded on three pillars. First, we need a framework for economic integration that will support an open global trading system in order to sustain the region's economic dynamism and avoid regional economic fragmentation. Second, we must foster the trend toward democratization so as to deepen the shared values that will reinforce a sense of community, enhance economic vitality and minimize prospects for dictatorial adventures. Third, we need to define a renewed defense structure for the Asia-Pacific theater that reflects the region's diverse security concerns and mitigates intra-regional fears and suspicions—a prerequisite for maintaining the stability required for continuing economic and political progress.

III

In formulating American policy toward the Asia-Pacific region, we should recognize our historical and continuing interests. Since 1784, when the merchant ship *Empress of China* sailed for Canton from New York, the United States has consistently pursued an open door approach to the Asia-Pacific region. Our interest has resided in maintaining com-

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mercial access and preventing the rise of any single hegemonic power or coalition hostile to the United States and its allies and friends. In today's world a shared focus and the development of an active partnership among the nations of the Pacific Rim are essential to the success of the emerging global system.

The Asia-Pacific region is now America's largest trading partner. America's trans-Pacific commerce is now more than $300 billion in annual two-way trade—nearly one-third larger than that across the Atlantic. The United States exports more to Thailand than to the Soviet Union, more to Indonesia than to central and eastern Europe and more to Singapore than to Spain or Italy. Moreover, U.S. firms have invested more than $61 billion in the region, with over $95 billion of Asian investments in the United States.

Our closest bond to Asia is the growing number of Asian-Americans, some seven million strong, who are America's fastest growing group of immigrants. There are more Laotians today in the United States than in the Laotian capital of Vientiane; more Filipinos in California than in Cebu. These people, along with hundreds of thousands of other Asian-Americans—Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Koreans, Thai and Samoans among them—enrich our society, strengthen our engagement with the region and give us a growing mutuality of interests in an emerging Asia-Pacific community.

What has fostered stability and secured economic dynamism in East Asia for the past four decades is a loose network of bilateral alliances with the United States at its core. Our military presence, our commitment, our reassurance has constituted the balancing wheel of an informal, yet highly effective, security structure that emerged after World War II and endured throughout the Cold War years.

To visualize the architecture of U.S. engagement in the region, imagine a fan spread wide, with its base in North America and radiating west across the Pacific. The central support is the U.S.-Japan alliance, the key connection for the security structure and the new Pacific partnership we are seeking. To the north, one spoke represents our alliance with the Republic of Korea. To the south, others extend to our treaty allies—the Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN) countries of the Philippines and Thailand. Further south a spoke extends to Australia—an important, staunch economic, political and security partner. Connecting these spokes is the fabric

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of shared economic interests now given form by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process. Within this construct, new political and economic relationships offer additional support for a system of cooperative action by groups of Pacific nations to address both residual problems and emerging challenges.

This system has been successful precisely because its flexibility has respected the vast geographic expanse, political and cultural diversity, as well as the geopolitical realities of East Asia and the Pacific. Unlike Europe there has been no single threat commonly perceived throughout the region. Instead, there is a multiplicity of security concerns that differ from country to country and within the subregions of this vast area.

Today the overlay of U.S.-Soviet competition has been removed from Asia, so the enduring diversity of regional interests and security concerns stand out with even greater clarity. What was a secondary aspect of our Cold War-era security presence is becoming the primary rationale for our defense engagement in the region: to provide geopolitical balance, to be an honest broker, to reassure against uncertainty.

Our forward-deployed military presence and bilateral defense ties to Japan, South Korea, the allies within ASEAN and Australia are widely accepted as the foundation of Asia's security structure. Yet in the post-Cold War world, the enhanced capabilities of our allies and friends—and new security challenges—require adjustments in our force structure, defense activities and in the means of sustaining regional stability.

Asian security increasingly is derived from a flexible, ad hoc set of political and defense interactions. Multilateral approaches to security are slowly emerging. As we have seen in the Cambodian peace process, the combined efforts of the ASEAN countries, Japan, Australia and the U.N. Security Council's Permanent Five have tailor-made a conflict-resolution process. A semiofficial forum on the contested islands of the South China Sea, hosted recently by Indonesia, also reflects such an ad hoc, multilateral approach. Guaranteeing stability on the Korean peninsula may increasingly assume a multilateral form—a solution suited to the character of the problem. At this stage of a new era we should be attentive to the possibilities for such multilateral action without locking our-

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selves in to an overly structured approach. In the Asia-Pacific community, form should follow function.

IV

While Asian security concerns have a diverse, decentralized character, burgeoning intra- and trans-Pacific trade and investment provide areas of broad common interest. Commerce offers the most natural approach to fostering greater regional cohesion. This is why the United States and 11 other Pacific basin economies came together two years ago to initiate the APEC process. We see APEC as an important mechanism for sustaining market-oriented growth, for advancing global and regional trade liberalization and for meeting the new challenges of interdependence. The APEC agenda is expansive. It includes, for example, assessment of regional needs in telecommunications, human resource development, energy, trade and investment, marine resources and tourism, among others.

APEC is as much the hallmark of American engagement in the region as are U.S. security ties. Indeed, one could draw a 21st-century Pacific analogy from a nineteenth-century experience: the development of the American continent. As the pattern of expansion and influence in the American West was determined by the location of telegraph lines and railroads, so the infrastructural links we are building across the Pacific in areas such as telecommunications and transportation will shape the economic and political character of the region and our ties to it.

With the anticipated addition to APEC's membership of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan at November's third ministerial meeting in Seoul, APEC's potential as a major trans-Pacific forum is becoming a reality. The efforts of APEC's ten working groups are laying a solid foundation of economic cooperation on a broad range of issues.[2] APEC is ready to emerge as a key forum that can forge the greater sense of Asia-Pacific community needed to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world.

Let me also leave no doubt about what APEC is not: it is not a regional economic bloc. To the contrary, it is a product

[2]APEC's ten working groups are: trade promotion, expansion of investment and technology transfers, human resource development, regional energy cooperation, marine resource conservation, telecommunications, transportation, data, tourism and fisheries. In addition APEC has begun regional trade liberalization discussions.

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of—and catalyst for—economic integration and trade liberalization. These developments will not cut off the Asia-Pacific community from the rest of the globe. In fact, by stressing the gains that have been made from open multilateral policies, and by enhancing economic efficiency, APEC should help the Pacific region contribute to a more open trading system. APEC's outlook is inclusive, not exclusive. APEC's members include a number of the great trading nations and offer excellent investment opportunities. The intent of the APEC participants is to overcome barriers and inefficiencies within the region while working for a more open global system.

Similarly, the emerging North American Free Trade Area will support both APEC and the global, multilateral systems for trade and financial flows. Unlike a customs union, NAFTA will not establish common barriers to those outside. Rather it will lower barriers among its participants—a governmental response to the accelerating economic integration already taking place among neighbors. Heightened integration and efficiency will increase the productivity of the U.S., Mexican and Canadian economies. Growth will bring expanding markets for Asian traders and investors, thus strengthening, not weakening, trans-Pacific economic links. Indeed, I believe Mexico views the NAFTA as a vehicle for better integrating its formerly autarkic economy into the global system; more efficient patterns of trade and investment with the United States and Canada will strengthen Mexico's ties with a competitive world economy, not weaken them. This view is supported by Mexico's recent membership in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and its interest in participating in both APEC and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Of course the logic of regional integration is more widely applicable. Indeed, Thailand's proposal for an ASEAN free trade area is a welcome initiative that could strengthen ASEAN and, by stimulating ASEAN growth, also reinforce U.S.-ASEAN economic relations.

The economic future of the United States depends on strong ties with all the regions of the world. As a nation generating some 24 percent of the world's GNP, we cannot operate effectively or efficiently through any other strategy. This is why the United States has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to advancing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) through the Uruguay Round. It is also why

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we are seeking to complement that effort through a network of initiatives designed to reduce market barriers and support a more open, competitive and growth-oriented system. The NAFTA, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the U.S.-European Community declaration, our trade enhancement initiative for the emerging central and east European democracies, our agreements with ASEAN and APEC each reflect our customized attempts to reach out to all major markets, not to exclude any of them.

Each initiative is tailored to meet special circumstances and to maintain momentum for liberalization by pressing forward simultaneously on a large number of fronts. Our logic is that gains from increasing trade and investment are not calculated according to any zero-sum formula—instead, greater competition leads to efficiencies and growth that benefit the system as a whole. This is a logic that will profit the dynamic economies of Asia, especially if they join with us to reduce barriers that threaten political support for a liberalized global trading system.

The natural partner of market-oriented economics is political pluralism. The public accountability that is the hallmark of democratic political systems is also the best check against tyranny and aggression. As the history of the past two centuries demonstrates, democratic nations rarely engage in armed conflict against each other. Not long ago some argued that democratic politics were unsuited to Asian cultures and traditions. Yet the political developments of the past decade in the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan demonstrate that economic growth naturally tends to promote democratization.

Perhaps most remarkably, the powerful appeal of the democratic ideal is evident in Mongolia's rejection of its Leninist past and its turn to political pluralism and economic reform. Once the oldest communist government in Asia, Mongolia is the first Asian communist state to purposefully undertake the challenge of a democratic transition.

In sharp contrast, the democratic ideal has been brutally thwarted in Burma. The socialist military regime, by suppressing the results of its own 1990 election, has betrayed the people in their quest for representative government. This denial of the expressed will of the Burmese people will leave Burma mired in isolation and stagnation until the military leadership reverses its repressive policies and transfers authority to the elected civilian leaders of the country. The awarding

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of this year's Nobel Peace Prize to Aung San Suu Kyi will give the Burmese people hope that the world is not ignoring their plight.

China, Vietnam and Laos have embarked on a course of market-oriented economic reform while retaining a Leninist monopoly of political power. But economic reform can be sustained only when it is accompanied by political reform. The tragic violence at Tiananmen Square in 1989 was a reflection of the social and political pressures generated by a decade of rapid economic expansion unaccompanied by concurrent political transformation.

Democratic reform in China and Vietnam, as well as in North Korea, would have a major impact on the character of international relations in Asia. As generational change unfolds in all three of what might be called "Confucian-Leninist" societies, the interplay between economic expansion and the striving for political reform can only become more pronounced.

V

Our ability to help realize the economic and security architecture of the Asia-Pacific community we envisage will rest in no small measure on the successful management of a number of critical relationships with our allies, friends and regional groups. Our ties with Japan, South Korea, ASEAN and Australia are the stabilizing and strengthening spokes in the fan.

U.S.-Japan Relations

The keystone of our engagement in East Asia and the Pacific is our relationship with Japan. Nothing is more basic to the prosperity and security of the region, and indeed to the effectiveness of the post-Cold War system, than a harmonious and productive U.S.-Japan relationship.

But U.S.-Japan relations have changed profoundly over the past decade. Our dealings have become more equal, and their form and substance must now be adjusted to reflect this reality if we are to address the sources of tension. I see four basic, interrelated elements as necessary to accomplish this adjustment.

First, the foundation of our relationship—the U.S.-Japan security alliance—must be strengthened. We have been pleased with our growing security cooperation with Japan. Japan is continuing to progress toward fulfilling our agreed-

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upon division of defense roles and missions. Japan's ability to secure its air and sea lanes out to 1,000 miles from its shores, the growing interoperability and joint training of our forces—along with generous host nation support, which will increase to 73 percent of the non-salary costs for our forward-deployed forces—are a major contribution to the stability of the region. One area which requires greater cooperation, however, is the goal of a more balanced two-way flow of defense-related technology, as codified by our 1983 Memorandum of Understanding.

Second, we must work to reduce the economic tensions in our increasingly interdependent relationship. The $140 billion in annual two-way trade, the investment and the burgeoning network of private sector linkages between the world's two largest and most technologically advanced economies underscore the importance of this aspect of our relations.

A solid, balanced economic foundation, with open markets on both sides, is needed if we are to sustain and advance our partnership—one now of truly global dimensions. This requires greater market-opening efforts by Japan, a more competitive U.S. economy and an intensification of the detailed economic dialogue we have begun in the Structural Impediments Initiative. Removing the impediments to external adjustment and building more balanced economic ties—thus creating fair opportunities for traders and investors—are essential to the new harmony we seek.

The SII talks could assume a particularly important role in this process of economic adjustment. Two nations, recognizing the extensive interconnection of their respective economies, have agreed to analyze and pursue microeconomic adjustments in order to harmonize an economic relationship vital to each other and to global economic growth. This makes the SII a microeconomic complement to the Group of Seven leading industrialized nations (G-7), which is designed to improve the coordination of macroeconomic policies among highly interdependent economies.

For its part, the United States is enhancing its competitiveness, as is evident in an 87 percent increase in its exports to Japan since 1987. This export expansion reflects, in part, Japan's removal of structural barriers to market access for goods, services and investment. But many aspects of the Japanese economy are still constricted by exclusionary business practices, to the detriment of new players in the market-

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place—both foreign and Japanese—and of the Japanese consumer. And at home we still have much work to do—from further reducing the cost of capital to American business to encouraging more aggressive marketing of U.S. products abroad—if we are to carry out our part of the SII equation.

Third, we must fulfill the promise of the global partnership called for by the president at the Palm Springs summit last year. As democracies and market-oriented economies that together generate nearly 40 percent of the world's GNP, the United States and Japan have the potential to marshal unrivaled resources in support of a better future—if our foreign policies are effectively coordinated. On issues from the Uruguay Round to reform in central and eastern Europe, from preserving the environment to Third World debt relief, we must engage together globally.

For the international system to work, leading powers must lead. This is the lesson we learned from our own reluctance to play an active role in world affairs in the period between the two world wars. This is why today we seek to build a global partnership with Japan—with Tokyo assuming a greater leadership role in a system from which it derives significant benefits. Our broadly convergent interests have already led us to pursue similar policies on many issues. We are committed to developing better consultative mechanisms in order to give greater synergy to our foreign policies.

Finally, we must deepen our understanding of each other's culture. Japanese youth must be introduced to more about American life and values. Fast-food, rock and rap music and Hollywood style are one image we project in the modern world, but America has much else to offer. Similarly, more Americans must gain knowledge of, and appreciation for, Japan's rich history and traditions—in particular, they should learn the Japanese language. The recently created Abe Fund offers one important opportunity to expand a host of exchanges and interactions—intellectual, scientific, cultural and people-to-people—needed to deepen our mutual appreciation and ability to work together.

U.S.-Korean Relations

Another pillar of our engagement in the Pacific is our alliance with the Republic of Korea. South Korea's economic and political achievements rival those of Japan. Economically the R.O.K. has converted itself from a poor agricultural society

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devastated by the war into the world's thirteenth largest economy. Its industry is now on the cutting edge of high-tech growth. Within a generation South Korea's per-capita income has trebled. And its success in building democratic institutions and the accomplishments of *Nordpolitik* in forging new international relationships underscore the significance of our firm support for the R.O.K. over the past four decades.

South Korea's dynamism helps us meet the challenge of transforming what has been primarily a military alliance into a more equal political, defense and economic partnership. This is the logic of the U.S. force restructuring now under way, of Seoul's increased support of our defense presence there, of our economic dialogue and enhanced political consultations.

South Korea's success is all the more remarkable as it has been achieved in the face of unrelenting military and political confrontation with North Korea. Indeed the very real danger of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula is now the number one threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific community.

North Korea's repeated failure to meet its international obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—requiring it to implement full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards inspection of its nuclear facilities—has raised serious questions about its intentions. Widespread suspicions about a nuclear weapons program cannot enhance North Korea's security. President Bush's recent initiative in withdrawing worldwide U.S. tactical nuclear weapons renders Pyongyang's preconditions for fulfilling its NPT obligations more specious than ever.

Yet, as important as the NPT regime is, we have seen in the case of Iraq that even IAEA safeguards cannot ensure that a maverick regime will not seek to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. The only firm assurance against nuclear proliferation in Korea is a credible agreement by both Seoul and Pyongyang to abstain from the production or acquisition of any weapons-grade nuclear material on the Korean peninsula.

The key to reducing tensions on the peninsula—and ultimately to the reunification of Korea—is an active North-South dialogue. The Koreans themselves must traverse the road to peace and reunification. President Roh Tae Woo's initiatives to advance the free flow of trade, people and communications between North and South are important steps in this direction. For real progress to occur, a climate of trust and confidence must be established. The recent admission of both Koreas to

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the United Nations and the ongoing prime ministerial talks are hopeful signs that the last glacier of the Cold War in Asia is at last beginning to melt. For our part, we are prepared to enhance our dealings with Pyongyang as the Democratic People's Republic meets its responsibilities as a global citizen.

There is potential for European-style confidence-building measures and, ultimately, Conventional-Forces-in-Europe-type arms reduction on the Korean peninsula. As in Europe, large and heavily armed ground forces confront each other across a clearly demarcated demilitarized zone. Korea is a place in East Asia where arms control initiatives seem particularly timely.

The process of reconciliation and, eventually, reunification on the Korean peninsula need to be based on Korean initiatives; yet the four major powers—the United States, Soviet Union, China and Japan—have important interests that intersect there. As the North-South dialogue progresses, we will explore the possibilities for a forum for the two Koreas and the four major powers in Northeast Asia that will support the dialogue, help in the easing of tensions, facilitate discussion of common security concerns and possibly guarantee outcomes negotiated between the two Koreas.

U.S.-Southeast Asian Relations

Our relations with the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are at the core of our engagement in this dynamic subregion. Over the last fifteen years, we have built an impressive structure of economic, political and security cooperation with our ASEAN colleagues. Indeed, just fifteen years ago many feared that countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia would become "dominoes" in a communist assault on Southeast Asia. Today the talented, industrious people and market-oriented economies of the ASEAN states are setting global standards for development.

ASEAN today is America's fifth largest trading partner, rivaling U.S. commerce with Germany; and America is ASEAN's largest export market. ASEAN was a leader in launching the Uruguay Round of the GATT, and we look to ASEAN for support in successfully completing the current negotiations. We have worked hard to keep ASEAN at the core of our efforts at regional economic integration, and we will continue to do so.

In the political realm a decade of cooperative efforts with ASEAN has led to the successful conclusion of a comprehensive

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agreement to end the conflict in Cambodia. In the wake of the Paris Conference we look to the building—under U.N. auspices—of a just and durable peace in Cambodia. This should make possible a new era in Southeast Asia, including the integration of Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos into the mainstream of the region.

The culmination of the Cambodian peace process—free and fair elections, the installation of a legitimate government in Phnom Penh, along with substantial resolution of our POW/MIA concerns—will finally provide a durable basis for the United States to normalize relations with Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

Two of ASEAN's members, the Philippines and Thailand, are also bilateral treaty allies. Today there is much uncertainty about the future of our military presence in the Philippines. I want to emphasize two points in this regard: our overriding concern is to sustain good relations with a democratic and economically resurgent Philippines. And second, regardless of the future of our military presence at Subic Bay, our security engagement in Southeast Asia will remain undiminished, even if realized through other arrangements.

We are exploring ways to enhance defense cooperation with our friends throughout the subregion in order to sustain an adequate security presence on a more diversified basis. The base-access agreement reached earlier this year with Singapore is a reflection of our commitment to sustaining a defense capability in Southeast Asia—as well as of the region's widespread desire for an active U.S. security presence.

U.S.-Australian Relations

Australia is the southernmost spoke in the fan I described earlier, serving as the southern anchor for our links across the Pacific. Moreover, Australia is a bridge between Southeast Asia and the South Pacific island states. Canberra's activism in both global and regional affairs—from efforts to rid the world of chemical weapons to elimination of agricultural subsidies via the Cairns group in the GATT—demonstrates its importance as an ally. In its contributions to the Cambodian peace process, and in its role of honest broker and catalyst for development in the South Pacific, Australia plays a vital part in regional affairs.

In addition, Canberra has been an important bridge to New Zealand, as we have sought to encourage policy changes in Wellington that will make possible a reactivation of the ANZUS

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alliance. President Bush's nuclear disarmament initiative has created a favorable context that we hope will elicit a positive response from New Zealand.

China

The tragic violence at Tiananmen Square in the summer of 1989 shattered the bipartisan consensus in the United States—carefully constructed over two decades by five administrations—for engagement with China. Rebuilding that consensus is in our national interest, but it is proving to be a daunting task.

Looking back over more than 150 years of American contacts with China—since the time of the first missionaries and traders—our views of China have oscillated between extremes of fascination and confrontation. Indeed the influence of the missionary experience in China—evident in the work of novelists, scholars and diplomats—has shaped our romantic perception of this land and its people. We have admired China's exotic culture and its hard-working and long-suffering people.

When the Chinese seemed to adopt our principles—either religious or secular—we enthusiastically welcomed them into the fold. But when periodic upheavals led to disappointment and frequently bloodshed, Americans felt the anger of rejection—of a conversion that failed.

Even in recent years, no foreign event seemed to capture the American public's interest and excitement more than the effort in the 1980s to reform China's Soviet-style economy and to open up the country to the modern world. And then, overnight, our hopes for a new, democratic China turned to revulsion at the sight of tanks crushing unarmed students. The subsequent advance of political reform in the Soviet Union has made China's setback all the more poignant.

We cannot forget those who were halted by a backlash of fear, but we will not help the eventual success of their cause by again turning our backs on China. The pendulum of U.S. relations with China must stop its sharp swings. China is home for almost a quarter of mankind. We cannot simply wish away their problems.

That is why President Bush has pursued a policy of engagement toward the People's Republic. We can eventually solve our problems with China only if we maintain the ability to make our case to the Chinese. Our agenda is open for all, Chinese and American, to see. We want to protect human

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rights and advance liberty. We want to counter the threat of nuclear and missile proliferation. We want free and fair trade that benefits both countries and the region.

Our ideals and values must be an essential part of our engagement with China. We will fight against political repression and religious persecution. Yet political liberty is not easily or long separated from economic freedom. As President Bush pointed out at Yale University in June, no nation has yet discovered a way to import the world's goods and services while stopping foreign ideas at the border. It is in our interest that the next generation in China be engaged by the Information Age, not isolated from global trends shaping the future.

That is why we believe it is important to maintain China's most-favored-nation trading status. MFN has been a critical catalyst in the growth of our bilateral ties and in the overall expansion of China's foreign trade during the 1980s to more than $100 billion annually. MFN has also facilitated development of a large market-oriented sector—in Guangdong province it now exceeds the state sector. This engagement has led to the integration of China's coastal provinces with Hong Kong, Taiwan and the global economy.

Of course, if China is to become fully drawn into the world economic system it must further deregulate its economy, adopt the transparency needed to enter the GATT and protect foreign intellectual property rights. Resolving these issues—and additional ones on our bilateral economic agenda, such as market access and the export of prison-labor products—can only be pursued through a policy of active engagement.

Finally, China's international role spans a growing range of global and regional issues affecting our interests: from concerns about missile and nuclear proliferation, to cooperation in the gulf crisis, to resolving regional conflicts. This underscores the need for sustained engagement with China on issues of common concern. Our recent experiences in working with Beijing on the Cambodian peace process and in reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula suggest that our engagement can produce results.

In sum we need to recognize that China is in a time of transition. An anachronistic regime has alienated us by lashing out, by seeking to repress an irrepressible spirit. A return to hostile confrontation will not help the people of China nor serve our national interests. The only sensible course is to move ahead with our agenda, secure improvements where

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possible and create the context for managing the change that will come some day.

The U.S.S.R. in Asia

Any discussions of the future of the Asia-Pacific region would be incomplete without mention of the Soviet Union and Russia, which have interests in Asia as well as in Europe. Increasingly we see the Russian Republic taking a more active role in the Asia-Pacific region. And despite the turmoil in the U.S.S.R, Moscow has been playing an increasingly positive role in the region. Soviet cooperation on Cambodia and in the Persian Gulf, as well as the normalization of relations with South Korea, illustrate the potential for new forms of cooperation on Asian issues between Washington and Moscow.

Yet Soviet forces in the Far East still remain large, and market reforms that are the prerequisite for participation in the Asian economic miracle have yet to be implemented in the Soviet Union. No nation that spends 20 percent or more of its GNP on the military can expect to compete economically in the dynamic Asian region.

We welcome the growing interest in forging new economic ties between Soviet Asia and the nations of the Pacific Rim. The opening of Vladivostok, the establishment of a free trade zone at Nakhodka and resolution of the Northern Territories issue are important steps that can pave the way for greater participation in the Asia-Pacific community. As Soviet market reforms take shape, the potential for economic exchange with the market-oriented economies of the Pacific Rim will undoubtedly grow. In this regard I am pleased to welcome Soviet membership in the semi-official Pacific Economic Cooperation Council.

VI

President Bush's trip to East Asia and the Pacific highlights our hopes for the future of this promising region. Sustaining American engagement in East Asia and the Pacific is vital to U.S. interests—not just in the region, but to the international system we are trying to forge. Our defense commitments remain at the core of the Asia-Pacific security structure, but they will evolve to reflect new circumstances and partnerships based on the enhanced capabilities of our allies and friends. Supporting democratic trends and helping to shape a frame-

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work for economic integration are key policy goals which will enhance the sense of Asian-Pacific community.

Yet we cannot fully enter the future while still burdened by legacies of the Cold War era, particularly the military confrontation on the Korean peninsula and the dispute over the Northern Territories. Moving from the Korean armistice to a stable peace and advancing Soviet-Japanese bilateral ties to make possible a peace treaty would be major steps in transcending those legacies. Only when true peace comes to Cambodia, when all the states of Indochina have normal relations with the rest of the world, when Korea is unified on terms acceptable to all Koreans and when the Northern Territories are returned to Japan can we finally turn a new page in the history of the Asia-Pacific region.

For the next millennium to be one of the Pacific, a strong sense of community must emerge based on shared prosperity and common values. The agenda and architecture I have discussed here hold the promise of building that sense of community. By accommodating Asia's diversity in security, uniting around shared principles and interests, and forging the economic ties that bind the region, our vision can be realized and a new trans-Pacific partnership achieved.

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Robert A. Scalapino

THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA: FUTURE PROSPECTS

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ushered in a new era of U.S. involvement in Asia. In the past lay hearty merchant-voyagers, missionaries and assorted diplomats. Only in the Philippines, however, had Americans become deeply involved in an Asian society, and even there colonial governance was in the hands of a relative few. For the average American, Asia signified exotica—a distant region wholly foreign and to many, slightly ominous.

In the years since 1941, however, massive American military involvement was to be followed by diverse efforts at political tutelage, extensive cultural exchange and a level of economic and financial intercourse that was eventually to make the Pacific-Asian region more critical to the American economy than Europe.

Millions of Americans acquired a personal knowledge of certain parts of Asia. In addition a growing Asian population in the United States has begun to influence American society in a variety of ways as the century draws to a close. Thus, just as victory in war extended the United States further into the Pacific, so that victory bound America to Asia in ways that could not possibly have been foreseen on that fateful day of December 7, 1941.

II

To understand where the United States stands today and what future prospects exist for U.S. relations with Asia, one must first comprehend the enormous changes that are taking place throughout this vast region.

First, note the geopolitical transformation. At the close of World War II the Eurasian heartland was strong, its peripheries weak. Although deeply wounded by that war, the Soviet Union had the strength and will to build a buffer-state system to the West and, in alliance with the newly victorious commu-

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nists in China, to project communist power to the edges of the Asian mainland. Western Europe and the peripheral regions of Asia, including Japan, on the other hand, were weak, either crippled by the war or emerging from lengthy colonialism. Only substantial American military and economic assistance provided the key peripheral societies with an opportunity for renewal.

Today the situation is precisely reversed. The Eurasian heartland is in the throes of crisis, with the Soviet Union in the process of dismemberment and China—especially interior China—facing a host of complex problems that affect its cohesion and power. For the present at least, China has only a limited capacity for external involvements. The other Leninist states remaining on the Asian continent are in similar or worse condition. But the Eurasian peripheries are generally strong, with western Europe demonstrating a new dynamism and the market economies of East Asia led by Japan providing models for the developing world. The implications of this great transformation of power and authority in Eurasia for American attitudes and policy have yet to be fully grasped.

Second, to an unprecedented extent, economics has taken command of international relations. This was not always true. At the close of the Second World War, politics was generally paramount, especially in Asia, with revolutionary leaders seeking to build or rebuild nations by mobilizing their people through ideological appeals. They gave lip service to development, but their priorities were political. Today, however, even Leninist states are forced to concentrate on economic reform in an effort to compete with others.

Leaders everywhere are coming to the realization that the economic health of their society is critical not only to internal stability but to external influence. Moreover the rapid growth of economic interdependence has linked domestic and foreign policy together more closely than at any time in history. A nation's domestic policies, in both the economic and political realms, directly impact other countries, and hence are a matter of legitimate concern to a much greater extent than in the past. This is the basic rationale for the U.S.-Japanese Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), in which each side proposes internal changes to make economic relations more harmonious.

Issues of interdependence are becoming increasingly complex. Throughout Asia, for example, natural economic terri-

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tories (NETS) are being formed, often cutting across political lines. Sometimes they are the result of governmental promotion; sometimes they evolve largely because of private sector initiatives; often a combination is involved. In any case, they are becoming significant in both political and economic terms. One NET encompasses the Guangdong province of southern China, Hong Kong and Taiwan; another that is emerging includes China's Shantung province and South Korea. It is likely that within a few years a Sakhalin-Kuriles-northern Japan NET will emerge, and in the Sea of Japan closer ties are forming between the Siberian ports of Vladivostok and Nakhodka and regions such as Niigata in west Japan. In Southeast Asia discussions are under way toward establishing a NET to include Singapore, Johore (Malaysia) and Batam island (Indonesia). The relationship between NETS and the political entities called nation-states, along with the massive financial transactions that flow across borders daily and the more formal large-scale economic regions now being formed, forces one to evaluate the growing limitations upon national sovereignty and its implications for an international order as this decade advances.

Naturally the ascendancy of economics has colored domestic politics in Asian countries as elsewhere. If one defines ideology as a universally applicable theory—a set of cosmic ideas and values that provide a comprehensive guide to thought and action—it has declined in the face of the pragmatic impulses stemming from economic primacy. This has posed an acute problem for all political systems. Asia's remaining socialist leaders are downplaying—or completely jettisoning—Marxism-Leninism in favor of resorting to nationalist appeals in an effort to bolster faith in a system in trouble. Considering the original Marxist appeal to the brotherhood of the global proletariat, it is a supreme irony that the remaining Leninists now concentrate on nationalist appeals while economics is driving the democratic societies—sometimes reluctantly—to internationalism.

But in politically open Asian societies, as in the Western democracies, enduring political values are also in jeopardy. Can liberalism encompass responsibilities as well as rights? Can it preserve both the community and individual interests in an age when materialism and hedonism seem to reign supreme? In any case, whatever its political form, a government today must depend upon performance, not faith, to sustain its

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legitimacy. Despite efforts at intensive indoctrination in certain socialist societies, increasingly the average citizen is asking the government, "What have you done for me?" often adding the word "lately."

Political leaders, and not just old Marxists, have turned to the nationalist appeal as a substitute of sorts for a more comprehensive ideological faith. Imbedded in Asian nationalism are certain traditional feelings that can be revitalized, including antiforeign sentiments. When the contemporary conservative Chinese leaders warn citizens against foreign forces that would subvert Chinese socialism by infiltrating the society using the technique of "peaceful evolution," they hope to strike a responsive chord among a people that have periodically struck out against those external forces that earlier penetrated China in one form or another. When North Korean leaders speak of socialism under *juche* (self-reliance), with "iron-clad unity around one leader, one party, one nation," they are making a traditional appeal to people that have lived in a country once known as "the hermit kingdom."

Nationalism, however, is also a natural reaction in democratic societies when external economic forces seem to represent the new threat. In an incredibly short space of time, societies coming from different traditions, at different stages of development and pursuing different economic strategies have been thrust together economically. Friction is inevitable, and with only rudimentary instruments of economic conflict-resolution, a political response based on themes such as a "foreign threat" or "foreign pressure" may find a receptive audience. Recent public opinion polls in South Korea, for example, show that the principal reason for the growth of anti-Americanism there comes not from the political left, but from those in agriculture and business who believe that the United States applies undue pressure to obtain a swifter movement away from Seoul's neo-mercantilist policies.

Despite its resurgence, however, nationalism faces strongly competitive forces. On the one hand, there are growing pressures from below due to the rise of problems connected with the advanced stages of industrialization and the renewed vitality of ethnic and religious cleavages; on the other hand, pressures from above are steadily mounting in the form of internationalist imperatives due to economic interdependence and security needs. The complex interaction among localism,

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nationalism and internationalism will be one of the great dramas of the coming decades.

Among the separatist forces, ethnicity and religion are formidable agents, especially in southern Asia. Populations in northeast Asia, Japan, the two Koreas, Mongolia and Taiwan are remarkably homogeneous. Even China has a minority population of only some eight percent, although the minorities occupy more than half of this massive nation's land area, primarily in the sparsely populated border regions. Beijing is understandably nervous about the rising nationalist sentiments in the central Asian republics that were a part of the old Soviet Union and the substitution of Genghis Khan for Lenin as a national hero in Mongolia. Despite their best (and worst) efforts, the Chinese will never be able to homogenize the Tibetans, Mongols, Kazhaks and Uighurs that inhabit their land, and thus ethnicity will remain a permanent factor in Chinese politics, but given the disparity of numbers, not one that is regime-threatening.

Southeast Asia has long lived with ethnic diversity, and it remains a vital force in the politics of the region, providing linkage between domestic and foreign policies. The major division is that between Malay and Chinese, although Indian and aboriginal elements exist along with numerous ethnic subdivisions. While the Chinese represent a small proportion of the population (except in Singapore and Malaysia), they play a major role in finance, commerce and industry. Hence recurrent tensions have an economic as well as a social base. In South Asia, meanwhile, religion is an enduring source of conflict, primarily with regard to Hindu-Islamic divisions, but also within Hinduism itself.

Meanwhile political institutions throughout Asia are generally weak, and the premium upon leadership remains high. The old political structure in many societies has been destroyed or badly damaged, but broadly acceptable new institutions are not yet in place. Three basic political systems now coexist: Leninism, authoritarian-pluralism and parliamentary democracy. The authoritarian-pluralist system is one characterized by restrictive politics, with choice and freedom constrained, but with a civil society existing apart from the state in some degree, manifested in the capacity of religious, educational and familial institutions to operate with a degree of autonomy. The economy, moreover, is one where the market plays a crucial role although with extensive state involvement.

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At this point the political spectrum in Asia appears to be widening. The surviving socialist states are fighting desperately to batten down the political hatches even as they experiment with more open economic policies. Political tightening is being pursued in the name of stability, a term that is endlessly invoked in China, North Korea and Vietnam. Events in eastern Europe and the old Soviet Union are being held up to the citizenry as negative lessons. The breakdown of order, it is asserted, will seriously retard economic development and hence the opportunity for a better life. Thus while they search desperately for the proper combination of economic policies to reform socialism, the key leaders of these societies attempt to keep Leninist politics more or less intact.

In the Asian Leninist states, remnants of the first generation revolutionaries still cling to power, in contrast to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union prior to the recent revolutions, where the revolutionary flame had been supplanted by routine bureaucracy and greyness. In this atmosphere leaders came to realize that they presided over essentially backward societies, and the necessity of reform began to gain recognition within the elite. Their response was to attempt reform not revolution, their appeal to "make socialism work better." At a certain point, however, the elite lost control of the process. To be sure, it was vitally important that their populations had always lived within the orbit of Western culture and were increasingly influenced by the dynamic developments in western Europe. These factors suggest the need for caution in projecting political developments in Europe automatically to Asia.

If the immediate situation is characterized by a stretching of the political spectrum, there are good reasons to believe that in the not distant future, that spectrum will narrow. On the one side, the few remaining traditional monarchies will either be reformed or disappear. On the other side, Leninism in its traditional form is doomed, with the only issue being that of timing of demise and means of exit. An open economy and a closed polity cannot long coexist. As the socialist states turn outward, seeking capital, technology and markets from the dynamic economies around them, as NETs involving a portion of their state evolve, and as political power is assumed by younger generations—who are more technocratically inclined, better educated and have a greater knowledge of the world—the old political order cannot possibly be sustained.

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Development bears with it three forces that have powerful political implications: diversity, inclusiveness and porousness. The developmental process, especially in its early stages, generally accentuates class and regional differences, thereby rendering highly centralized controls increasingly inefficient and politically unacceptable. As education spreads and livelihood improves, moreover, demands emerge for more genuine inclusiveness in the political process, especially from a growing middle class.

Finally, economic policies and the communications-information revolution combine to remove the instrument of isolation from the hands of the state, once an excellent technique for preserving mass faith. The society becomes more porous, thus susceptible to a variety of external influences; witness the emergence of a cosmopolitan culture among a growing number of youth in Shanghai, Beijing and Ho Chi Minh City. Note also the increased access to outside information from radio, television, tourists and visiting relatives. Even in remote North Korea, information about the external world, however partial and distorted, is filtering in to the populace. This can only increase with the new economic measures now under way. With information comes the ability to make comparisons, which leads to demands that cannot be met by exhortations to keep the faith.

Thus, on balance, development in Asia as elsewhere serves the cause of political pluralism. In assessing this fact, however, one must avoid two errors. No political process is completely linear; there will be zigs and zags, retrenchments and retreats as well as advances. Further, neither the world at large nor Asia in particular are destined to have a total convergence of political systems. Differences of tradition, scale, geographic position and stage of development preclude identity, now or in the foreseeable future. It is possible—indeed probable—that most if not all of the remaining Leninist states of Asia will evolve toward some form of authoritarian-pluralism rather than liberal democracy in the near term. In fact that was the trend in China in the mid-1980s, after economic reform had been under way for a few years.

Nonetheless if the political extremes are eliminated, a narrower spectrum will permit much more meaningful dialogue across ideological-political boundaries and, together with the ever more complex economic network connecting societies, reduce the risks of military conflict.

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Security issues and the security structure are also rapidly changing in the Pacific-Asian region. Here as in Europe the Cold War no longer serves to delineate the lines and define the critical issues. For the indefinite future Russia will be weak—not necessarily in terms of its military arsenal (although that will continue to be reduced) but in terms of its capacity (or will) to use its military resources outside the boundaries of the old Soviet Union, and perhaps even within those boundaries. Moreover, under current conditions, the United States and Russia have a growing community of interests, both with respect to the global scene and with regard to the regional order in Asia. China is fully preoccupied with its domestic problems. Japan, an economic superpower, is only beginning to apply that power for political purposes and is content at present with a purely defensive military strategy.

In sum the risk of a major power conflict in Asia is at its lowest point in this century. Violence will be domestic or subregional, allowing others to determine whether or not they choose to intervene directly or indirectly. The implications of these developments for the United States are far-reaching.

Given present trends it is not surprising that a process of Asianization is expanding ever more rapidly—a growing network of ties among and between Asian states at every level. At the same time alliances of the earlier type are disappearing or undergoing significant alterations. The exclusiveness of past ties and the dominant pattern of patron-client relations is giving way to a trend toward partnerships, with greater flexibility and independence on the part of both parties in the relationship. And in current bilateral relations, whether they be those of alignment or otherwise, a combination of cooperation and competition prevails, with some element of tension. Hence continuous negotiations are necessary at the bilateral level; in addition, it is important to place such relations in a broader multilateral context.

For the foreseeable future it will be necessary for the major Pacific-Asian states to operate simultaneously at the bilateral, regional and global levels, in both the economic and political-security fields. The inevitable contradictions involved in this situation will have to be managed with as much skill as possible—a challenge especially for the United States, given its important global position at present and its past proclivity for unilateralism.

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III

It is against this background that the future alternatives for U.S. policy in Asia should be explored. First, however, there is merit in examining America's post-1945 Asian policies to see if there are lessons to be learned from the past.

One lesson stands out graphically: do not mislead your opponent. The two wars that the United States fought in Asia in the past forty years—Korea and Vietnam—were both products of communist miscalculation in some measure, and for this America bears considerable responsibility. The signals sent to the Korean communists and their Soviet and Chinese mentors were that South Korea was outside the perimeter of American security commitments. The communists had little reason to believe that the United States would intervene on South Korea's behalf. Thus, tragedy ensued.

In Vietnam also, Hanoi could scarcely have imagined that a massive American commitment would ultimately be made, given the initial responses of the Eisenhower administration to signs that the North did not intend to abide by the terms of the 1954 Geneva agreement. To be sure, one can and in some instances should keep strategic options open, but to allow the aggressor to believe that it can move with impunity can have deadly consequences. It is not altogether clear that the United States had learned that lesson by the time of the gulf crisis. The Iraq conflict proved once again that if war comes, Americans support most strongly those wars in which U.S. troops are used with full force, win an overwhelming military victory, and leave as quickly as possible.

A second, more complex lesson is that, henceforth, the United States must subordinate unilateralism to bilateral and multilateral approaches, whether the issue is strategic or political. Nothing is more difficult for Americans. The Gulf War illustrated these new complexities. When the gulf crisis began, it was imperative for the United States to work through the United Nations, and most specifically with the permanent members of the Security Council. Indeed it was this necessity that precluded a march to Baghdad. Moreover, while the United States is largely disengaged militarily as a major occupying force, it is still politically involved in the region, having inherited the twin burdens of dealing with Saddam Hussein and of seeking to construct a broader Arab-Israeli peace.

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Whatever the outcome, the effort to combine American leadership and international consensus is a result of realizing that a new era is at hand. No country including the United States has the capacity or desire to create a new global order single-handedly. The costs of going it alone—political as well as economic—are now too formidable despite the difficulties of reaching multilateral agreements. Often in the past the United States has sallied forth on behalf of the American way. It has become increasingly clear, however, that such values as human rights can be most successfully defended abroad when it is not just an American cause, but an international one.

In this connection, moreover, another lesson should be considered seriously. It is proper to champion democracy and seek to support it abroad, since with all of its defects democracy allows people the greatest opportunities, material and cultural. Yet it should also be recognized that within most if not all nondemocratic societies diverse political forces exist, some seeking to forestall change, others seeking to accelerate it. The concept that one promotes democracy—or greater political openness—by limiting contacts with such societies to a minimum is naïve. The proper question to ask is how can a process of change be most effectively accelerated in a given authoritarian state? The answer may vary but rarely if ever will it be to impose isolation to the maximum possible extent.

Perhaps the most powerful political lesson is the close correlation between the American citizens' level of economic and political satisfaction at home, and their willingness to support an active international role. When there are strong domestic concerns, it is nearly impossible to muster public enthusiasm for a foreign aid program, apart from short-range humanitarian measures. If crime and drugs are rampant in one's own neighborhood, concern about security centers on the home front. There has been a growing gap in opinion polls between American decision-makers and average citizens on the willingness to make security and economic commitments to others. Even the former group is now shaken by diverse manifestations of social disorder, the decline in primary and secondary educational standards, the rising fiscal deficit, the low savings rate, the poor investment record in civilian research and development and the resulting loss of competitiveness. The lesson is clear: either these problems will be tackled with a seriousness not yet in sight, or the commitment to

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internationalism will rapidly decline at all levels of American society.

To put this matter differently, when one asks from whence comes the threat, the proper answer is that in major part the threat is within our own society. It is here that the battle for internal cohesion, international competitiveness and, hence, genuine strength and influence will be won or lost.

Yet there is another threat: the inability of leaders and citizens to devise and activate a range of institutions above the nation-state level that can effectively handle the multitude of economic, political and strategic issues that confront the world today.

How the United States and other key countries balance the conflicting demands of their localities, their nation, their region and their world will determine how well they cope with the greatest revolutionary age in the history of mankind. Living with complexity is difficult and there are no simple answers. It is precisely because of this fact that leadership remains supremely important even in advanced industrial states where political institutions are relatively strong. The central task of leaders today, irrespective of the particular qualities that diverse societies demand, is to simplify intricate problems for their citizens without undue distortion, fathoming correctly and in time the implications of the oncoming tides of global change for their nation. Despite the difficulties in keeping up with events, leaders cannot afford to be merely reactive; the premium is to understand the basic meaning of the massive transformations that the world faces, and pursue innovative policies to move into the future at the optimal time. Herein lies the supreme test of the leader—but beyond this, the test of the citizenry at large.

IV

What lies ahead for the United States in Asia? In an age like this it would be foolish to posit a certain outcome for many of the issues that confront America. It is only possible to sketch a broad road map, allowing for detours and impasses, starting with the supremely important issue of economic relations. The United States cannot restrict itself to a single level of economic interaction with other nations. At the bilateral level the United States will be involved in continuous negotiations with its key trading partners, notably Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China

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using a variety of mechanisms to advance dialogue from the SII to the trade action discussions. Efforts will be focused on resolving disputes before they reach the highly emotional political level. As in the case of U.S.-Japanese economic relations, however, the issues will go beyond tariff and sector-specific issues to a discussion of general administrative and structural barriers to an open trading and investment system. Inevitably this will reach into highly sensitive areas, evoking the charge of interference in a country's internal affairs. But that is the price to be paid for interdependence.

Another aspect to the new economic order is emerging. The United States will find restraints on imports increasingly controversial because of the damage caused to other parts of its own economic system and the risks of retaliation. Increasingly industry-specific protectionism will be challenged by American companies hurt by such action even as it is supported by those companies assisted. Increasingly restraints will have to be justified less on traditional grounds of security or unfairness and more on the grounds that it is a temporary measure to enable an industry to become competitive. But the premium will be upon the efforts for, and the logic of, competitiveness.

Unquestionably the level of frustration in important sectors of American society will remain high, and many U.S. grievances are justified. The major differences relating to the timing of development and economic strategies between the United States and its key Asian trading partners will not suddenly disappear. Thus the temptation to move to more comprehensive protectionist measures will continue to be strong, especially if economic regionalism in Europe and Asia proves to be exclusivist. Indeed, in political terms, the present system of restraints and retaliatory measures serves as a shield against more extensive protectionism.

The capacity of the United States to play a key role in preserving and developing more open global markets hinges upon action on the home front. Macroeconomic policies require extensive revision. The massive investment in military research and development can and must be redirected to commercial purposes. The private sector must engage in rapid technological innovations and restructuring. In the past Japan borrowed much from America, including earlier methods of quality control; it is now appropriate that America borrow some (not all) techniques from Japan and others.

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Meanwhile it will be critical to encase bilateral economic relations in a regional and global context. In the first instance, this requires that Washington try to develop the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum into something more than a debating and discussion society. APEC is the one organization that should eventually encompass all Pacific-Asian societies and take the lead in inaugurating policies, combining assistance for latecomers with a more open system of economic intercourse across national boundaries.

Subregional groups will undoubtedly emerge, formally or otherwise. The nonwhite East Asian Economic Group proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir harkens back to the old Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and it is out of step with the times. Any group that seeks to represent East Asia alone, omitting Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico and above all, the United States, not only adds fuel to protectionist fires in the United States, but fails to take into account the degree to which the American economy, and particularly that of western America, is becoming integrated into Asia. It may be meaningful to have quasi-formal North Pacific, South Pacific and ASEAN groups (joined eventually by Indochina) as stepping-stones to APEC, but not in competition with it.

In any case for the United States the critical challenge will be to operate regionally on two fronts, North America and Pacific-Asia, to facilitate maximum openness and cooperation. For the time being these fronts are moving at a different pace, but that could change. Already extensive Asian investment is taking place in Canada and Mexico as well as in the United States. Proposals to extend the North American Free Trade Area to the more advanced portions of Asia are now being heard, even before the NAFTA has come into being. Whatever the barriers, the process of economic integration is irreversible, and future policies must be planned and executed with this fact in mind.

Finally, it is of great importance to make the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade work. Otherwise regional trade blocs are likely to be inevitable, and that could produce the type of economic damage America has not known since the 1930s.

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V

On the political front one worrisome fact emerges. For the first time in the twentieth century, U.S. relations with Japan and China are troubled simultaneously, albeit for largely different reasons. Previously America had good relations with one while it confronted the other. To be sure the U.S.-Japan relationship is fundamentally sound and supremely important. In both societies, however, public opinion has been moving in a negative direction. Especially in the United States, negative sentiment toward Japan has risen rapidly, principally due to a perception that Japan pursues self-interested, selfish policies without regard to the interests of others. And in Japan resentment has been growing against what is perceived to be slander and unfair policies on the part of the United States to compensate for shortcomings in American industry and society.

In the years ahead a new foundation for U.S.-Japan relations must be laid. The time when the Soviet threat served to underwrite the relationship, whatever the immediate storms, is ending. Such a foundation will require resolute domestic actions on the part of both countries. If interdependence is to be made viable, greater economic compatibility must be achieved; objections by either party that this would require impermissible cultural changes or economic measures unpopular with the electorate cannot be accepted. Cultures do change, and never more rapidly than in this era. It is the responsibility of leaders to make their electorate understand why certain measures are imperative.

Beyond this, however, the U.S.-Japan relationship must be broadened to encompass new or expanded fields: cooperation in the monumental environmental tasks that lie ahead; joint research in such fields as biotechnology and space; cooperation in advancing programs relating to peacekeeping in concert with the larger international community; interaction in dealing with regions of tension, particularly in East Asia; and much more broadly gauged cultural relations that bring the younger generations into sustained contact with each other.

Japan is no longer a follower in many lines of basic research; it is a pioneer. The challenge is to seize upon this fact and to build a new relationship based upon it. This can best be accomplished in the fields that are on the horizon, the areas

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that will determine how well we live in the 21st century. The two countries that together make up nearly 40 percent of the global gross national product can lead together in these endeavors, and in leading, reduce the friction that has dogged our bilateral relations in the recent decades.

What of China? Economic issues between Washington and Beijing are rising and Chinese sales of strategic weapons to sensitive areas are of great concern, but political issues remain central. It is appropriate to continue to criticize the violations of human rights occurring in this society, and to point out that China is involved in a tremendous waste of much needed manpower by treating its intellectuals in a shoddy fashion, both in material and political terms. In the United States alone some 50,000 Chinese students and intellectuals reside, unwilling to go home—not merely because of political uncertainties, but because only rarely do they get the type of respect and remuneration that they feel they deserve, verbal assurances of their importance to the contrary.

At the same time Americans should also recognize that China is in a transitional phase, with leadership changes—and quite possibly policy changes—lying ahead. The two principal objectives of the moment, economic diversification and political tightening, are basically incompatible, and the tension between them can only grow with time. Meanwhile, decentralization is an irreversible process, made more complex by the growth of the NETS previously described.

Thus the United States must not treat China as a monolithic society, frozen in its current posture indefinitely. It is entirely appropriate for Washington to act in a pluralistic fashion, with private activities and official policies pursuing different emphases, and with maximum contact maintained at different levels.

No doubt some Chinese leaders will continue to accuse the United States of being the leader in the effort to subvert Chinese socialism by "peaceful evolution." But in fact the external sources of stimulation for China's people are numerous, many of them coming from the market economies and open societies of East Asia. One important influence is Taiwan, which combines a dynamic economy that now reaches deeply into coastal China as well as Southeast Asia with an unfolding democracy—fragile and facing problems but still indicating to the Chinese people that there are Chinese alternatives to Leninism.

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China is a society that will undergo many travails in its long march toward development. Weaknesses and strengths in all areas, including the military realm, are likely to be interwoven. The greatest probabilities for the decade ahead are for some form of authoritarian-pluralism on the home front and a continued effort to create a loose buffer system by building upon the recent improvements in its relations with Russia and the East Asian states. Although it can no longer play the pivotal role in a U.S.-China-Soviet triangle, China intends to be a regional power. American policy must take its cues from those facts.

At some point it is likely that the United States will establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam and North Korea (Cambodia represents a special case where recognition of a consolidated government will come soon if present trends hold). Both of these governments cling to hard-line political policies at present while they wrestle with adverse international trends and serious economic problems at home. Prediction in each case is hazardous.

Vietnam is the more porous, with economic changes already under way. The legitimacy of the present government is low, the differences between north and south are pronounced, and a generational change in political leadership is at hand. Hanoi is almost desperate for Washington to lift its embargo, hopefully followed by recognition. Hence Vietnam is en route to meeting most American conditions. Meanwhile diverse pressures have mounted within the United States for a change of policy. Those who expect great economic returns are likely to be disappointed; except for a very few fields such as off-shore oil and tourism, Vietnam is not an investor's bonanza.

The North Korean situation is even more cloudy. The political system is essentially Stalinist, with extensive nationalist trimmings. There are scant indications of any serious challenges to the regime, at least from the grass-roots level. A transition in governance is under way from Kim Il Sung to his son, but the father's charisma cannot be transferred. After his father is gone, Kim Jong Il must depend upon performance to earn his own legitimacy. Without major economic changes, substantial improvements are impossible—hence the current quest for normalized relations with Japan, the expansion of barter trade with the South and other signs that Pyongyang may seek to take a leaf from Beijing's book.

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Projections for North Korea's future range from a political collapse, which could have serious repercussions for the South's stability, to a military regime controlled by technocrats operating within an authoritarian-pluralist structure. The variables are too numerous to make a firm prediction. It can only be asserted with some confidence that the status quo cannot hold much longer.

In this situation it behooves the United States to raise the level of official dialogue with North Korea, allow the expansion of private scholarly and cultural contacts, and work toward military as well as political measures that will reduce tension. These activities should and will be undertaken while America's basic commitments to the Republic of Korea are maintained and extensive consultation is carried out. America's stake in peace and development on the Korean peninsula remains high and demands a flexibility and innovation in American policies that has not yet appeared.

As this century draws to a close, the profound changes in the nature of alliances and the character of interstate relations will continue. The old, exclusive patron-client relations of the past are fading away. Those alliances that continue will be at once more conditional and permit greater independence of action for both parties. In most cases, moreover, they will be encased in various multilateral agreements and arrangements.

Much speculation surrounds key bilateral relations. The likelihood, however, is that no relationship between two major Pacific-Asian nations will be threatening to others in the foreseeable future. Sino-Russian relations will be normal, but scarcely intimate, with severe limits due to geography, economics and politics. Both sides need a reduction of tension; hence, both will seek "normalcy" and expand economic and cultural contacts. Fundamentally, however, Russia will look west, and China will look east.

Relations between Russia and Japan will gradually shift from confrontation to accommodation as the Russian military threat recedes, but the economic foundation of this relationship will remain limited for the foreseeable future due to conditions in Russia, despite Japanese cooperation with other industrial nations in helping the Russians chart a new economic course. Moreover cultural as well as political ties can only be slowly advanced. Mutual suspicions will die hard, as in the case of Korean-Japanese relations.

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Sino-Japanese relations will have a strong economic footing, but the thesis advanced by some observers that the intimate relationship sought by various Japanese and Chinese throughout the twentieth century is now in the offing is fanciful. The political and economic systems of these two nations are at great variance, and will remain so despite a process of continuous change in China. Moreover their cultures are radically different, notwithstanding their shared Confucian heritage. Both are destined to eye each other warily, given their mutual interest in playing a significant regional role. Here, as elsewhere, a strong quotient of competition will coexist with cooperation.

Given the likely power relationships in East Asia, U.S. policy can proceed with minimal concern about new hostile coalitions; Washington can fit its policies to the specific needs of each situation, building above the bilateral level whenever possible.

Meanwhile the situation in the Asian subcontinent is undergoing profound changes. On the one hand the Russian factor in Indian foreign policy has been substantially reduced by ongoing events. The Soviet-Indian alignment has ceased to have meaning. At the same time new political forces are emerging that, while weak and uncertain, appear dedicated to abandoning India's neo-mercantilist, quasi-socialist policies and casting their lot with market economics. On the other hand the U.S. need to protect Pakistan against Russian power has essentially disappeared, and with the Afghanistan civil war in a holding pattern, the threat of large-scale violence in this region has significantly diminished.

Under these circumstances the time has come for a fundamental reappraisal of American policies toward India. Such a reassessment will happen, assuming present trends are not disrupted. For the first time in history there is a genuine prospect of a constructive American-Indian relationship, but one that does not ignore American interests in other South Asian states and the vital issue of nuclear proliferation.

The process of Asianization will accelerate, but a continued U.S. presence in the region will be desired by virtually all Asian governments. To be sure, the current leaders of the People's Republic of China are telling both Russia and Japan that there must be closer cooperation to block a hegemonic America—ironically at the same time as certain prominent Americans are suggesting to Beijing that the United States and China must

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work together to prevent Japan from emerging as a dominant power. Most states seek some kind of card to play in efforts to bolster their position vis-à-vis others. But it is indicative of the times that even the North Koreans whisper into American ears that since the Russians are talking to the South about military relations, it might be wise for the United States to improve its relations with the North.

In truth it is widely recognized that for the near term the United States is necessary to play the role of buffer, balancer and stabilizer in a Pacific-Asia rife with unresolved bilateral and multilateral problems. The real issue is whether the American people can be persuaded that such is their mission in the post-Cold War era. Fundamentally this is related to the degree of cooperation and burden-sharing in every field that can be expected from America's Pacific-Asian neighbors, the instruments and institutions that can be utilized to bring about greater equity and responsibility on the part of medium and small as well as large states and, above all, a more successful resolution of America's domestic problems.

VI

In no area have bolder global measures been announced by the U.S. government than in the security realm. With the Russian response indicating a willingness to advance still further, the United States appears to be on the threshold of startling breakthroughs in the critical field of strategic weaponry—breakthroughs that could change the entire history of the 2lst century.

As yet, however, new ideas relating to American security policies in Asia have not been forthcoming from Washington. On the contrary, the present line is that the United States should pursue the same course, except at the reduced level necessitated by budgetary cuts. America has managed to look as if it were being driven out of Subic Bay against its will, and deplored the Philippine Senate vote as a tragedy for the Filipinos. Perhaps such a view has some merit, but it is an example of old thinking in a new era. It should have been realized long ago that by remaining as a large military presence in a nation where the United States had once been the colonial power, Americans were certain to make themselves the focus of domestic politics, thereby perpetuating old attitudes and policies deleterious to both American and Filipino interests.

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At the end of this century the United States will have departed from most if not all fixed bases on foreign soil. The emphasis will be upon staging areas and bases kept in readiness by those states aligned with the United States strategically, with a small number of American technicians in residence in some places. The premium will be upon lift capacity and rapid deployment, keeping in mind the contingencies most likely to occur. Moreover, with its primary military forces mobile, the reliance will be upon air and sea power; there is virtually no chance that large American ground forces will be sent into combat in Asia again.

This new strategy will be put in place for both political and economic reasons. The political costs of foreign bases are not limited to the Philippines. Those costs will rise in South Korea and even in Japan as the perception of the end of the Cold War sinks in fully. Moreover the American people will rightly expect Asian states to bear the primary responsibility for their own defense, even in those cases where such defense is critical to an overall regional balance of power and, thus, to American national interests. The premises of the Guam Declaration of 1969 will come into play ever more prominently.

Does this mean that the United States will cease to be a meaningful part of an Asian-Pacific security structure? Not if Washington makes timely adjustments suitable to the situation at home and abroad. The argument currently being advanced to Asians and Americans, however, that the United States must maintain its present strategic policies in East Asia because of the Middle East security requirements has only the barest chance of being accepted by either constituency. Future security policies must take into account a new world: the extraordinary changes in the global and regional environment, the greatly altered nature of real and perceived threats, the revolution in military technology and the need for revised American priorities. Security policies must take on a stronger multilateral component, with issues like nuclear proliferation and strategic weapons sales placed on the international agenda. At the same time America must make progress through unilateral and bilateral actions in adjusting its vast arsenals to these new realities, exercising that degree of caution dictated by the uncertainties surrounding the old Soviet Union.

Experience dictates that the United States must conceive of security structures suited to specific situations, whereby con-

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centric arcs are constructed, arcs rather than circles so that contacts can flow among levels when necessary. In the case of the Korean peninsula, for example, the first arc is naturally composed of North and South Korea, the parties immediately concerned; beyond them, the four major states long involved with the Korean problem; as an outer arc, international bodies, both economic and political, that may provide services.

A similar structure was used in making progress in Cambodia: the first arc being the four Khmer factions; the second composed of China and Vietnam, states whose concurrence with any formula was critical; beyond them, the ASEAN members and the United Nations and in this case, more specifically, the five permanent members.

VII

The future of Asia and of American relations with Asia are promising. The risks of a major power conflict are small. Most subregional tensions have eased and, with very few exceptions, the costs of armed struggle, even between smaller states, are such as to make that option highly undesirable to the leaders concerned. Meanwhile the new priorities are on economic development. Hence pragmatism is ascendant, ideology at a lower premium.

Nationalism, to be sure, is a force with which to reckon. It takes many forms, including that of xenophobia, as fearful elites seek to bind their people to existing political dogma. It is also a prominent factor in nations afraid of external economic inroads, including the United States. But the broad course is toward greater economic contacts of all types across ideological-political boundaries, and a growth in political inclusiveness and openness, various problems notwithstanding. Meanwhile the leaps taking place in science and technology make possible a pace of development impossible to envisage only a few decades ago—if the proper policies are instituted.

America's future policies in Asia must be based on these realities. There is a middle path between withdrawal and the status quo, and the United States must take it. To withdraw precipitously under current circumstances would be irresponsible and would seriously damage U.S. national interests. America cannot withdraw since it is a part of the Pacific-Asian region in every sense. To hew to the old policies, however, is impossible in light of the tremendous changes under way. Despite the natural attention recently given to Europe and the

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U.S.S.R., it is time for America to cease merely reacting and to start innovating in its policies in Asia, a region that constitutes half the globe and may well determine the fate of the United States in the 21st century.

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Richard Holbrooke

JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES: ENDING THE UNEQUAL PARTNERSHIP

Anniversaries sometimes impose their own almost arbitrary logic on events. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the massive attention being paid in the United States to the fiftieth anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The television programs, articles and ceremonies—with the president himself presiding over one of them—have caused alarm among many Japanese, who fear that memories of that infamous day and the world war that followed will fuel anti-Japanese sentiment.

The anniversary itself will quickly pass. But serious strains between Japan and the United States will remain long after December 7, 1991, and they are likely to increase. What has been called America's most important single foreign relationship, one central to regional peace and global prosperity, has lately turned unhealthy and even nasty. While far from a breaking point, the U.S.-Japanese relationship is increasingly filled with friction, resentment and mutual recrimination.

For two decades nearly every study of this bilateral relationship has concluded that, as the two greatest economic powers in the world, Japan and the United States have a special responsibility to work together to address the planet's most pressing problems, with each nation taking the lead in specified areas. In pursuit of this goal President George Bush and former Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu talked frequently of a "global partnership" to deal with the world's problems, and the two governments have created numerous task forces and commissions to address these issues.

The effort to reduce some of the specific difficulties has made progress. The trade deficit between the two nations is decreasing. American exports to Japan have doubled in the last five years—in fact, American exports to Japan are almost as large as those to the United Kingdom, Germany and France

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combined. And Japan has already taken major steps toward accepting its responsibility to do more to help the rest of the world. Over the last three years, for example, the Japanese have been the biggest donor of aid to the Third World, supplying an impressive 22 percent of all funds flowing to developing countries in 1989 (although they have been criticized for making loans instead of grants, and imposing stiffer repayment terms than other nations).

Nonetheless there is a general sense among many outside observers that the overall relationship is drifting slowly downward—its tone increasingly acrimonious and its original postwar rationale now largely irrelevant. Both sides have entered a period filled with false expectations and misunderstandings. Even as the interdependence between the two nations increases, each society is showing greater impatience and less sympathy for the other. The leaders of both nations continue to employ old rhetoric to explain what binds the two nations together. Yet to continue such outdated rhetoric in the face of the dramatic changes sweeping the world is to ignore the effect those changes are having on U.S.-Japanese relations.

In the fiftieth year after Pearl Harbor, two unexpected events have accelerated the pace at which U.S.-Japanese relations and Japan's role in the world are changing. One is the end of the Cold War, the other the aftermath of the Gulf War. The time has come to factor both old history and these new realities into the equation and see what they mean for the future.

II

American displeasure with Japan has been well documented, and now for the first time the Japanese are beginning openly to show their own frustration and anger with the United States. Most Americans feel they have a right to make special demands of Japan because of history. And, indeed, history will judge America's postwar policies toward Japan as perhaps the most remarkable and far-sighted ever conducted by a victorious nation toward a defeated foe. For their part, Japanese acknowledge the generosity of America's postwar policies, but they generally feel that the United States no longer has the right to make seemingly endless demands based on obligations from that past. While Americans often say that the Japanese are ungrateful or that they still owe the United States something, Japanese are more likely to say that Amer-

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icans should stop blaming Japan for America's own failures. For years Japanese made such observations only in private, but their irritation and self-confidence have now increased to the extent that their complaints can finally be heard in the United States.

Attention has long been focused primarily on the American trade imbalance with Japan and charges that Japan plays by unfair rules in trade and business. But is this the fundamental factor? If identical trade problems existed with Germany or Britain, for example, would they create such animosity? Would the purchase of Rockefeller Center or Columbia Pictures by a Dutch or Italian company have generated the continuing public attention triggered by Japanese purchase of these two American trophies? Does a manufacturing plant in Tennessee owned by a European company attract the same attention as one owned by a Japanese company? Do the difficulties Americans have dealing with the regulations of European nations provoke the same anger as difficulties with Japan? In all cases the answer is clearly no.

What, then, lies at the heart of the American obsession with Japan? In a certain sense it is a reflection of America's fear that it may have lost its own way. Japan seems to be better at the very things on which Americans once prided themselves: quality products, hard work, sacrifice, strong family structure, a sense of national unity and patriotism. In another sense, there may still be an underlying racism, not always conscious, in the attitudes of some Americans toward Japanese. Finally, there is resentment that Japan is not sufficiently grateful to the United States for its generosity and protection since World War II. Perhaps fifty years is not such a long time after all.

Postwar U.S.-Japanese relations were never immune to friction or misunderstandings. In the first forty years after World War II, there indeed were many difficult problems, but each was surmounted through the efforts of public officials on both sides of the Pacific committed to preserving good relations. Leaders in Washington and Tokyo recognized that close ties between the United States and Japan were of immense importance not only to both nations but to global peace, stability and growth.

Mike Mansfield, the former American ambassador who presided over the last decade of this productive era, was not the only person to believe that the relationship with Japan was "the most important bilateral relationship the United States

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has." His view was shared by a large number of foreign policy experts and even reflected in public opinion polls, which showed that the American public increasingly understood the importance of Japan. In 1982, for example, Japan was perceived by Americans as more "important to U.S. interests" than any other country, and these results continued in subsequent surveys. But importance did not equate automatically with affection. The same series of polls showed a drop in Japan's score (on a scale of 1 to 100) from 61 in 1986 to 52 in 1990, in response to a question that tested the "feelings" of Americans toward a number of countries. (No other country, except China in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square, showed any comparable decline.) Seventy-one percent of those polled believed Japan was guilty of unfair trade practices, compared to 40 percent who said the same for the European Community. And most revealing, when asked if Japan's economic power constituted a "critical threat" to the vital interests of the United States, 60 percent of those questioned said yes—a number far higher than that for any other "possible threat" to the United States mentioned by the poll's respondents.[1]

In the late 1970s, a period aptly described by the late Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohiro as one of unparalleled "productive partnership," I believed that greater communication and interaction between the two nations would increase understanding and that greater understanding, in turn, would strengthen the relationship. I now believe this theory was wrong. Greater communication did in fact take place at almost every level of society; businessmen, scholars and students on both sides of the Pacific established close counterpart relations to an unprecedented degree. Americans became familiar for the first time with many elements of Japan's impressive culture and society, from *sashimi* to *ikebana*. But this hugely increased interaction did not bring with it a greater sense of common destiny, shared values and closer friendship. Even many Americans who admired Japan's postwar achievements came to fear that the United States could never compete with Japan on a level playing field because of what *Business Week*, in a recent scathing cover story, called Japan's "collusive network"

[1]Polls conducted by the Gallup Organization at four-year intervals for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1974–91. I am indebted to William Watts of Potomac Associates for his invaluable assistance in locating and analyzing polling data concerning U.S.-Japanese relations.

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of "politicians, bureaucrats, big business, and sometimes even gangsters."[2] As former Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson wrote recently: "There is a strong streak of genuine admiration—indeed envy—for Japan's hard work, managerial and product achievements. . . . Yet, on the other hand, there is a growing fear of Japan and a suspicion that these better products have arrived in our markets on the backs of a closed market and an unfair business system in Japan."[3]

By the late 1980s many Americans harbored a fear that, despite the high quality of its products, Japan was in some insidious manner destroying or threatening the American way of life. This new alarmism in the United States was matched by a growing public candor in Japan about its frustrations with the United States. For the first time Japanese gave public voice to their feelings that the United States treated Japan unfairly.

Shintaro Ishihara received international attention (even that ultimate tribute, a *Playboy* interview) after writing *The Japan That Can Say No*, a powerful nationalistic tract stating, among other things, that "racial prejudice was behind the trade friction between our two countries," and constituted "the root cause of Japan-bashing."[4] Ishihara did not mention the deep roots of racism in his own country, a problem that Japanese rarely admit exists. Some Japanese tried to minimize Ishihara's impact in the United States by suggesting that his was a lonely voice. But in the introduction to the American edition of Ishihara's book, Japan expert Ezra Vogel observed that, although "Japan's political leaders are more pragmatic and more cautious than Ishihara," his book should be read "as a reflection of deep currents of popular Japanese thinking about the United States."[5]

Ishihara's outspoken views were sometimes echoed, more discreetly, by senior Japanese officials charged with maintaining good relations with the United States. "Why, of all countries in the world, is Japan [America's] favorite target?" asks Ryohei Murata, Japanese ambassador to the United States. Because, he says, "the average American feels that Japanese

[2]*Business Week*, Aug. 26, 1991, page 34.

[3]Peter G. Peterson, "The 1990s: Decade of Reckoning or a Decade of a New Partnership?" A Paper for the Commission on U.S.-Japan Relations for the Twenty First Century, March 7, 1991, pp. 6–7.

[4]Ishihara, *The Japan That Can Say No*, (English language edition) New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991.

[5]*Ibid.*, page 9.

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are somehow 'different' from Americans." At the same time, Murata notes that Japan has begun to "view both reasonable and unreasonable requests as U.S. pressure and reacts defensively and antagonistically."[6]

III

For decades one could divide U.S.-Japanese relations into "high" policy and "low" policy. The former concerned political and strategic issues relating to regional stability and the containment of Soviet adventurism in the Pacific. Low policy, by contrast, consisted of a broad range of bilateral issues primarily related to trade and business practices on which the two nations were in constant contact and increasing conflict.

While not entirely passive on high policy issues, Japan generally followed policies designed to keep Washington content. Tokyo kept a certain distance from the United States in the 1960s, in part because of the widespread opposition within Japan to American policy in Vietnam (some Japanese leaders even stated at the time that their nation pursued a policy of "equidistance" between the United States and the Soviet Union). But once the war was over and both nations had opened relations with mainland China, an era of unprecedented cooperation began. Washington realized that, in the aftermath of the disaster in Vietnam, close ties with Japan were essential for America's strategic and political interests. (This was true despite the attention paid by the American public and certain senior officials to the new and exciting relationship with China during the 1970s.) The cooperation between the United States and Japan during the late 1970s and most of the 1980s was an important ingredient in the reversal of the perception that America was retreating from the Pacific after Vietnam. The strategic relationship became increasingly close, including considerable, if unpublicized, cooperation between the defense forces of the two nations in such areas as joint naval operations.

Low policy involved the interaction of the internal politics of the two nations and thus was usually more complicated than high policy. While high policy problems were generally re-

[6]See Hiroshi Kitamura, Ryohei Murata and Hisahiko Okazaki, *Between Friends: Japanese Diplomats Look at Japan-U.S. Relations*, New York: Weatherhill, 1985, pp. 111–118.

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solved by a handful of professional diplomats, low policy issues were usually the bailiwick of trade-oriented departments and agencies that were responsive to domestic pressures.

Both sides knew that no matter how serious trade differences were, they could not be allowed to jeopardize the strategic relationship. Throughout the last generation both governments successfully managed to keep tensions over low policy from destroying cooperation on high policy. If a trade negotiation appeared to be headed for collapse, the leaders of both nations would often step in (usually through trusted intermediaries) to make a deal that could be justified on grounds that the only beneficiary from any crisis in Japanese-American relations would be the Soviet Union. This potent Cold War argument won the political or bureaucratic debate every time, although it annoyed many who thought it was invoked excessively and without proof.

This ritual at times resembled kabuki theater, but it was crucial in resolving many tense trade problems, from Japanese automobile exports to American access to the Japanese telecommunications market. But by the mid-1980s, it was clear that this case-by-case approach to trade problems had run its course. The much-heralded Structural Impediments Initiative of 1989–90 was the result: an effort to create a broader system that would solve the commercial problems between the two nations through a structural approach. Both governments considered it a breakthrough. On both sides of the Pacific, however, there was serious public criticism of SII, and it fueled the developing anger between the two nations, especially among ordinary people. Karel van Wolferen articulated the view of many hostile and skeptical Western observers when he called SII a fraud and "the most recent instance of American wishful thinking."[7] On the Japanese side, Ishihara again said what others felt but rarely voiced in public: SII, he wrote, was "further evidence of an unequal relationship" in which the United States "presented Japan with more than two hundred items for discussion, including some farfetched suggestions that utterly ignored distinctive features of Japanese society, especially certain cultural aspects," while Japan offered a few "limited" proposals that were ignored by the Americans.[8]

[7]Karel van Wolferen, "The Japan Problem Revisited," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1990, p. 45.
[8]Ishihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 120, 128–9.

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IV

American military involvement in East Asia and the Pacific has a far longer and deeper history than it does in Europe. American military forces have been in Japan and the western Pacific continuously since the end of World War II. They have been present in the Philippines since the beginning of the century and operated intermittently in China over many decades prior to 1949. Thus any discussion, however speculative, of the possibility of the departure of American troops from the western Pacific may cause concern, even fear, among some people, both in Asia and the United States, who have come to assume that there will always be American military forces in East Asia.

For the present, of course, the United States still has important obligations in East Asia. Northeast Asia, a perennial cockpit of great power rivalry and conflict, is today more peaceful and stable with American troops in Japan and South Korea than at any time since the beginning of the century, and those troops should not leave Japan or South Korea as long as North Korea remains a threat to peace and as long as Japan's Northern Islands, seized by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, remain in Soviet hands. Their presence is an important factor encouraging a peaceful outcome to both problems.

But in the long run, the removal of permanent American military facilities and troops from East Asia is probably inevitable, as recent events in the Philippines suggest; when the reasons for their deployment disappear, force withdrawal could be healthy for both Asians and Americans alike, provided it is handled correctly. When the new post-Cold War Pacific emerges, the American Seventh Fleet, with access to ports of call in the western Pacific, should be sufficient to defend U.S. national security interests and make the necessary contribution to regional stability.

In the United States the commitment to defend Japan's home islands has been widely supported since 1950 when Mao Zedong's takeover of China and the outbreak of the Korean War alerted Americans to the communist threat in Asia. In Japan the security ties and the American troop presence had often come under heavy pressure, especially in 1960 when student demonstrators snake-danced through the streets of Tokyo and forced the cancellation of a planned trip to Japan

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by President Eisenhower. As late as 1981, Tokyo, fearful of serious domestic repercussions, still resisted the use of the word "alliance" in any official statement describing its relationship with the United States.[9] In recent years this problem subsided, and the once-controversial word is now used routinely. A strong U.S.-Japan relationship came to be recognized as the key to stability in the entire Pacific region—a bulwark against Soviet adventurism, a symbol of the American commitment to the security of the region and one of America's greatest policy successes since the end of World War II.

The continuity of this commitment was made strikingly clear last September, when the huge American aircraft carrier *Independence*, with 5,300 personnel, steamed into its new homeport 25 miles south of Tokyo (replacing the aged *Midway*), as though the world had not changed in twenty years. Objecting to the deployment, Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) foreshadowed a debate. "Why do we have to spend all these dollars," she asked, "to defend a rich country that is an economic competitor?" But in this case the answer was readily available: since Japan absorbs most of the "in-country" costs for the large American base at Yokusuka, where 18,000 American military personnel and dependents are stationed, it is cheaper to homeport the *Independence* in Japan than in the United States. Responding to constant American pressure since 1975, Japan now contributes over $3 billion a year to support the American military presence in Japan, far more than any other American ally has ever contributed to the costs of stationing American troops on its soil.

Even as communism collapsed in eastern Europe, the residue of the Cold War that remained in East Asia prevented comparable progress. Yet the disintegration of communism inside the Soviet Union in August 1991 greatly increased the possibility of eradicating such legacies. Both Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin and spokesmen for the "former Soviet Union" hinted last September that the question of the Northern Islands could soon be resolved on terms that would satisfy Tokyo. North Korea remains a Cold War anachronism and a danger to regional stability, but it is now almost completely

[9]A storm of protest arose when the word "alliance" first appeared in a joint statement during Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki's May 1981 visit to the United States. See John K. Emmerson and Harrison M. Holland, *The Eagle and the Rising Sun: America and Japan in the Twentieth Century*, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1988, p. 180.

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isolated. It seems increasingly unlikely that when Kim Il Sung, the world's longest-lasting dictator, finally passes from the scene, his shadowy son will be able to maintain absolute power. The admission of both Koreas to the United Nations last September—delayed for decades and to the end opposed by North Korea—was surely an omen that sooner or later this last bastion of Stalinism would crumble. And further to the south another protracted tragedy, the Cambodian problem, moved closer to resolution, however imperfect, under U.N. auspices.

Thus it is finally possible to envision East Asia in the approaching future free from the Cold War environment that dominated the region and helped shape the U.S.-Japanese relationship for forty years. But what will then remain of the old strategic relationship? What will be the rationale, if any, for the continued presence of American troops in Japan and, for that matter, in South Korea?

By decade's end, if not sooner, there may be no American troops in Japan or, in fact, anywhere on foreign soil in the western Pacific or East Asia (with the exception of American deployments on Guam and some other small Pacific islands that have a special relationship to the United States). The departure of American troops from Japan—where they have successively symbolized wartime victory, the Occupation and the American commitment to defend their homeland—would affect deeply the psychology of the relationship, removing a sense of dependency and obligation that has existed since 1945. The common strategic objective of keeping the Soviet Union at bay, which helped contain trade disputes, would no longer exist. At the same time, ironically, major irritants caused by the troops and exploited by politicians for a generation would no longer exist either: Japanese could no longer complain about American behavior or special privileges on the bases, and American politicians would no longer be able to demand trade concessions in return for Japan's "free ride" on defense. Both the positive and negative aspects of the American troop presence would disappear—and the relationship between the two nations would change, gradually but profoundly.

V

Nothing could have been less helpful to U.S.-Japanese relations than Operation Desert Storm. Most Japanese did not see their vital interests threatened by Saddam Hussein's take-

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over of Kuwait and were sharply divided about the wisdom of supporting the coalition. But listening to prescient warnings from Ambassador Michael Armacost that its actions would have a profound effect on future relations with the United States, the Japanese government contributed an impressive $13 billion to the gulf effort, far more than any other nation outside the gulf. Had Japan not given such a vast sum, the American reaction undoubtedly would have been worse, but it was bad enough: Americans felt that Japan's support of the coalition was slow, grudging and inadequate, especially since three-fourths of Japan's oil comes from the Middle East. Japan's political style requires that major changes in its foreign policy be worked out through a methodical, consensus-building ritual that Westerners often find frustrating and confusing. The rapid American timetable for assembling the Desert Shield coalition did not fit that process. American public support for Japan dropped during and after the war and has yet to recover.

The Gulf War gave further impetus to Japan's quiet re-evaluation of its foreign policy. Most Japanese felt that their vast monetary contribution was not appreciated by the United States. For Japan one of the main lessons was that it should not allow itself to be placed in a position where the United States could drag it into a foreign policy adventure without adequate prior consultation.

Quiet evidence that Japan intends to accelerate the process, already under way, of developing its own foreign policy came in the fall of 1991. Predictably it received little notice in the United States. When the U.N. General Assembly convened, Tokyo made a concerted effort to gain a seat on the Security Council because, according to foreign ministry spokesmen, it felt that it needed to have a stronger voice in international affairs.[10] In Tokyo the government devised a new plan to deal with future crises, which would allow up to 2,000 troops from Japan's Self Defense Forces to participate in a future U.N. peacekeeping force—after any fighting had stopped and only if the government approved the specific mission. More specifically Japan put the word out that it would be willing to send

[10]Despite pro forma American support, Japan's long-standing hope for a permanent Security Council seat, which it surely deserves, seems doomed unless there is broad-ranging reform of the Security Council and the creation of a class of permanent members without veto power.

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troops to Cambodia as part of a U.N. force—a small step for international peacekeeping, perhaps, but a giant step for Japan, which has not sent troops abroad, under any flag, since 1945.

More incremental steps of this sort from Japanese foreign ministry officials, once regarded as custodians of a passive foreign policy, can be expected. They will certainly create apprehension in some nations that fear Japan's ambitions or cannot forgive the past. China, for one, has already indicated concern. But Japan's eventual involvement in such activities outside its home borders, once unthinkable, is now inevitable. (Already Malaysia has proposed a regional economic bloc that would exclude all non-Asian nations and be dominated by Japan; while Tokyo will probably keep its distance—under American pressure—the proposal itself marks another milestone in Japan's new regional acceptability.) One probable consequence of such activity will be a further gradual distancing of Japan's foreign policy from that of the United States—even were the United States to dominate the United Nations again in a crisis, as it did during the summer of 1990.

VI

Accepting a more assertive and independent Japan will prove difficult for many Americans, who have come to regard Japan as a junior partner on most important foreign policy issues. This attitude was most evident during the 1970s and 1980s, when the United States embarked on a particularly shortsighted effort to get the Japanese to increase their own defense spending.[11] Behind this effort lay the fact that, because Japan spent less than one percent of its GNP on defense compared to over five percent for the United States, Japan was able to devote more of its resources to nonmilitary spending, creating resentment in the United States over the "free ride" Japan was getting from the American security umbrella. From Congress and four successive administrations came pressure on Tokyo to break through the one percent barrier and take up more of the burden of defending the northeast Pacific against the Soviet Far Eastern fleet, which had, in fact, peaked

[11]The first manifestation of this policy came much earlier, when, during a visit to Japan in 1953, Vice President Nixon urged the Japanese to begin rearming. This bewildered his hosts, who were comfortable with the famous Article 9 of the constitution renouncing war as an instrument of national policy and prohibiting the development of all offensive weapons.

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in strength by the mid-1980s.[12] This effort was a particular favorite of members of Congress looking for ways to reduce America's own defense expenditures or criticize Japan. Little thought was given to the long-term consequences: its potentially destabilizing effect on Japan's East Asian neighbors, whose memories of World War II were more vivid and stronger than those in the United States; and the possibility that Japanese military capability might, over time, lead to a more aggressive foreign policy from Tokyo that might even eventually be at odds with America's.

Washington was on sounder ground when it embarked on several policies designed to encourage Japan to make a larger contribution to the international financial institutions and foreign assistance agencies. These policies were not only correct; they should have been pursued earlier and more vigorously, in lieu of efforts to increase the defense budget. At least a decade ago, before it was too late, Washington should have offered Tokyo a "grand bargain"—that it would continue to provide the security umbrella for Japan and not ask Tokyo to increase its defense budget, in exchange for a quantum leap by Japan in foreign assistance levels, support of international financial institutions and contributions to such international problems as refugees, famine relief and environmental disasters. A provocative version of this idea was contained in Peterson's proposal for a new relationship in which "Japan would be senior partner on economic issues and the United States the senior partner on political and military ones," with both countries committing themselves to substantial transformation of their own societies: "Japan becoming more open; the United States putting its economic house in order."[13]

When it was timely, such an arrangement was discussed neither with the Congress, whose approval would have been essential and difficult to obtain, nor the Japanese government. Today, regrettably, the time for such a division of responsibility between the United States and Japan has faded: with the passing of the threat from Moscow, Japanese seniority on economic issues, with American primacy in political and security issues, would not be a particularly good bargain for the United States.

[12]From 1977–81 I participated in these efforts. The policy was misguided and carried out with far too much enthusiasm.

[13]Peterson, *op. cit.*, pp. 8 and 12.

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VII

Despite their vast cultural and stylistic differences, Japan and the United States are linked by an extraordinary series of events stretching back to the arrival of Commodore Perry's black ships in Tokyo Bay in 1853.[14] The two nations were destined to a stormy and often unpredictable relationship, with the exception of the U.S.-Israeli relationship probably the most unusual American bilateral tie in the world. But until now it has always been an association between two unequal partners, one clearly inferior to the other. In that form it has run its course and no longer serves the interests of either nation.

What does this mean for the future? Are U.S.-Japanese relations doomed to deteriorate still further? Or are they essentially cyclical in nature, destined to improve if Japan's economy slows down and America catches up? Is this, perhaps, less of a crisis than meets the eye? Will the relationship simply go on much as it has been before, enduring out of mutual need and ever-deepening economic interdependence, despite chronic complaining that resembles the bickering of an unhappily married couple for whom divorce is nonetheless impossible?

There are no easy answers, yet on these questions much will depend. The extraordinary size, scope and importance of the relationship will not only continue; it should increase—but not on the old basis. Clearly Americans and Japanese alike should seek to accelerate the day when Japan is completely freed from the dependency relationship that has existed in one form or another since 1945. So long as the United States expects constant repayment for past generosity and for its open markets, a relationship based on dependency, resentment and false expectations will continue. The best basis for post-Cold War relations with Japan is a mature relationship of equals. The two most powerful economies in the world, while competitors, must learn to interact with each other in a manner that sets aside ideas of junior and senior partnerships. Natural concepts in the early postwar and Cold War eras, such notions

[14]The Russians arrived at Nagasaki only six weeks after Perry reached Tokyo Bay. Later Perry made a remarkable forecast: "Eastward and southward will [our] great rival in the future aggrandizement stretch forth her power, and thus the Saxon and the Cossack will meet. Will it be in friendship? I fear not! The antagonistic exponents of freedom and absolutism must thus meet at last."

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defied realities of domestic politics in both countries and were made obsolescent by events in the communist world and by the Gulf War.

The current mood is one of unfulfilled hopes and disappointments. High rhetoric about a special "global partnership" only adds to false expectations and increases the sense, on each side, that the other has failed to live up to its obligations. In the days of the Occupation and the Cold War, the relationship worked to the mutual benefit of both nations. But what the United States did for Japan during the Cold War it did out of a belief that it was also in the American national interest, that it was essential for strategic reasons. The extraordinary generosity of the United States in giving Japan, and other nations, access to the vast American market without full reciprocity has to come to an end, not as an act of neo-protectionism, but as a simple political and economic fact reflecting the recent changes in the world, the limitations on American resources and the tremendous economic competition America faces from abroad.

The United States gains nothing by dwelling on alleged Japanese ingratitude. One cannot hold an entire people hostage to repayment of a debt without eventually provoking resentment that outweighs any obligations imposed by the past. It is time to accept Japan as a full member of the world's leadership, not just in the economic arena but across the board. This likely will be more difficult for Europeans than for Americans, given their far greater lack of understanding and communication with Japan.

Japan gains nothing by showing open or thinly veiled contempt for America's internal problems and inefficiency. Every indicator shows that Japan has earned the right to participate in international affairs as an equal of any other nation on earth. But Japan would be well advised to proceed cautiously in the brave new era that lies ahead. The future may not be as bright as the last twenty years for Japan, as other parts of the world catch up. Furthermore as the twentieth century nears its end, Japan is undergoing some important internal changes of its own, including the rapid growth in the number of its elderly and the increasing demand for leisure time among its youth that could significantly reduce its comparative advantages in international commerce.

Japanese are always quick to remind the rest of the world how resource-poor and vulnerable they are. This vulnerability

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may tempt Japan to seek primacy or domination in areas that contain vital natural resources or important trading partnerships. This would be a natural policy to follow, especially if it is true, as many experts have concluded, that Japanese have great difficulty dealing with other people or nations as equals. According to this widely accepted theory, the Japanese either accept inferior status or seek superiority in all relationships, and true equality is virtually impossible.[15] It would be a tragedy if Japan were to attempt, in a nonmilitary form, to control certain resources or regions of the world. It may be true that the United States once had such dominance in many parts of the world, notably Latin America, but those days are over, not only for the United States but for every other nation. In the modern world, any nation that seeks to dominate any region of the world through either political or economic pressure risks massive economic retaliation from other major trading nations. Shooting wars may be out of the question between the major powers, but trade wars, stimulated by powerful domestic interests, are still possible—and both the United States and Japan run risks in this regard. This is why even Americans with impeccable pro-Japan credentials, who often have been embarrassed by statements by their own countrymen, feel a shiver of concern as they listen to some of the recent rhetoric coming from Tokyo.

Economic and political necessity makes it imperative that discourse between the two nations not reach the breaking point. In this regard, the selection of Kiichi Miyazawa, the senior Japanese political figure most at ease in dealing with Americans, as prime minister is welcome news. Miyazawa has broader knowledge of the United States than any other senior politician and is well-liked by his many American friends. Although it is reasonable to assume that he will continue to develop a more independent Japanese foreign policy, Miyazawa can be counted on to use his substantial diplomatic and personal skills to contain tensions with Washington. But Washington must be careful not to expect from Miyazawa special favors; he has long been suspect in Japan precisely because of his ease and fluency with Americans, and he will have to protect himself from any charges that he is subservient to the United States.

As the Japanese gradually embark on a more assertive

[15]This theory is best laid out in Chie Nakane's *Japanese Society* (English language version), Rutland, Vermont: C.E. Tuttle, 1984.

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foreign policy, they must remember two unpleasant and rarely voiced truths: they remain generally unpopular overseas, and the United States is still Japan's best friend, and perhaps at times its only friend.

If the comparative economic strength of the two nations continues to move in Japan's direction, and Japan continues to diversify its overseas markets and sources of supply, Japan's relative importance to the United States may increase as Washington's relative importance to Tokyo decreases.[16] Nonetheless the United States will remain the most important nation in the world to Japan, and Japan will remain among the most important nations to the United States, if not always the most important.

Perhaps it is time for a statute of limitations on invoking the past in the current debate: while no one should have to repeat history because they have forgotten it, there is also a risk of being trapped by half-accurate myths presented as history. This has happened in many other parts of the world (Ireland, Cyprus and Lebanon leap to mind), always with unfortunate results. Let us hope that it does not happen between the United States and Japan.

Each side will have to change certain attitudes deeply engraved into their national subconscious in the half century since December 7, 1941. The United States will need to accept a Japan that carries out an independent foreign policy and no longer automatically follows the American lead on international issues. Japan will need to recognize the necessity of true equality of market access between the two nations and avoid the temptation to seek complete domination of the East Asian region. Japan will also have to learn how to treat other nations as equals. Both nations will need to move beyond a period of history that was immensely successful, helped preserve the peace and brought prosperity to a region covering one-third of the globe—but a period that is rapidly coming to an end.

[16]Last year for the first time Japan's exports to East Asia were greater than those to the United States.

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Yoichi Funabashi

JAPAN AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

A crisis almost always reveals the reality, and the Persian Gulf crisis revealed the real Japan. In the moment of truth, an economic superpower found itself merely an automatic teller machine—one that needed a kick before dispensing the cash. The notion that economic power inevitably translates into geopolitical influence turned out to be a materialist illusion. At least many Japanese now seem to subscribe to that view.

In Japan the crisis over the gulf was a manifestation of the failure of Japanese leadership. In 1989 Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost control of the Diet's upper house, the House of Councillors. Thus when the gulf crisis erupted, Japan was governed by its politically weakest leadership of the postwar era, and it had great difficulty in forming a coalition with the opposition—the Democratic Socialist Party and the Komeito—to support its response. The public was polarized. Japan had not witnessed such a divergence of views on an issue of this magnitude for thirty years past. Slow and cumbersome decision-making was the result, which only benefited Japan's powerful bureaucracies and served the status quo. In the end the government proved totally unfit to respond quickly in a crisis.

Japan nevertheless managed to be part of the international coalition effort by making a $13 billion contribution. But it could not make even the most modest contribution of manpower, falling short of Korea's dispatch of 150 medics and the Philippines' 190 doctors and nurses. Certainly many Japanese are pleased that the national consensus finally solidified against sending troops abroad. Many feel that Japan did what it could and that the Japanese themselves, as well as foreigners, should not expect too much of Japan. Moreover the $13 billion, made possible only by a tax increase, was not negligible.

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It was more than Japan's annual foreign aid program, its Official Development Assistance (ODA), which ranks first in the world.

The Gulf War was a unique phenomenon. The war itself crystallized and magnified issues that Japan should have addressed long ago. For Japan the crisis was, in a way, a day of reckoning. It broke out precisely when the gap was most pronounced between Japan's underdeveloped political capacity and its seemingly uncontrollable economic expansion. The outcome was shocking, rudely awakening Japan to its inability to cope with a crisis affecting its vital interests. The lesson was that the international environment in the 1990s will no longer allow Japan to follow the same one-dimensional economic strategy it has single-mindedly pursued for the past forty years.

II

In the postwar era Japan's image of itself as a small, strategically naked and economically fragile island nation gradually changed as it became a respected member of the world community. Japan's inclusion in 1975 as a founding member of the Group of Seven (G-7) leading industrialized nations helped transform the Japanese public's perception of its own country. A decade later Japan's self-image as an economic power was supplanted by the image of Japan as an economic superpower, as Japan suddenly found itself the world's largest creditor nation. And now with the end of the Cold War and the advent of a more polycentric world, the perception of Japan as a global power should become even more widespread.

Ironically, as Japan's international power has advanced, the underpinnings of its political and economic systems have been called into question. Japan's rapidly aging population, unique lifelong employment system, homogeneous social fabric, "plutocratic collusion" among leading industries, speculative "bubbles and bursts" in financial markets, and complacency have all been pinpointed as vulnerabilities or signs of decline. But it is still too early to deliver such a verdict. Japan has a proven capacity to adapt to new international environments, as happened with the Meiji Restoration and the post-World War II reconstruction.

Japan's strategic premises are nonetheless basically conditioned by a historical sense of vulnerability and are the legacies

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of traumatic defeat and a determination to be reborn. These legacies are many, yet the following stand out: adaptation and "catch-up," concentration on economic gains, following the lead of the United States and absence of regional strategy.

Throughout its modern history Japan has felt isolated in world affairs. This heightened sense of Japan as "latecomer" or "odd man out" on the world scene contributed to its familiar foreign policy behavior: inward-looking exceptionalism (ultra-nationalism in prewar days and "one country pacifism" in the postwar era) coupled with desperate efforts to catch up to those ahead of it (rectification of unequal treaties in the Meiji period and "GNP-ism" after World War II).

Confined by this mindset, Japan has seldom tried to present itself as a rule-maker in the world community. The rules were already there. Japan simply tried to adapt to them and, if possible, excel at playing the game. When faced with difficulty, however, it tended simply to ignore or reject those rules altogether. But the world order is a given, and Japan a reactor par excellence. In the words of one Japanese political scientist, "The world is nothing but a 'framework' or the setting which can change only mysteriously."[1]

Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda's (1976–78) "equidistance diplomacy" in large part reflected this psychological block against defining Japanese priorities in foreign policy. Japan's apparent obsession with its status in the world also testifies to its lack of will in defining its own self-image and world role. Postwar "economism" or "GNP-ism" was a strategy used to eschew political involvement. Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki's (1980–82) characterization of Japan as the "10 percent nation" (*ichiwari kokka*)—a nation occupying 10 percent of world GNP—and his call for Japan to make a greater international contribution also revealed how the nation perceives its status and even the world itself in quantitative terms, while conspicuously avoiding a qualitative definition.

Recently Japan's former vice minister for foreign affairs, Takakazu Kuriyama, has argued for a new Japanese diplomatic posture with the phrase "foreign policy of a major power with an unassuming posture." But this thrust for a new foreign policy posture is still expressed by attitudinal concepts rather than strategic ones. Shintaro Ishihara's much publicized book,

[1]Kyogoku Jun'ichi, *Gendai minishusei to seijigaku*, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969, p. 170.

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The Japan That Can Say No, merely worsened the situation for, as the book's title indicated, it was a rejection, not a projection, of a national psyche.

Today Japan's increased weight and stake in the world has in turn increased the world's stake and interest in Japanese strategy and policy. But the gap between Japan's foreign policy projection and the expectations placed on Japan by other countries has widened to a precarious abyss. The call for Japan to bear a full share of the burden to sustain the world system has intensified. For Japan the essential question is now this: For what purpose should Japan assume a larger share of the burden? Japan must now define its objectives and world role more clearly than at any time in the past forty years. It can no longer merely respond to the international environment and measure itself quantitatively. Such a task will severely challenge Japan's long-standing strategic premises and policy foundations. But Japan is now a key pillar of the global order itself, no longer merely an actor within it, and Japanese policy must reflect that change.

III

The Japanese people almost unanimously supported the nation's postwar mercantilist strategy and enthusiastically compelled it for four decades. Japan's postwar determination, symbolized by the "Peace Constitution," was so overwhelming that nearly all the nation's energy and resources were mobilized exclusively for economic reconstruction and expansion. Military and security issues were constantly placed on the back burner, and certain other noneconomic policy goals, such as international peacekeeping and human rights, were never vigorously pursued.

But this postwar strategy of economic expansion became increasingly untenable by the mid-1980s. First, the scale of the Japanese economy and its overseas penetration caused political repercussions that forced Japan to respond politically as well. The voluntary restrictions on automobile exports to the United States throughout the 1980s was one such example. Second, Japan's creditor status compelled it to endorse many international programs with strategic implications—Latin American debt relief, east European recovery, Middle East peacekeeping—changing the nature of its economic diplomacy. At the same time, louder criticism of Japan's "checkbook diplomacy" was also likely to be heard. Finally, Japan increas-

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ingly acquired and developed militarily relevant technology, transforming the nation's strategic significance. Japan's long-standing nonmilitary strategy was based on its status as "have-not" in terms of indigenous military resources. But that premise has been shaken. Japan now clearly belongs to the club of "haves" possessing a key military resource: technology.

Japan's postwar economic miracle required U.S. protection. The U.S.-Japanese alliance provided both national security and an economic market for Japanese products. For many Japanese the lesson became clear: Japan prospered while following the lead of the world's most liberal economic power. A strategy of following was thus born, came to be cherished and eventually developed into a kind of axiom.

That strategy changed somewhat under Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982–87), when Japan began to seek a higher profile and broader role in world politics. Nakasone's commitment to the Western alliance, based on the assumption that global security was "indivisible," reflected Japan's search for a leadership role. His "high yen" strategy helped lay the groundwork for the G-7's 1985 "Plaza accord" and inaugurated Japan's new role as a world banker. At the G-7's Venice summit in 1987 Nakasone changed policy to provide for fiscal expansion and paved the way for Japan's new task as an "absorber" country, a market power. Yet the Japanese leadership's habit of viewing the world through the prism of U.S.-Japanese relations still limited the scope of its foreign policy.

Overdependence on its bilateral relationship with the United States undermined Japan's creative diplomacy by closing off avenues to other foreign policy initiatives. Accustomed to the deep-rooted hierarchical relationships in Japanese society, Japanese leaders found it difficult to execute an effective foreign policy based on equality. The leadership developed a psychology of dependency—a tendency to view America as a big brother—and failed to assert a distinctively Japanese foreign policy, in effect inviting foreign pressure, or *gaiatsu*. This new word, coined solely to denote this phenomenon, indicates the degree to which foreign pressure has affected Japanese political culture.

Gaiatsu, however, causes problems. Foreign pressure does not help generate healthy policy debates or create a sound political milieu for Japan to promote foreign policy initiatives. It shifts the focus of debate away from what Japan should do in its own best interests and toward what other countries want

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it to do. For this reason it often arouses nationalistic sentiments and infuses issues with emotion. It also provides a "cover" for certain Japanese to pursue their own policy agendas (e.g., sending Self-Defense Forces abroad) under the guise of policy coordination, particularly with the United States. *Gaiatsu* politics thus undermines U.S.-Japanese relations, because it tends to perpetuate a patron-protégé relationship and a love-hate cycle between the two nations.

Japan's postwar strategy was also affected by the bankruptcy of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Its failure created profound political and psychological inhibitions for Japan. Whenever Japan tried to assert itself and assume a regional leadership role, Asian leaders recalled its culpability in the Second World War and repeatedly warned of its "new ambition" and aspiration toward becoming a "military giant" once again. Japan was handicapped by the lack of an institutional economic and military framework for cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region, such as NATO and the EC in Europe, which helped West Germany overcome the constraints on its regional policies. The Japanese government's attempt to send Self-Defense Forces abroad during the Gulf War was one such example. It was met with suspicion and opposition from other Asian nations that feared possible consequences of Japanese power projection.

Since regionalism was so tainted, Japan became one of the few countries in the modern world with truly global interests.[2] Regionalism was seen as both bad politics and bad economics. It implied political domination by an ambitious hegemon as well as by an economic bloc that would destroy the free-trading system. Unlike its prewar concentration on Asian markets, Japan was encouraged to devote itself to engaging the U.S.-led global economic framework. It thus diversified its export markets but came to develop a special link to the United States. While Japan still heavily concentrated its ODA on Asian neighbors, who received more than 60 percent of all aid, it never developed a comprehensive regional policy.

Renewed interest in a regional strategy has emerged in recent years. Global economic developments have forced Japan to entertain "new thinking" about the Asian-Pacific economic framework. An aggressive bilateral U.S. trade policy has

[2]Robert A. Scalapino, "Perspectives on Modern Japanese Foreign Policy," *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, University of California Press, 1977, p. 399.

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strained the multilateral trading system that Japan has taken for granted and within which Japan has prospered. European Community integration, the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement and now the prospect of a North American Free Trade Agreement that also includes Mexico have caused Japan to reconsider its previous regional restraint. European integration, for example, can be viewed as a classic "challenge-response" case. EC integration was in part driven by the challenge from the dynamic economies of Japan and its Asian-Pacific neighbors. But European integration has in turn challenged Japan. A unified Germany as the nucleus of the EC, coupled with the specter of eastern Europe as the new frontier of an even more colossal Europe, have only served to sharpen that sense of challenge.

World political developments also lead Japan to take stock of its regional strategy. The sudden recession of the shared perception of a Soviet threat—the glue of the U.S.-Japanese mutual security mechanism—the prospect of U.S. military disengagement and the need to incorporate the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union as responsible regional players add momentum in Japan toward broader Asian-Pacific cooperation. In the multipolar world after the Cold War an effective regional framework could provide each country with a sort of safety net. But questions arise: How viable is Asian-Pacific regionalism, politically and economically? Can Japan assume a leadership role there? And, more generally, what is Japan's role in the already existent system?

Some influential business leaders, such as Yotaro Kobayashi, argue for Japan's "re-Asianization." It is only natural, Kobayashi proposes, that Japan should find its "home" in Asia, in the same way that Mikhail Gorbachev has said Russia should find its in Europe. Kobayashi has suggested that Japan explore the possibility of playing a role as regional "co-chairman" with China.[3] Although he stresses the importance of U.S. participation in Asian regionalism, other political and business leaders urge stronger Asian ties regardless of the United States. These voices could fan the embers of anti-Western, and particularly anti-American, feeling among Japanese. Japan's historical modernization process has been pendulous, vacillating first toward the West, then back to the more familiar East.

[3]Yotaro Kobayashi, "Japan's Need for Re-Asianization," *Foresight*, April 1991.

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And today Japan's soul-searching for the proper self-image and regional and global roles is still haunted by its past swings.

IV

Japan's international agenda for the 1990s must respond to a variety of new issues and challenges. Japan must establish a new image of itself in the world, one that expresses its cherished values and self-enlightened interests. This need not be a radical process, but rather a conscious effort on the part of the nation to develop itself incrementally. Japan's unorthodox power portfolio ("economic giant" and "military dwarf") should not be viewed as an unstable and transitional phenomenon; its deep-rooted pacifism should not be treated as mere escapism, although its more eccentric elements have sometimes been refered to as "Kamikaze pacifists." On the contrary this very portfolio presents Japan with the opportunity to define its own power and role in the radically changing world ahead. Emergence of a more internationalist and actively engaged Japanese pacifism could play a constructive role in making Japan a global civilian power.

For the first time in its modern history, Japan in the 1990s will be substantially free of security threats from the north, whether explicit or implicit, ideological or military. Although the post-Cold War world will surely see its share of small-scale regional conflicts, and even wars, the Asian-Pacific area may have a better chance to maintain peace than in the turbulent days of the 1940s (the Pacific War), the 1950s (the Korean War) or the 1960s (the Vietnam War).

The widespread perception that the Gulf War actually underscored the supremacy of military power should not alter Japan's strategy of acting as a global civilian power. Japan should still search for various avenues to enhance its political power through economic strength, not military might. Such a strategy could again stimulate the perception of the changing nature of power in the world and the recognition and acceptance of Japan as a new power. Global interdependence and a higher priority for economic statecraft benefit Japan. They better suit its pacifistic strategy and enhance the levers available to the nation through financial and economic resources. Japan should take full advantage of such global developments to pursue a broader set of policy goals aimed at promoting a world order more compatible to Japan's own self-image and interests.

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Japan should therefore pursue two sometimes contradictory strategies: active engagement for world peace and military self-restraint. Its one-dimensional economic strategy must be replaced by a more multifaceted, values-oriented policy. It is time for the world's banker to design and contribute to an international order based on something more than mere economic growth. Japan should give higher priority to four values as foreign policy goals: to act as a model for, and lend assistance to, poorer countries in their own efforts for economic and democratic development; international peacekeeping; promotion of human rights; and environmental protection.

In particular a human rights policy has been problematic for Japan. For various reasons Japan has been reluctant to place human rights on its foreign policy agenda. Japan's foreign-policy makers have not usually come under heavy pressure from the nation's grass-roots movements. The dependence of Japan's economy on a conservative and feudalistic Saudi Arabia, as well as Japan's sensitive relationships with China and the Republic of Korea, force it to think twice before speaking out on human rights. Moreover Japan's sense of guilt after World War II, especially toward China and Korea, puts a psychological brake on criticizing human rights violations and exerting diplomatic pressure. A vigorous human rights policy is regarded as the luxury of countries such as the United States and France, who were able to claim a kind of moral superiority because of their victory in the war.

Such constraints will not easily disappear. But Japan has begun exploring ways to set certain political conditions on its economic aid policy. Tokyo has now placed four criteria—level of military expenditure; potential for atomic, biological and chemical weapons; arms trade and democratization—on future aid to developing countries. Although the effectiveness of this new approach remains to be seen, it clearly reflects the stronger yearnings of the Japanese public.

An extremely delicate case concerns Japan's relationship with China, as demonstrated by Japan's tortured diplomacy following the Tiananmen Square incident. Although Japan should be mindful of its strategic relationship with China, it must still effectively convey Japan's aspirations for human rights to Chinese authorities as well as the Chinese people. Otherwise the Sino-Japanese relationship may come to be viewed at home as well as abroad as a collusion between apparatchiks of both ruling parties and the single-minded

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pursuit of Japanese economic interests. Such an appearance would not only undermine the value of the Sino-Japanese relationship but also hinder any broader attempts by Japan to pursue a more vigorous policy on human rights.

Protection of human rights will also be more crucial to peacekeeping efforts among nations in the 1990s as the world faces more ethnic and nationalistic conflicts. Ensuring that the rights of minorities are respected and internationally monitored is the most effective way to reduce the likelihood of conflict. But Japan also has minority groups, although relatively small. Japan's human rights diplomacy first and foremost should be directed at its own minorities, particularly its 600,000-strong Korean community, in order to enhance their political and economic status.

Japan's expression of values in foreign policy must be matched by more strenuous efforts to make its own political system more democratic, and its economic structure more open and liberal, so that Japan may serve as an example to developing nations and make its institutions and practices more compatible with like-minded democracies.

V

As part of a new foreign policy Japan also needs to initiate a fuller global partnership with the United States. The U.S.-Japanese "global partnership"—a new look designed at the spring 1990 meeting between President George Bush and Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu—proved to be a non-starter only several months later. Yet the concept should not be abandoned. Rather it must be further defined and developed as Japanese foreign policy matures.

Japan should not believe, however, that this means equal standing with the United States. The United States will be the sole superpower in the 1990s. Its superior military resources and logistics will probably make it the only country in the world capable of being a kind of "lender of last resort" in providing a security blanket in military crises. The relationship between the two countries can best be characterized as mutually supportive. Yet it is not necessary or desirable that Japan try to gain equal footing in sharing leadership. Japan's relationship with the United States, as well as its world role, is better defined as "supportive leadership." Its leadership role should not be primary, but auxiliary, to U.S. global posture and commitment.

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The Gulf War may have marked the return of an American unipolar system, but it also demonstrated the need for the United States to exert its leadership as part of a coalition. The Gulf War was but one example of the types of threats the world will confront in the future. Even a confident United States will not always be able to cope with a diversity of threats alone. The United States will be, at least for the foreseeable future, subject to financial limitations. It will also have to pay more attention to a wider range of issues that now qualify as security matters—its economy, the environment, human rights and drugs. These issues will pose problems for the traditional pattern of U.S. hegemonic leadership, because they require collective leadership and policy coordination. Finally, as Washington gradually disengages militarily from Europe and the Asian-Pacific region, it will likely face isolationist sentiments at home or, at least, milder domestic pressures to turn inward.

Japan's supportive leadership, therefore, should not be viewed as simply following the United States, neither should it be regarded as financial underwriting for U.S. military actions. It should instead be seen as providing collective goods indispensable in an age of collective leadership. Japan's major task will be to stimulate U.S. interest in the open global trading system. It must also manage the dollar so that the United States will be able to overcome its twin deficits while maintaining non-inflationary economic growth. Japan has an "absorber" function as well, principally regarding neighboring Asian-Pacific countries, in reducing the U.S. external trade imbalance and lessening the U.S. burden.

The U.S.-Japanese security alliance should continue to be the underpinning of a dynamic bilateral relationship and an anchor of future Asian-Pacific security. Japan's alliance with the United States is the third alliance Japan has forged in its modern history. But unlike the Anglo-Japanese alliance in the early part of the century and the Axis alliance with Germany and Italy prior to World War II, the U.S.-Japanese alliance is not a mere invention of realpolitik. It is a far more pervasive engagement and a symbol of friendship and stability between two societies. It can continue to function as such and help stabilize the Asian-Pacific framework.

At the same time Japan's excessive reliance on its bilateral relationship with the United States should be balanced by strengthening its multilateral (the United Nations, GATT), trilateral (G-7, OECD) and regional diplomacies (APEC). As more

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constraints are placed on U.S. leadership and as the need for policy coordination grows, both the United States and Japan will need to search for wider options and alternatives to their previous relationship. Japan's contribution to this task is the essence of supportive leadership.

VI

Japan must not delude itself that its identity can be developed in purely regional terms, its economy sustained in an Asian bloc and its political ambitions fulfilled in Asian-Pacific integration alone. Yet Japan must have a regional strategy. Such a strategy must not be confined to Asia, particularly East Asia, but widened to the Asian-Pacific rim, which includes the United States. Its objective must be to keep the region open, peaceful and democratic. Regionalism for this purpose can be called "Pacific globalism."

In the coming years Japan's strategy of Pacific globalism should consist of three pillars:

—to promote regional economic growth and development as well as the liberalization and multilateralization of trade and investment in the region;

—to enhance regional peacekeeping and peace-building mechanisms and measures by stimulating U.S. commitment and engagement; and

—to incorporate the region's rapidly changing socialist countries—the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and North Korea—as responsible players.

As for regional economic liberalization, Japan can sustain and reinvigorate U.S. global trading interests and posture by infusing Pacific globalism into the aging globalism set in place by the Atlantic Charter. Japan could accomplish this by promoting stronger interest in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). In doing so Japan can play a constructive role in deterring European and North American regionalism from becoming exclusivist and create a more favorable milieu for Soviet and Chinese regional integration. Such a policy would also help mitigate inward-looking, nationalistic thrusts in Asian countries and calls for their own restrictive regional grouping. A U.S. presence and contribution is essential to the formation of any Asian-Pacific arrangement, and Japan should thus resist Malaysian Prime

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Minister Mahathir's call for an East Asian Economic Grouping, because of its exclusivity.

While APEC is currently an embryonic organization, it could gradually be transformed into a policy coordinating body. Future annual meetings could be held at the head-of-state level and timed to precede the G-7's annual summits. Japan, with the United States and Canada, could then represent APEC's interests at these summits. When APEC matures it may even be worthwhile exploring the possibility that its chief attend G-7 summits, in a fashion similar to EC representation.

One way Japan could enhance APEC is by liberalizing its own trade and economic systems and maintaining vigorous domestic demand. A part of this effort should be to engage in a multilateral Structural Impediments Initiative with the United States and western Europe, preferably within the framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Japanese leadership for more open economic systems must first be rooted in its own market liberalization. SII talks target politically sensitive sectors of the Japanese economy, such as banking, securities, distribution, transportation and construction industries, which have more or less remained untouched by the liberalization processes of the past three decades. SII implementation will help lay the groundwork for harmonization of Japan's economic and social system by gradually breaking up the collusion of vested interests. By setting an example in transforming its own noncompetitive structures, Japan could urge other trading partners to do the same.

Japan could also set in motion a new process of coordination between the micro and macroeconomic policies of nations within the G-7. Moreover it should cooperate with the United States and western Europe to manage a more stable currency relationship among the dollar, yen and European Currency Unit. It will be crucial for all three parties to intensify their efforts to promote future cooperation not only for economic reasons, but for political and strategic reasons as well.

In the realm of security Japan is likely to continue to be constrained from playing a leading role even in the 1990s. U.S. leadership will still be required to stabilize the region, and U.S. bilateral alliances with certain nations, particularly Japan and Australia, will remain necessary to anchor the regional security framework. Japan's role will be as a support. But that role should be pursued in the name of broader regional security, rather than Japan's security alone.

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

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

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

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While the United States and a reinvigorated United Nations are indispensable to fostering a better security climate, Asian-Pacific countries themselves must discuss security matters more directly with one another. The problem for Japan's regional security may lie with Japan itself. Japan's reluctance to face up to its past colonization of Korea, invasion of China, domination over Southeast Asia and guilt for war crimes—and its feeble effort to educate its people about this history—generate deep suspicion and mistrust all over Asia. This reluctance also creates complacent and self-indulgent views of Japan's history among Japanese themselves. Japan's new nationalistic thrusts, though still amorphous, may gather momentum and run a dangerous course if not soon checked and redressed. This perception that Japan has not come to terms with its own past puts a fundamental obstacle before its pursuit of an effective regional policy.

Japan must also pursue an effective peace structure for Northeast Asia. Such a structure, however, should not copy the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Asia's security environment and political configuration are too different from Europe's. In Asia, particularly in Northeast Asia, it is more realistic to build multilayer security regimes. Confidence-building measures should be introduced on the Korean Peninsula under the auspices of an Asian "two plus four": North and South Korea along with the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan.

It is also advisable that concerned parties—the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, Japan, China and the Koreas—begin to undertake a reduction of military capabilities in the region. Northern territory areas could eventually be demilitarized and a free economic zone introduced that incorporates Soviet maritime provinces and a free port at Vladivostok. The U.S. naval nuclear presence could be reduced, proportionate to a reduction of the Soviet land and nuclear arsenals and Soviet logistical capabilities. The United States-Japan Security Treaty, however, should be maintained as an anchor of regional stability.

With regard to China, Japan and the United States should encourage China, as a regional power, to participate in Asian-Pacific economic expansion. But both the United States and Japan should beware of emerging political forces in China, such as a "new authoritarian school," that may urge Japan to join in opposing the "human rights imperialism of the United

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States." Japan also has a deep-rooted cultural and psychological affinity toward China that may take political shape, spurred by mounting frustration over "Japan-bashing" in the United States. But Japan should refrain from trying to establish an exclusive "special relationship" with Beijing.

Finally, Japan's relationship with the Soviet Union (or the Russian republic) may be normalizing. This is due to a possible settlement of the still unresolved Northern Territories issue. If such a settlement finally comes to pass, economic development in Siberia and the Soviet Far East could gain momentum with an infusion of Japanese capital and technology. Yet it is more advisable for Japan to explore ways to multilaterize development of the region.

VII

Japan's own political constraints affect its pursuit of a dynamic foreign policy. It took the gulf crisis to bring many of these shortcomings into stark relief. Tokyo lacked initiative and policy innovation, global institutions through which it could effectively pursue its policies, the acceptance of its leadership by its neighbors, and recognition of the contribution it could make to responsibility-sharing stemming from its unique power portfolio.

Japan must thus examine its own political and decision-making structures to try to overcome these constraints. Japanese societal and behavioral patterns and attitudes clash with the need for sometimes quick and dynamic formulation and implementation of foreign policy. The structural weaknesses of its leadership—highly personalized political allegiances among factions and parties, and the predominance of pork-barrel politics—characterize Japanese political culture and limit the projection of its foreign policy. These shortcomings may also be destabilizing factors in world financial markets. The inability of Japan's leadership to cope with the unrealistically high prices of land and stocks, for instance, has already caused a dangerous bubble—and burst—in Japanese financial markets, putting a grave strain on Japan's macroeconomic policies.

Japan's consumers, particularly its urban dwellers, increasingly find a gap between Japan's economic wealth and the quality of their standard of living, which sharpens their political awareness. But in addressing this gap Japan's bureaucrats and politicians have become a part of the problem rather

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than problem-solvers. The bureaucracy and its symbiotic "policy tribes" in the ruling LDP have formed "iron triangles" with protected industries to resist fundamental economic and social reforms.

The immobility of Japan's decision-making process is well exemplified by ubiquitous *gaiatsu* politics, which helps maintain the existing political order by blaming foreigners (often Washington) for uncomfortable accommodations. Future foreign policy success is thus essentially a function of overcoming the immobility of the Japanese system. This immobility is the product of institutional and cultural factors that include a bottom-to-top, consensus-oriented decision-making process, the supremacy of "domesticists" over the internationalists, and the need for domestic political institutions to achieve parity in burden-sharing.

Japan cannot ultimately develop an effective international role without a significant measure of domestic political change. Japan still has only one political party capable of ruling. The opposition does not have the psychology and policy positions required of a governing party. The quasi-coalition among the LDP, Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito in the gulf crisis was a telling example of political immaturity. A viable two or multiparty system is yet to evolve.

Yet the initiative for change must come from politicians, not from bureaucrats. The politicians must press for long-overdue political and electoral reform in order to assure better representation of the "silent majority" of its big-city constituents—a huge bloc of voters with a keener sense of Japan's enlightened self-interests. The politicians must start lively and constructive debates to enhance the development of meaningful policy proposals not dependent on the bureaucracy. They may have a better chance to do so in the coming years, now that the ideological overtones of the security issue—so characteristic of Diet debates in the Cold War era—are fading.

Japan will see a generational change in the leadership of all its major political parties in the next decade. More internationally minded, confident and self-assertive leaders will appear among the top echelons. At the same time new political forces—women, the elderly, consumer and environmental groups as well as local governments—will increasingly gain momentum. Some of these political forces will push Japan toward a more active foreign policy—for example, strong overtures toward the Pacific Soviet Union by certain prefec-

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tures on the Sea of Japan, pressures to open agricultural markets from Japanese consumer groups. But others may counter with emphasis on domestic issues involving "quality of life."

Japan may have to wait for this new generation of leaders, political parties and social forces in order to persuade its public that "quality of life" is increasingly linked to the stability and welfare of global security and economic systems—systems to which its voice and commitment contribute. But the national debate already appears to be starting. The painful lessons of the gulf crisis have helped to stimulate public interest and demands for the political reforms necessary for Japan to realize fully its new international role. A world power, after all, is a power with a commitment to others. Japan's path to power—as a global civilian power—must start with the commitment to reform from within and, increasingly, that seems destined to be the will of the public.

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Nancy Bernkopf Tucker

CHINA AND AMERICA: 1941–1991

How important is China to the United States? Among the most enduring legends of Sino-American interaction has been the insistence that Americans and Chinese have shared a special relationship, a friendship unusual in international affairs. But in truth China has always been of secondary significance to the United States—important simply in the context of crises with other countries. Only now, for the first time, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the absence of a new credible enemy must the United States deal with China for its own sake and decide where the Chinese fit in the American concept of a new world order.

The history of Sino-American relations in the past fifty years has been a tale of how Americans, preoccupied with the affairs of Europe, thought they could use China, subordinating its needs and interests to the realization of weightier objectives elsewhere. China played a role in defeating Japan and Germany in the 1940s, slowing Soviet industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s, and complicating Moscow's defenses in the 1970s and 1980s. The United States did not focus on China, as China, because its lack of wealth and its purely regional power did not necessitate direct attention.

Not surprisingly, disappointment plagued this distorted relationship. Neither country seemed willing or able to fulfill the expectations of the other. Americans saw the Chinese both as allies and adversaries, as people to be helped and feared, as potential customers and competitors, as strategic partners and expansionist aggressors. Such contradictions colored the efforts of statesmen to structure policy and of the public to understand what has transpired between the two states.

Differences in political objectives were aggravated by cultural discord. Americans determined to elicit political and social reforms commensurate with their investments—financial and emotional—felt frustrated by the Chinese rejection of Western values. Both before and after the communist

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takeover in 1949 China sought to modernize without having to Westernize.[1] A source of tension throughout the Third World, the clash between change and tradition has been nowhere more powerful than in China and nowhere more troublesome than in Sino-American relations.

II

Possibly the most striking illustration of China's peripheral status and the thwarting of both Chinese and American expectations can be found in their respective responses to the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. What President Franklin D. Roosevelt called a day of infamy was a blessing to Nationalist (Kuomintang) Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek in his fog-enshrouded wartime capital. According to an observer in Chongqing, "The military council was jubilant. Chiang was so happy he sang an old opera aria. . . . The Kuomintang government officials went around congratulating each other, as if a great victory had been won."[2] The divergence between America's distress and China's joy underscored the differences between American and Chinese national interests. Washington, although now China's ally and a more forthright participant in the anti-Japanese struggle, put the war in Europe and the defeat of Hitler first. Roosevelt wanted to use the Chinese to bleed Japan, to thwart Tokyo's attempt to create a new order in Asia and seize European colonial holdings. To these ends the United States tried to reorganize Chiang's war effort by diverting him from China's civil conflict, training his troops and providing an American commander.

Chiang Kai-shek, in contrast, had assumed that the United States would take over the fight against Japan, freeing him to concentrate on eliminating the internal communist threat. The Nationalist leader saw no reason to send his soldiers to die opposing Tokyo when Americans could defeat Japan without them, and he had no use for the American commander and adviser in China, General Joseph Stilwell, whose efforts to replace loyal but inept Chinese officers threatened to destabi-

[1]See the stimulating argument offered by Paul A. Cohen, "The Post-Mao Reforms in Historical Perspective," *Journal of Asian Studies*, August 1988, pp. 518–540. The use here of the terms Westernize/Westernization is somewhat different: a shorthand for acceptance of Western political culture.

[2]Han Suyin as quoted in Michael Schaller, *United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 70.

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lize his regime. Chiang expected Washington simply to send money, tend to the larger war and leave him to deal with China's domestic politics.

The clash in priorities escalated when Americans sought contacts with Mao Zedong's forces at Yan'an. Negotiations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were vital to the rescue of downed U.S. pilots and the staging of an American assault on Japan's home islands from the Chinese coast. They would also allow the American military access to the only "allies" operating freely behind Japanese lines in north China. But the Nationalists adamantly rejected the idea of consorting with their enemy, relenting only under extreme pressure. And the Nationalists arguably had been right in their resistance, given the enthusiasm with which Americans responded to the communist Chinese. The Americans praised Mao's government and army, whose energy, integrity, efficiency and idealism so forcefully highlighted the corruption, disarray and torpor of the Nationalists. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai welcomed the first American observer mission by celebrating the Fourth of July in 1944 and offering to travel to Washington to meet with Roosevelt to coordinate war strategies.

Nevertheless the United States remained, if reluctantly, tied to the Kuomintang government, disappointing the communists and encouraging the Nationalist Party to maintain an unrealistic assessment of its importance to Washington. In actuality Chiang's refusal to mount an energetic effort against Japan gradually eroded U.S. support and ensured substitution of an island-hopping strategy for winning the Pacific war. But, although he despaired of making Chiang an active wartime asset, Roosevelt continued to imagine that China after the peace could become a great power and useful American partner. Thus he insisted, over the protests of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, that the Chinese be given a seat in the Security Council of the soon to be created United Nations.

Such extravagant assertions of China's significance did not prevent Roosevelt's willing betrayal of Chinese interests at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 in pursuit of better relations with the Soviet Union and a swifter end to the war. In exchange for Moscow's agreement to fight in the Pacific and to sign a treaty with Chiang's government, Roosevelt arbitrarily sacrificed China's control over Outer Mongolia, Port Arthur and Dairen, as well as a share in the Chinese Eastern and South Manchuria railways. Although the United States could have

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done little to keep these territories and assets out of Soviet hands, it is also true that the president neither sought Chiang's approval nor worried much about the postwar impact of these choices on China's sovereignty.

III

President Roosevelt's compromises at Yalta did nothing to prevent the deterioration in Soviet-American relations that accelerated with the end of the Second World War. Americans insisted upon forward bases and open markets vulnerable to U.S. domination. The Soviets demanded security buffers and exploited unrest to spread revolutionary ideology. The resulting Cold War pitted competing blocs of antagonistic states against each other, slowly inducing the United States to see that China's strategic location and market potential could actually make it a useful partner.

America's policy in the tense days immediately following Japan's surrender consisted of creating a strong and prosperous China by avoiding renewal of civil conflict and focusing government attention on political reform and economic rehabilitation. If Harry Truman felt constrained to support anti-communist forces under Chiang Kai-shek, he nevertheless did not yet see the Cold War as the critical variable in Asia and could contemplate establishing a Nationalist-Communist coalition. But Chiang, confident of U.S. patronage, refused compromise, opting for military victory. He disregarded American advice and tried to project his forces into Manchuria beyond the capacity of his supply system. His forces squandered popular support by preying upon the newly liberated cities of east China, treating the citizenry as collaborators for having lived under Japanese rule. His interference in battlefield command threw planning into disarray, and when the People's Liberation Army trapped frontline troops Chiang bombed his own units to prevent their equipment from falling into enemy hands.

Chiang saw the key to success as unstinting American aid. In a relentless campaign to secure ever-increasing amounts of assistance, he devised inventive ways to entangle the United States directly in the war effort. But despite U.S. assistance amounting to $2 billion between 1945 and 1949, neither money nor weapons could compensate for what the Nationalists lacked in competent leadership, ideals or popular devotion. Furthermore Chiang's suspicion of foreigners and dis-

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trust of modernization projects that threatened his control reinforced Washington's inclination to focus on pressing European problems, such as the Berlin blockade and implementation of the Marshall Plan, where American help would be better utilized and more appreciated.[3]

As a result the Truman administration searched for ways to escape Chiang's grasp and move toward diplomatic relations with a new regime in China. In August 1949 Secretary of State Dean Acheson published an exposé of Chiang's blundering, known as the China White Paper, which argued that a generous and sympathetic United States could do no more on Chiang's behalf. Acheson spoke publicly of the practical value of diplomatic relations. Despite incidents like the house arrest of Consul General Angus Ward by communist forces in Mukden and labor confrontations with businessmen in Shanghai, American missionaries, diplomats and others remarked upon the surprising civility shown to foreigners in the midst of a civil war.

By December 1949 the Kuomintang's demise appeared imminent. Chiang had been forced to flee the mainland and had taken refuge among a hostile population on the island of Taiwan. American intelligence asserted that a communist attack would encounter little Nationalist resistance. On January 5, 1950, Truman announced that the United States would not interfere. Acheson placed Taiwan and Korea outside America's defensive perimeter in Asia. It was only a matter of time before Taiwan would collapse and the administration could accept the reality of communist control in Beijing.

For the United States, however, there could be no simple transition from Nationalist to communist control in China. Republican desperation to recapture the presidency in the late 1940s triggered a "red scare," blighting domestic affairs and undermining American foreign policy. Borrowing charges from the "China lobby" (a conglomeration of missionaries, businessmen, publishers, journalists, military figures and politicians who vigorously promoted the interests of Chiang and the Kuomintang), the GOP insisted that communist sympathizers in the State Department had "lost China." But it remained for the Korean War and Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-Wis.) to turn China's loss into political dynamite. In need of an election

[3]Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny*, New York: Roy Publishers, 1947. The volume originally was published in China in 1943.

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issue, McCarthy waged a vitriolic attack upon the Truman administration, sweeping otherwise responsible Republicans up in the frenzy. The senator knew little about China but, armed with documents from China lobby activist Alfred Kohlberg, McCarthy capitalized on the shock arising from sudden war in Asia to generate national hysteria.

North Korea's attempt to unify the Korean peninsula had a profound impact upon the course of the Cold War and Sino-American relations. Truman's resistance to huge military budgets evaporated. The administration used the Korean War to justify rearming Germany and militarizing NATO. It escalated appropriations to France for the fight against Ho Chi Minh in Indochina and dispatched its first technical advisers. Soon the United States would disregard Soviet and Chinese objections to conclude a peace treaty with Japan and would sign security pacts with Japan, Australia and New Zealand.[4]

For Chinese-American relations the Korean War proved an unmitigated disaster. Beijing leaders had taken Truman and Acheson at their word and anticipated an unopposed effort to oust Chiang from Taiwan. But Washington now reversed itself and placed the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait to prevent expansion of the war either by a CCP attack or a Nationalist feint that would force U.S. intervention. Beijing's frustration was compounded by fear when U.S. forces, under U.N. auspices, threatened China's Yalu River border. Recently revealed documents from Beijing indicate that Mao, believing a military confrontation with the United States inevitable over either Vietnam, Taiwan or Korea, opted to fight in the arena most accessible and easiest to control.[5] Thus Zhou Enlai cautioned the Americans not to move north, and when they dismissed his warnings because the Chinese appeared weak and preoccupied with domestic troubles—not a match in any case for American soldiers—China struck.

President Truman had hoped that a short conflict in Korea would mean but a brief reinvolvement in the Chinese civil war and a momentary distraction from European affairs. Although

[4]Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, December 1980.

[5]Exciting new work on China and the Korean War has been appearing recently. See Zhai Zhihai and Hao Yufan, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," *China Quarterly*, March 1990; Chen Jian, "China's Changing Aims During the Korean War," manuscript; and the important review essay by Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," *Diplomatic History*, Summer 1991.

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the president was quickly reassured that war in Korea was not simply a diversion to facilitate communist aggression in the West, he continued escalating military expenditures for Europe, revealing the administration's true priorities. But the Korean War dragged on and, despite administration antipathy, the network of economic and military ties with the Kuomintang grew more complex and self-perpetuating.

IV

By the time the Republicans came to power in the White House in 1953, with what was supposedly a new attitude toward Chinese affairs, much of the structure of support for Taipei and harassment of Beijing was already in place. Nevertheless, Dwight Eisenhower chose to "unleash" Chiang Kai-shek. The president declared the Seventh Fleet would no longer protect the mainland from Chiang, thereby certifying his anticommunist credentials to the Republican right.[6]

But the president and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, were never the staunch proponents of Chiang's cause that they pretended to be in public. In reality they had a far more tenuous relationship with his regime and far less interest in Chinese affairs.[7] Both men preferred to focus on Atlantic concerns and dealt with China reluctantly. When they could not avoid the China problem, they combined moderate attitudes with belligerent rhetoric. Eisenhower actually believed that trade with the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) would be in America's interests and that diplomatic relations were unavoidable. Dulles became convinced that a "two Chinas" policy provided the only viable course for Washington. His disagreements with Chiang over troops on the offshore islands and in Burma, over returning to the mainland and over defense commitments gradually alienated him. Thus Chiang discovered that "unleashing" neither freed him to move against Red China nor implied U.S. support for such an

[6]Pu Shan, an aide to Zhou Enlai in 1953, remarked in retrospect that the indignity of American presidents leashing or unleashing Chiang like a dog said much to Beijing about problems in the Washington-Taipei relationship. Author's interview with Pu Shan, Beijing, 1987.

[7]Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the 'Two Chinas' Policy," in Richard H. Immerman, ed., *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, pp. 235–62; and "A House Divided: The United States, the Department of State, and China," in Warren I. Cohen, ed., *The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953–1960*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, pp. 35–62; and "Cold War Contacts: America and China, 1952–1956," in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., *Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955*, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1989, pp. 238–66.

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endeavor. In fact the new administration secretly imposed restrictions more onerous than any dictated by the Truman administration. Chiang henceforth had to clear any large-scale assault on the mainland with Washington—a clearance Eisenhower never intended to give.

The Taiwan Straits crises of the 1950s convincingly demonstrated how inaccurately expectations were being calculated on all sides. The Nationalists anticipated unqualified American support, objected to Washington's unwillingness explicitly to affirm protection for Quemoy and Matsu, and refused to remove their troops from the islands to eliminate grounds for future confrontations. The Americans thought that they could dictate Chiang's cooperation rather than be manipulated by him. But in 1954, solely to prevent a Nationalist veto barring U.N. intervention in the crisis, Dulles reluctantly agreed to a mutual defense treaty with Taipei. Beijing, at the same time, misread the Americans, hoping that bombardment of the islands might deter deeper American involvement in the area by making it appear too dangerous. Later in 1958 Washington assumed that Beijing meant to seize the offshore islands when, in fact, the P.R.C. had decided to leave them in Kuomintang hands as a "land bridge" between Taiwan and the mainland.

The United States miscalculated not only Chinese intentions but also the impact of American actions on world opinion. Washington appalled its allies with its willingness to risk nuclear war for worthless islands and a discredited regime. Support of the Nationalists, in large part designed to demonstrate American credibility and steadfastness in the defense of Western Europe, clashed with a European emphasis on the need for prudence. To attest to its reasonableness, the administration agreed to talk with the P.R.C. in Warsaw despite Taiwan's objections, creating a forum for contact more frequent than for many official representatives in Beijing. Although few concrete results followed, periodic meetings discouraged confrontations and ultimately expedited rapprochement.

V

Among the most enduring myths of Sino-American relations has been the assertion that John F. Kennedy intended to recognize the People's Republic of China. In fact little evidence has been provided for such a scenario. Instead it would appear that Kennedy pursued a policy at times more rigid

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

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than that of Eisenhower, that he feared China more intensely and that he placated Chiang Kai-shek more assiduously. Certainly the communist Chinese nursery rhymes that mocked and condemned Kennedy suggested that Beijing did not see him as likely to allay frictions between the two countries.[8]

Contradictory indicators existed. The Kennedy State Department undertook a serious reexamination of China policy early in the administration. The desire to improve relations by relaxing travel restrictions and providing food aid captured the imagination of China experts and high-level diplomats. Perhaps most significantly, in 1962 when Chiang provoked a third Taiwan Straits crisis by mustering troops for an assault on the mainland, Washington used the Warsaw talks to assure Beijing that there would be no invasion.

More often Kennedy approached China as a pragmatic cold warrior. In striking contrast to Eisenhower, the young Democratic president secretly pledged to Chiang use of America's veto in the Security Council to keep the P.R.C. out of the United Nations. Kennedy believed his sympathies would eventually necessitate blocking China and so, against the advice of his experts, he chose to benefit from the inevitable by trading his veto for Chiang's cooperation on other issues.

Kennedy's suspicion of China appeared to grow rather than abate during his presidency. Although the split between Moscow and Beijing became increasingly obvious, Kennedy persistently dismissed it as an argument over how to bury the United States. Instead of courting China as Dean Acheson might have done and Richard Nixon eventually did, he looked solely to the Soviet Union for détente. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin gave impetus to this posture by planting the belief that Nikita S. Khrushchev's Cuban missile gamble had been in part a response to the radical taunts of the Chinese. But in any case Kennedy found the Soviets less threatening than the so-called yellow peril. Beijing's incursion into India during the peak of the Cuban missile crisis, moreover, reaffirmed a view of the Chinese as dangerous and alienated many of those in the administration, like John Kenneth Galbraith, who had been pushing for reconciliation.[9]

The situation in Vietnam also made better relations less feasible. The Kennedy team attributed trouble with the 1962

[8]Author's interview with Professor Wang Jisi, Peking University, 1987.
[9]Warren I. Cohen, *Dean Rusk*, Totowa, NJ: Cooper Square, 1980, pp. 169–70.

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Laotian accords and the deterioration of conditions in South Vietnam to Chinese influence. Escalation of American involvement there in turn convinced the Chinese of a U.S. desire to encircle them.

None of these developments, however, frightened Kennedy as profoundly as China's steady progress toward possession of an atomic bomb. Indeed, here, Kennedy momentarily ceased to view the P.R.C. through the lens of third country challenges, by taking it seriously as a military threat. Kennedy became obsessed with the idea that the Chinese would "go nuclear" and then intimidate the rest of Asia. The administration went so far as to discuss its fears with the Soviets, and one scholar has contended that Ambassador Averell Harriman carried a message to Moscow proposing a joint strike against Chinese research and development facilities.[10] Even though the Chinese breakthrough in 1964 passed uneventfully, Secretary of State Dean Rusk was not above evoking the image of "a billion Chinese, armed with nuclear weapons" as late as 1967 to justify the Johnson administration's policy in Southeast Asia.

But by the mid-1960s China seemed more likely to self-destruct than wield atomic bombs against the United States or its Asian neighbors. Acting on his concern that time had vitiated conviction, Mao Zedong plunged the nation into a frantic campaign to reaffirm values, a campaign that quickly deteriorated into a struggle for power. China's Cultural Revolution ironically coincided with the first major steps toward liberalization of America's China policy. Responding to growing public discussion of "containment without isolation" as a way to reach out to China without risk, Congress held hearings to explore the possibility of modifying the China policy. But when Johnson himself echoed the theme, the Chinese had already descended into the abyss and could not be distracted from self-generated anarchy.

China's implosion also took its toll in Vietnam. American involvement in the Indochina war had arisen out of concern for France's position in Europe but had deepened, in part, in response to the threat from communism in Asia. With Chinese foreign policy in disarray, rather than retrench Johnson pressed his advantage with troop escalations in the south and

[10]See Gordon Chang's controversial article "JFK, China and the Bomb," *Journal of American History*, March 1988.

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bombing missions ever closer to the Chinese border in the north.[11] Washington policymakers, troubled by the 1965 words of heir apparent Lin Biao encouraging wars of national liberation, overlooked China's anxiety regarding the growth of Vietnamese power and convinced themselves that with the Third World under siege America could not be found wanting in Vietnam.

VI

But if Vietnam served to escalate tensions between the United States and China in the early 1960s, it helped to initiate the process of rapprochement at the end of the decade. Nixon had declared in a 1967 *Foreign Affairs* article that China should no longer be treated as a pariah.[12] He increasingly thought of China as a strategic partner to deter the Soviets, conceivably as a market to remedy U.S. economic ills and certainly as a foreign policy triumph with attendant domestic political acclaim. Most immediately he believed that pressure exerted through a Beijing friendly to Washington could force Hanoi to negotiate.

The outbreak of shooting along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 facilitated the reversal. Following on the heels of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Moscow's announcement in the Brezhnev Doctrine that it would act to save socialism wherever threatened, China concluded that Soviet belligerence necessitated support from the United States. Ultimately, although Beijing provided little direct assistance in getting the United States out of Vietnam, Americans and Chinese became useful assets to one another in a new international game of triangular politics.

Progress toward reconciliation accelerated after Chinese hard-liners, worried about security, ideology and Westernization, lost out to more pragmatic leadership. In April 1971, signaling advances secretly negotiated by diplomats, Zhou Enlai welcomed a team of American ping-pong players to China. In late October the United States acquiesced in a U.N. vote to expel Taipei and to grant Beijing a seat in the United Nations. Although determined to preserve "Free China,"

[11]U.S. officials simultaneously signaled to assure China that no direct threat was intended, according to Allen S. Whiting, who from 1962 to 1966 headed the Far East Division of the Intelligence and Research Office at the U.S. State Department, and Chinese diplomat and Warsaw negotiator Wang Bingnan. Author's interviews, 1988.

[12]Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1967.

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Nixon signed a document, the Shanghai communiqué, during his historic visit to the P.R.C. in February 1972, agreeing not to challenge Beijing's position that there was only one China and Taiwan was a part of it (a view that the Nationalists in fact shared). Eager to give the Chinese incentives to facilitate a settlement of the war in Vietnam, the United States promised that as the level of violence in the area diminished Washington would withdraw its troops from the island.

Great expectations engendered by the breakthrough once again brought disappointment. First the Watergate scandal impeded American efforts. Nixon could no longer risk alienating conservatives whose opposition to recognizing communist China remained strong. The Chinese failed to comprehend Nixon's disgrace and condemned American faintheartedness. Soon, however, political turmoil in China added to the difficulties. In 1976 both Zhou and Mao died, and Mao's radical allies purged Deng Xiaoping, leaving the policy of opening to the United States without a patron.

Only Deng's rapid return to power and his daring program of economic reform helped to swing the pendulum back. Anxious to realize Zhou's plan of the "four modernizations" (in agriculture, industry, science and technology and the military), Deng recognized the opportunities created by foreign trade and investment. Simultaneously Jimmy Carter, prodded by national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, looked to an alignment with China to curb the Soviet Union, allowing Sino-American relations to be governed yet again by Soviet-American tensions. Moreover, in the wake of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, the timing could not have been more propitious. Deng agreed that China would not reclaim Taiwan by force, anticipating that China's improved relations with the United States would serve to check Vietnam's Soviet allies while Beijing punished Hanoi. Normalization, long sought, became reality with breathtaking speed.

The rapidity and secrecy with which the American government moved, intended to distress the Soviets, shocked and dismayed others as well. The Nationalists on Taiwan, of course, were horrified. The final indignity in the tortuous reconciliation process that had subjected Taiwan to repeated humiliations since 1971 arrived when the American ambassador, Leonard Unger, woke Chiang in the middle of the night to notify him that diplomatic relations were to be severed in the morning. In Congress the administration's blatant disre-

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gard for legislative consultation as prescribed in the 1978 Dole-Stone Amendment, coupled with genuine alarm at having abandoned an ally, triggered a bipartisan backlash. The resulting Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 strengthened administration assurances that the Nationalists would continue to receive military assistance, despite renunciation of the 1954 mutual defense treaty, and provided civil mechanisms to simplify continued economic, political and cultural contacts between the United States and Taiwan.

VII

Normalization based on opposition to a common enemy rather than on mutual understanding provided only a temporary respite from frictions. The TRA went further than the Carter White House had intended in protecting Taiwan. Beijing, angered by American interference in its internal affairs, did not comprehend that congressional action could be allowed to contradict executive branch policy. Annoyance over the act escalated into outrage during the 1980 presidential campaign. Ronald Reagan refused to acknowledge the Shanghai communiqué and repudiated Carter's shameful abandonment of Taiwan.

The campaign speeches proved but the first in a series of Reagan actions that soured relations with Beijing and gave the Nationalists false hope about Washington's intentions. As president-elect, for instance, Reagan invited Taipei to send a representative to his inauguration—an invitation that had to be hastily withdrawn. As president he declared that he would rather adopt tennis star Hu Na than force her to return to China when she sought asylum in the United States. More seriously the administration persisted in selling arms to Taiwan in excess of Beijing's expectations. By the end of 1981 Deng had concluded that Reagan's unreliability justified a stance more equidistant between Washington and Moscow. The Sino-American accommodation nurtured by three administrations seemed to be unraveling. When in early 1982 intense Chinese pressure stopped sales of advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan but failed to prevent transfer of less sophisticated planes, Beijing remained dissatisfied and Taipei felt betrayed.

A joint communiqué, signed on August 17, 1982, arrested the precipitous deterioration of relations between Washington and Beijing but as always seemed to promise more than would be delivered. The United States agreed not to increase the

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quality or quantity of weapons sold to Taiwan and committed itself to gradual reductions. Beijing thought it had negotiated an end, if a distant one, to American support for Taiwan. In reality the United States, by recalculating past levels, significantly augmented the assistance it could give and postponed termination by decreasing sales minimally. Further it denied that the communiqué covered transfer of technology, and it supplied Taiwan with the capability to produce its own advanced weaponry.

Despite such maneuvers, ties between the United States and China revived and flourished during the Reagan years while Washington turned its attention to the threat posed by the Soviet "evil empire." Arguments that Beijing could help contain Moscow, coupled with Chinese hospitality during a 1984 Reagan visit, appear to have persuaded the president to desist from provocative rhetoric and live with a Red China. The United States became one of the leading foreign investors in the P.R.C. and trade boomed. Collaboration in fields as diverse as theater and nuclear energy expanded dramatically. By the late 1980s some 40,000 Chinese studied in the United States and American teachers, researchers and students were scattered throughout the Chinese countryside. The election of George Bush to the presidency in 1988, given his experience in Beijing as head of America's liaison office, seemed to be the perfect complement to these developments.

But the solidarity of the relationship that diplomats on both sides spoke about in reverential tones proved deceptive. There had, indeed, been a flaw all along. Although accommodation had proceeded from strategic concerns on both sides, the Chinese had also been motivated by the desire for American technology and trade. Yet behind Chinese interest in U.S. science remained resistance to Westernization. Chinese leaders repeatedly cautioned that Americans should not misunderstand China's willingness to educate its youth in the United States. There must be no nineteenth-century-style effort to patronize China, no spiritual pollution. A recurrent theme in the repressive campaigns of 1979–80, 1983–84 and 1986–87, this fear of an American-influenced "bourgeois liberalization" lurked just beneath all the exchanges and surfaced whenever groups within the country began to talk about democracy.

The crisis at Tiananmen Square in June 1989 demonstrated how rash expectations were that Chinese-American relations had matured beyond dangerous misperceptions. Americans

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saw the crowds in the square and assumed, incorrectly, that they were witnessing a vast popular uprising demanding immediate implementation of American-style multiparty democracy. The conviction that the Chinese people yearned to be more like Americans magnified American repugnance for the Beijing regime and unprecedented concern for human rights in China.

Chinese leaders, in their horror at the uncontrolled demonstrations of national disaffection—a clear indication of the dangers of Westernization—assumed that they could use force to suppress opposition, that international and American objections would be muted and quickly forgotten. But television cameras made the events at Tiananmen Square visible everywhere, and the crackdown did not fade. The American Embassy in Beijing, moreover, became a direct participant when it gave refuge to dissident astrophysicist Fang Lizhi and his wife. Assertions were also made that Voice of America broadcasts had helped to create and sustain the crisis.

The obvious threat to Sino-American relations induced President Bush publicly to chide the Chinese government but privately to try to bridge troubled waters. Twice in the months following the Tiananmen Square massacre, secret missions headed by National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft traveled to Beijing to maintain contacts, provide briefings and avert a deterioration of strained relations. The president labored to avoid the worst of the sanctions Congress sought to impose on Beijing, particularly withdrawal of most-favored-nation trade status.

China's leaders, however, believed that they could propitiate the United States without risking domestic control and sacrificing Chinese values. They might generously permit the assistant secretary of state for human rights, Richard Schifter, to come to Beijing in December 1990 to explain American concerns, but never intended to remedy the problems he identified. They allowed Fang Lizhi to leave his uncomfortable "imprisonment" at the American Embassy but kept hundreds of others languishing in jail. Interference with Voice of America transmission and academic exchange projects became commonplace. The proposed Peace Corps program in China, which threatened to carry democratic principles into the countryside along with technical assistance, was terminated. American plots to subvert Chinese communist control through encouragement of "peaceful evolution" would be no more

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acceptable in 1991 than in the abrasive days of Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles.

Other problems added to the fragility of the relationship. Disputes over textiles and trade deficits, nuclear proliferation and weapons sales, as well as computer software piracy, proved increasingly volatile given the adverse atmosphere. Human rights issues including birth control, the production of export goods by prison labor and the crackdown in Tibet also received more attention as American activists waged a campaign to eliminate what they claimed had long been a double standard for China.

VIII

With Sino-American amity already so seriously undermined, the end of the Cold War removed the single most important impetus behind cooperation and the primary justification for compromise. Joint strategic planning against the Soviet Union motivated presidents from Nixon to Bush to make concessions to China. The complicated game of triangular politics encouraged the growth of trade and cultural ties and led Americans to ignore disquieting evidence of Beijing's unrepentant autocracy. But as the Soviet Union, as well as the Soviet threat, vanishes, China's leverage and license also disappear.

Efforts to substitute new types of cooperation against lesser enemies have not succeeded. Beijing did adhere to the anti-Iraq coalition long enough to cast several U.N. votes in favor of curbing Baghdad's aggression, but President Bush failed to elicit Beijing's support for military action. In exchange for violating his own prohibitions against high-level contacts by meeting with the Chinese foreign minister in Washington, all Bush managed to obtain was Chinese abstention from rather than opposition to war. The administration neglected to take account of China's sensitivity to any appearance of Western oppression and accordingly anticipated its participation when China never intended to join in. Subsequent White House anger demonstrated the dangers of misperception and the frailty of relations based on cooperation against other countries.

China's suggestion that growing militarism in Japan necessitates Sino-American collaboration need hardly be taken seriously. Even in 1941 the United States did not go to war with Japan to save China. Americans focused on defeating Germany, which meant tying Japanese forces down in China

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so that they could not march upon the Soviet Union. It meant preserving colonial empires to help finance and provide raw materials to European allies. It meant defending the southern Pacific so that troops from the Commonwealth could continue to fight in the Middle East and South Asia. Had the issue been China alone the United States might never have confronted Japan at all.

There are nevertheless several reasons why Sino-American relations remain important to both Washington and Beijing. China continues to benefit economically and technologically from its American connection. The United States may not need China to balance the Soviet Union, but the Chinese can facilitate settlements in Cambodia and on the Korean peninsula. Washington hopes to curb destabilizing Chinese arms sales, and each nation remains alert to the other's nuclear arsenal. In areas such as environmental pollution and drug trafficking both countries will benefit from working together.

Still the United States must avoid expecting too much from its ties to China. The two nations have not been allies since World War II, and their conflicting goals even then led to disappointment and friction. Americans should abandon ill-founded assumptions that they can transform China internally. Stringent sanctions are more likely to consolidate opposition to the United States than against China's leadership. Far better to demand of the Chinese things that they can give: greater autonomy in Tibet rather than independence, adherence to a global nuclear nonproliferation regime rather than abandonment of intrusive domestic birth control programs. Americans ought to recognize that impatience is a cultural trait that the Chinese do not share and that the fear of political chaos is more universal in China than abhorrence of the current authoritarian regime. Change must come, but few Chinese would welcome cataclysmic transformation such as has reshaped eastern Europe and the Soviet Union since 1989. Americans should also dispense with the hoary notion that a hugely profitable China market waits to be exploited. The Chinese today may welcome American investment and assistance but still prefer self-reliant development that will encourage Westerners to go home.

The Chinese in turn must finally understand that modernization inevitably involves Westernization and global interdependence. This need not be seen as pollution of the Chinese spirit. The Asian minidragons (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong

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Kong and Singapore), whose economic successes gave impetus to China's reforms, have not abandoned political and cultural traditions to pattern themselves upon the United States, but neither do they remain inward-looking Confucian autocracies. The future of Sino-American relations, as indeed of China itself, depends upon Beijing's willingness to devise an amalgam—perhaps "creeping pluralism"—to carry it into the next century.

The legacy of Sino-American interaction since World War II suggests that the future will not be, indeed cannot be, without friction. Even the shock of Pearl Harbor failed to divert Washington from its fixation on Europe. China appeared of lesser importance but also so mired in poverty and obscurantist politics that it had little to offer the United States beyond a limited anti-Japanese front. In subsequent years Washington sometimes exaggerated Chinese power but rarely gave China much attention. Only the opportunity to join in an anti-Soviet alignment rescued Sino-American relations from marginality.

Today, although Asia finally occupies a significant place in the American consciousness, China's domestic contradictions still prevent it from being a great power and stymie American efforts to establish enduring ties. Until China can offer cooperation unencumbered by ideological reservations, an internal order less repressive of its own people and opportunities not destined to be buried by bureaucracy or disrupted by upheaval, the cycle of improvement between Washington and Beijing may have peaked.

Given a new world order in which threats are not as dire or as neatly defined as the erstwhile challenge from Moscow, in which resources are scarce and demand inordinate, the United States does not need China as much and will be both less generous and less forgiving. Americans may be right to question why their government should try so hard to placate Beijing. When their national security is at stake, Americans have been prepared to ally with the devil; in the absence of such a threat they prefer to associate with nations that share their values. Few today argue that China should be isolated or Sino-American ties be severed, but the time has come to rethink Sino-American relations, to find a common ground where benefits are truly mutual, where China and America see each other clearly, free from distractions posed by third parties and apocalyptic crises.

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Fredrick F. Chien

A VIEW FROM TAIPEI

Developments in East Asia may appear sluggish compared to the momentous changes in Europe and the Soviet Union. The Cold War lines that divide both China and Korea remain firmly in place, although rendered more permeable by flexible policies. East Asia's three communist countries—mainland China, North Korea and Vietnam—are still ruled by first-generation revolutionary leaders. In stark contrast to the peaceful unification of Germany, Vietnam was unified by a vast communist army. And mainland China (the People's Republic of China) is soon to extend its domination to Hong Kong—the citadel of capitalism in the East. Moreover the string of arms control measures achieved in the West has not found a counterpart in East Asia. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of accommodation, sweeping as it is, has only begun to thaw the chilly relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. For different reasons the major powers in this area appear unwilling or unable to change the current situation.

Yet beneath the surface important currents of change are discernible. First, East Asia ranks as the fastest growing area of the world in terms of economic output. Japan's gross national product, 50 years after Pearl Harbor, is double that of Germany. Japan is now the world's largest creditor, while its victorious World War II adversary, the United States, has slipped into being the world's largest debtor. Other East Asian economies are also doing well, with average growth rates that far outstrip those of the European Community.

Second, the process of democratization is moving apace in the Republic of China (R.O.C.) on Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines. The light of democracy that flickered to life in 1989 on the Chinese mainland has only been dimmed, not extinguished. In fact the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe may portend similar

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Fredrick F. Chien, former representative of the Coordination Council for North American Affairs in the United States, is Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China on Taiwan.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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developments in mainland China after the passing of its first-generation leaders.

Finally, a spirit of reconciliation seems to be prevailing in East Asia as well. The normalization of relations between mainland China and the Soviet Union and also Vietnam, as well as the establishment of diplomatic ties between Moscow and Seoul and expanding people-to-people interchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits are but a few examples. In short, while the Cold War structure remains largely intact in East Asia, global trends toward democratization, development and détente have deeply penetrated the area, and there are grounds for optimism about the future.

Since its withdrawal from the United Nations in 1971, the R.O.C. has aimed to maintain and expand its substantive relations with other countries. It has also sought to upgrade its economic structure and make itself more democratic. Today it is the fifteenth largest trading nation in the world, with a GNP more than one-third that of mainland China. The R.O.C. is widely recognized as having emerged from an era of isolation and irrelevance to become a potentially valuable contributor to the emerging new world order. By furthering trends toward democratization, development, international integration and détente, Taiwan may play an important role in promoting stability and prosperity in East Asia. In fact Taiwan's experience may someday be especially relevant to the future of a unified and democratic China.

II

The 1911 revolution led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen brought the Ching dynasty to an end, but failed to create a suitable environment for economic and political development. The following four decades were marked by fierce fighting among rival warlords, a communist insurgency and a Japanese invasion that eventually helped lead to the communist conquest of the mainland.

Since 1949 Taiwan has made slow progress toward democratization, the timing and direction of which was narrowly controlled by the government, taking into account the threat from mainland China and Taiwan's own socioeconomic development. By the mid-1980s Taiwan and Singapore had become the only non-oil exporting countries in the world with per capita incomes of at least $5,000 a year that did not have fully competitive democratic systems. But today Taiwan has finally

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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developed the proper economic and social base for successful democracy.

An important step toward Taiwan's political reform came in 1986, when opposition forces formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), defying a government ban on new political parties. The ruling Kuomintang (KMT, or Nationalist Party) not only refrained from taking action against the opposition but made a series of moves in the following years that decidedly liberalized and democratized the nature of Taiwan's political system. The liberalization measures adopted by the KMT included replacing martial law with a new national security law, lifting press restrictions, revamping the judiciary and promulgating laws on assembly, demonstration and civil organization. The democratization measures legalized opposition parties, redefined the rules for political participation—such as the electoral law—and include the ongoing reform of the legislature (the Legislative Yuan), the electoral college (the National Assembly) and the R.O.C. constitution.

This process of democratization, begun by President Chiang Ching-kuo before his death in January 1988, was given further impetus by his successor, Dr. Lee Teng-hui. At his inauguration in May 1990, President Lee set a two-year timetable to complete the country's democratic transformation, including major structural and procedural reforms. A National Affairs Conference was convened in June 1990 with delegates drawn from all major political and social forces. After much public debate the NAC decided to end Taiwan's "mobilization period," begun in 1949, which had allowed the government extraordinary national security powers.

A declaration to this effect, made by President Lee in May 1991, also included recognition that a "political entity" in Peking controls the mainland area. On the recommendation of the NAC the "temporary provisions" appended in May 1949 to the 1947 constitution, giving the government sweeping powers to deal with external and internal threats, were abrogated in early 1991. By the end of the year all the senior members of the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly elected on the mainland prior to 1949, and who have never been subject to reelection, will have retired. A new National Assembly composed exclusively of representatives elected in Taiwan will then undertake the final phase of democratic reform: revision of the R.O.C. constitution. Upon its completion in mid-1992, and after Legislative Yuan elections scheduled for the end of

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that same year, the R.O.C. will have become by any standard a full-fledged democracy.

The R.O.C.'s democratization process is unique. It has not been initiated or monitored by external forces, as it was in Japan and West Germany. Nor was it undertaken after political or social upheavals, as in Greece or Argentina and lately in the Soviet Union. Rather it has evolved peacefully within the country and is mainly the result of prosperity. Tensions and divergent views exist, to be sure. For example, although both sides of the Taiwan Straits maintain that Taiwan has been, legally and historically, an integral part of China, the Democratic Progressive Party insists that Taiwan is a sovereign, independent entity. The DPP's position is contrary to the R.O.C. government's claim to represent all of China. Furthermore the DPP's foreign-policy platform holds that Taiwan should develop its own international relations, including membership in the United Nations and all other international organizations, on the basis of independent sovereignty and under the name "Taiwan." The R.O.C. government, however, maintains that "Taiwan," as a geographical area, is merely an island province of the R.O.C.

These kinds of differences are inevitable in an open society. But the point is that the government of the R.O.C. itself has largely set the timing for its own democratization; the clock cannot and will not be turned back. It is worth noting that the R.O.C. is the first Chinese-dominated society to practice pluralistic party politics. In that sense what we have been witnessing is truly revolutionary. It realizes the dreams of many of our founding fathers—a dream for which many have sacrificed their lives. And yet R.O.C. prosperity and democratization have been achieved without bloodshed and without overturning the existing socioeconomic order.

These changes, however, do not come without a price. They have unleashed societal forces that present new challenges to the government, which still needs to coordinate reforms in other areas, such as economic policy, mainland policy and foreign affairs. As various societal interest groups stake their claims on public policymaking, the quality of government will increasingly have to rise to meet the needs of its various constituents.

III

Despite Taiwan's economic miracle, rapid social change and political liberalization, the R.O.C. has an artificially low international status and remains an outsider to the emerging

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international order. Between the urgent necessity for greater integration into the international community and an underlying desire not to forsake the future reunification of China, the R.O.C. has adopted a flexible approach to foreign relations, commonly called "pragmatic diplomacy."

Pragmatic diplomacy did not emerge overnight. The R.O.C.'s diplomatic fortunes suffered their first major setback in 1971, when its seat in the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council were taken by mainland China. Its diplomacy reached its lowest point in 1979, when the United States switched diplomatic recognition to Peking. At that time the R.O.C. maintained formal diplomatic relations with only 21 countries and had only 60 offices abroad, and it feared that other nations would follow Washington's lead. Taiwan suffered yet another blow in 1982 with the "August 17 Communiqué," signed by Washington and Peking, which committed the United States to reducing the quantity and quality of arms sold to Taiwan.

But Taipei learned much from these reversals. A spirit of pragmatism emerged among its foreign-policy makers as well as the nation's public. Amid increasingly strident popular calls for change, the government chose on several occasions to adopt a more flexible approach. For instance, the R.O.C. agreed to participate in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics under the title "Chinese Taipei," not "Republic of China," as in previous games. It protested Peking's entry in 1986 into the Asian Development Bank (ADB), but refrained from withdrawing itself.

Under President Lee the R.O.C.'s search for international visibility and participation became more vigorous. In April 1988 an official delegation was sent to Manila to attend the annual ADB meeting under the name "Taipei, China." This was the first time that the R.O.C. and mainland China had both attended a meeting of an international governmental organization. In his opening address to the KMT's Thirteenth Party Congress in July 1988, President Lee urged the party to "strive with greater determination, pragmatism, flexibility and vision in order to develop a foreign policy based primarily on substantive relations," a passage incorporated into the party's new platform.

In March 1989 President Lee led an official delegation on a highly successful visit to Singapore, where he was referred to in the local press as "the President from Taiwan." That May

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the R.O.C. made an even more dramatic decision to dispatch its finance minister, Dr. Shirley Kuo, to the annual ADB meeting, this time in Peking. President Lee explained the decision in a June 3, 1989, speech to the Second Plenum of the KMT's Thirteenth Central Committee: "The ultimate goal of the foreign policy of the R.O.C. is to safeguard the integrity of the nation's sovereignty. We should have the courage to face the reality that we are unable for the time being to exercise effective jurisdiction on the mainland. Only in that way will we not inflate ourselves and entrap ourselves, and be able to come up with pragmatic plans appropriate to the changing times and environment."

In 1988 Taipei established an International Economic Cooperation and Development Fund and appropriated $1.2 billion for economic aid to Third World countries. This new foreign aid program, plus the 43 teams of technical experts already working in 31 countries, places the R.O.C. firmly in the ranks of significant aid-providing nations. Moreover 1989 saw the establishment of the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange with an endowment of over $100 million. A fund for International Disaster Relief also provided tens of millions of dollars to the Philippines, the Kurdish refugees and others who suffered during the Gulf War.

These and other efforts resulted in a sharp increase in the R.O.C.'s international ties. As of 1991 the R.O.C. has formal diplomatic relations with 29 countries and maintains 79 representative offices in 51 countries with which it has no diplomatic relations. These offices, some of which bear the Republic of China's official name, facilitate bilateral cooperation in areas such as trade, culture, technology and environmental protection. The R.O.C. is also a formal participant in the newly formed ministerial-level organization, the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, and has been active in regional groupings such as the Pacific Basin Economic Cooperation and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council. It also stands ready to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as the representative government of the "customs territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu," not the whole of China.

While pragmatic diplomacy enjoys wide support at home—so much so that the country's foreign relations were not an issue during the hotly contested 1989 election campaign—it has invited relentless criticism from mainland China.

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Characterizing it as a plot to create "one China, one Taiwan," or "two Chinas," Peking has taken a number of steps to forestall the R.O.C.'s international integration. Those countries that have shown interest in establishing air links with Taipei, receiving or sending official delegations, setting up offices in Taiwan or simply striking major business deals are warned of "deleterious consequences." In 1991 alone twenty countries, including Poland, Hungary, the Philippines, Malaysia and the Soviet Union, have been forced to reaffirm that "the P.R.C. is the sole legitimate government of China, and Taiwan is part of China."

This has not deterred the R.O.C. from its charted course. Pragmatic diplomacy is part and parcel of the R.O.C.'s democratic transformation, reflecting the nation's collective yearning for change. Just as the domestic political process is being democratized and its economy opened to the world, so its foreign relations must become more flexible as well.

IV

Taiwan is directly susceptible to winds of change from the Chinese mainland. In recent years the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits has undergone a sea-change. From 1949 to 1979 Taiwan was constantly threatened by direct military invasion. The shelling of Kinmen and Matsu in 1958, which almost brought the two superpowers into confrontation, was a dangerous example.

But beginning in 1979, when Deng Xiaoping led the Peking leadership to embark on its "four modernizations" program, mainland China's need to maintain a peaceful image eased its hard-line policy. The new goal was not to coerce but to cajole Taipei back into the fold with a variety of devices, such as the "one country, two systems" formula advanced by Deng in 1984. According to this formula, Taiwan would be downgraded to a "highly autonomous region," thus conceding the right to conduct its own foreign relations and national defense. The R.O.C. resisted by adopting its "three nos" stance toward mainland China: no contact, no compromise, no negotiations.

This deadlock was broken in November 1987 when President Chiang Ching-kuo decided to allow people on Taiwan to visit family members on the mainland. Subsequently, long-standing bans on indirect trade and investment, academic, sports and cultural exchanges, tourist visits and direct mail and

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telephone links were lifted in rapid succession. This opened the floodgates to people-to-people exchanges between the two sides of the straits, unprecedented at any period of Chinese history. In the early part of this year alone, an estimated two million people from Taiwan visited the mainland, more than 28 million letters were sent in both directions—an average of 40,000 per day—and telephone, fax and telex exchanges numbered five million. Moreover, by conservative estimates, indirect trade reached $4.04 billion in 1990 and investment topped $2 billion.

In November 1990 a cabinet-level Mainland Affairs Commission was established. At the same time the R.O.C. created the Straits Exchange Foundation, an organization funded primarily by private money. The SEF serves as an intermediary between the peoples of Taiwan and the mainland on an entire range of functional issues. If necessary the SEF may engage mainland representatives in non-political negotiations. Thus far SEF personnel have visited the mainland on three occasions and received one Red Cross delegation from mainland China—events all highly publicized by the R.O.C. press. The two sides have agreed on procedures for the repatriation of criminals and have indicated an interest in the joint prevention of crimes committed on the high seas. It is hoped, at least by the R.O.C., that through these exchanges "peace by pieces" may be achieved.

A National Unification Council was set up in October 1990 with President Lee as its chairman. To further clarify the R.O.C.'s stance on mainland-Taiwan relations, new Guidelines for National Reunification were proposed by this council and accepted by the Executive Yuan (Cabinet) in March 1991. The guidelines state: "After an appropriate period of forthright exchange, cooperation and consultation conducted under the principles of reason, peace, equity and reciprocity, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits should foster a consensus on democracy, freedom and equal prosperity, and together build anew a single unified China."

The guidelines envision unification after three consecutive phases. For the immediate future is a phase of exchanges and reciprocity, during which the two sides are to carry out political and economic reforms at home and "set up an order for exchanges across the straits . . . [to] solve all disputes through peaceful means and furthermore respect, not reject,

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the other in the international community," and "not deny the other's existence as a political entity."

In the medium term a phase of mutual trust and cooperation is envisioned, in which "official communications channels should be established on an equal footing," direct trade and other links should be allowed, and "both sides should jointly develop the southeast coastal areas of the mainland." Both sides should also "assist each other in taking part in international organizations and activities" and promote an exchange of visits by high-ranking officials to create favorable conditions for consultation.

In the final phase both sides may jointly discuss the grand task of unification and map out a constitutional system built on the principles of democracy, economic freedom, social justice and nationalization of the armed forces. In today's Taiwan context "nationalization" means enhancement of the non-partisanship of the armed forces.

Public opinion polls show a hard core of "unification" supporters in Taiwan, amounting to about 10 percent of the population. There is also a group of "independence" advocates whose strength ranges between 5 and 12 percent of the population. In between is a silent majority whose views tend toward the R.O.C. government's long-standing position of "one China, but not now" and its emphasis on phased advances toward the goal of unification. However, as in other democracies, the minority may be vocal and aggressive, and their voices are often amplified through the democratic process, thus complicating the formulation of mainland policy. While the push and pull involved in formulating the R.O.C.'s mainland policy may seem natural to those familiar with Taiwan's increasingly democratic political system, it at times appears inscrutable to the aged leaders in Peking.

Given the widening gap—politically, socially and psychologically—between the two sides of the straits, the danger for the R.O.C. appears to stem not so much from Peking's capricious and expansionist tendencies as from its unwillingness or inability to comprehend the changes in the R.O.C. The mainland's aged leaders seem all too ready to take extreme positions by drawing parallels between the R.O.C.'s democratization and what is derisively called "Taiwanization," and between "pragmatic diplomacy" and "two Chinas." At the heart of these misperceptions is Peking's stereotype of Taiwan as a small island province located on the Chinese periphery

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and ruled by mainland China's defeated civil war enemies. From this vantage point there is no way Peking can treat Taipei as an equal. The same attitude seems to have led the Peking leadership to deny, or at least suppress, the fact that the R.O.C. has come far in the last four decades in overcoming age-old feudalism, poverty and the last vestiges of imperialism. One hopes that in time the Peking leadership will realize that the R.O.C., as a dynamic polity and vibrant economy with ideals, hopes and fears of its own, likewise cannot agree to hold political negotiations with Peking from an unequal position and while mainland China continues to rattle its saber.

V

For too long too many foreign observers have cast the R.O.C. in a unidimensional mold. For those who hailed the R.O.C. as a bulwark of anticommunism, it was to be supported at any price. For those who favored better relations with mainland China, Taiwan was viewed as a "problem" or an "obstacle" to China's unification. When many in the United States were obsessed with the deteriorating bilateral trade situation, Taiwan even became a "threat" to be curbed by protectionist legislation.

Yet the Republic of China is rapidly coming of age. It is evolving into something that fits none of the old stereotypes. Along with the old stereotypes, we must throw out the old prism through which events on the island were once perceived. No analysis of issues relating to China is complete if it fails to take into account the views, ideals, aspirations and fears of the people of Taiwan.

Just as Taiwan is a part of China, so is the mainland. Neither should seek to lord it over the other or to claim superiority by dint of size, population or past performance. Both should instead recognize the fact that two different systems exist in these separate parts of China. While unification is the ultimate goal of Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, it should not be pursued simply for its own sake. As the breakup of the Soviet Union has shown, a forced union will ultimately end in divorce. The primary task for both governments in the next few years is therefore not to accelerate artificially the wheels of history, but to carry out reforms at home in order to narrow the political and economic gaps between the two sides. Most important, the unification process should be peaceful and voluntary, so that it will neither constitute an imposition by one

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side on the other nor cause undue concern among China's neighbors.

As the world celebrates the end of the Cold War, the people of the Republic of China are looking forward to making greater contributions to a new world order. Taiwan's experience shows that the Chinese people, like any other people, are fully capable of practicing democracy, promoting rapid economic growth with equitable income distribution and living peacefully with their neighbors. For this the R.O.C. welcomes the arrival of the global tides of democratization, development, international integration and détente in East Asia.

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George C. Herring

AMERICA AND VIETNAM: THE UNENDING WAR

"By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all!" So said President George Bush in a euphoric victory statement at the end of the Gulf War, suggesting the extent to which Vietnam continued to prey on the American psyche more than fifteen years after the fall of Saigon. Indeed the Vietnam War was by far the most convulsive and traumatic of America's three wars in Asia in the 50 years since Pearl Harbor. It set the U.S. economy on a downward spiral. It left America's foreign policy at least temporarily in disarray, discrediting the postwar policy of containment and undermining the consensus that supported it. It divided the American people as no other event since their own Civil War a century earlier. It battered their collective soul.

Such was the lingering impact of the Vietnam War that the Persian Gulf conflict appeared at times as much a struggle with its ghosts as with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. President Bush's eulogy for the Vietnam syndrome may therefore be premature. Success in the Gulf War no doubt raised the nation's confidence in its foreign policy leadership and its military institutions and weakened long-standing inhibitions against intervention abroad. Still it seems doubtful that military victory over a nation with a population less than one-third of Vietnam in a conflict fought under the most favorable circumstances could expunge deeply encrusted and still painful memories of an earlier and very different kind of war.

To put the Vietnam War in perspective three questions must be addressed. Why did the United States invest so much blood and treasure in an area so remote as Vietnam and of so little apparent significance? Why, despite its vast power, did the United States fail to achieve its objectives? What were the consequences of the war for Americans—and for Vietnamese?

George C. Herring is Professor of History at the University of Kentucky, and recently a Visiting Fulbright Scholar at the University of Otago in New Zealand.

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
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

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

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II

The question of causation in war is always complex, and with Vietnam it is especially so. America's direct involvement there spanned the quarter century between the February 1950 decision to aid France in suppressing the Vietminh revolution and the fall of Saigon in April 1975. The commitment expanded incrementally, from economic and military aid to France during the first Indochina war, to support for an independent South Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva conference, to the commitment of U.S. combat forces in 1965. America thus went to war not from a single major decision but from a series of separate, seemingly small decisions over a period of fifteen years. Amid this complexity, it is necessary to single out the common threads, the modes of thought that determined the fateful course chosen.

In the broadest sense U.S. intervention in Vietnam resulted from the interaction of two major phenomena of the post-World War II era: the dissolution of colonial empires and the start of the Cold War. The rise of nationalism and the weakness of the European powers combined at the end of World War II to destroy a colonial system that had been an established feature of world politics for centuries. Changes of this magnitude do not occur easily, of course, and in this case they brought turmoil and conflict. In South and Southeast Asia, the British and Dutch grudgingly granted independence to their colonies. The French, on the other hand, attempted to regain control of their Indochinese empire and put down the Vietnamese revolution by force, sparking a war in 1946 that in its various phases would not end until 1975.

What was unique and, from the American standpoint, most significant about the conflict in Vietnam was that the revolutionary movement, the Vietminh, was led by communists. Ho Chi Minh, the charismatic father of the revolution, was a longtime communist operative, and although he and his lieutenants deliberately established a broadly nationalist united revolutionary front, they remained firmly in control. Well organized and tightly disciplined, willing to use any means to attain their ends, they took advantage of the fragmentation of other nationalist groups to establish their preeminence. During World War II they exploited popular opposition to French and Japanese occupation forces, and they adeptly moved into the vacuum when the Japanese surren-

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dered in August 1945. During the ensuing war with France, they solidified their claim to the mantle of Vietnamese nationalism. Among all the former European colonies of Asia, only in Vietnam did communists direct the nationalist movement. This would have enormous long-range implications, transforming what began as a struggle against French colonialism into a major international conflict.

At the very time the communist-led Vietminh was engaged in a bloody struggle with France the Cold War was assuming global dimensions, and the United States perceived the war in Vietnam largely in terms of its conflict with the Soviet Union. From the outset American officials viewed Ho and the Vietminh as instruments of the Soviet drive for world domination, directed and controlled by the Kremlin, a view that was not seriously challenged until the United States was involved in full-scale war in Vietnam.

The reality was much more complex. Ho and his top associates were communists, deeply committed to establishing in Vietnam at the first opportunity a state based on Marxist-Leninist dogma. In addition, after 1949, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union assisted the Vietminh and later North Vietnam in many important ways. On the other hand it is equally clear that Ho initiated the revolution without explicit direction from Moscow and sustained it until 1949 without external support. The revolution grew in strength because it was able to identify with Vietnamese nationalism, and it had a dynamism of its own quite apart from international communism. Moreover the support provided by the Soviet Union and China was neither unlimited, unconditional nor unequivocal, and there is ample evidence that at numerous crucial points in the war the three nations did not share anything approaching unanimity of purpose.

All this is much clearer in retrospect than it was at the time, and for nearly twenty years U.S. policymakers viewed the conflict in Vietnam as an integral part of their broader struggle with communism. From this flowed yet another key assumption, that the "loss" of Vietnam would threaten interests deemed vital. There is more than a bit of irony here, for at least until 1940 Vietnam had been of no significance to the United States—a position to which it quickly reverted in the aftermath of the war.

To understand the change it is necessary to look at the reorientation of U.S. foreign policy after the fall of China to

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the communists in 1949 and to the emergence of a universalist world view best expressed in a National Security Council document. Drafted in early 1950 in response to the fall of China to Mao Zedong's communists and the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb, NSC-68 set as its fundamental premise that the U.S.S.R., "animated by a new fanatical faith," was seeking to "impose its absolute authority on the rest of the world." In the frantic milieu of early 1950, American policymakers concluded that Soviet expansion had reached a point beyond which it must not be permitted to go. "Any substantial further extension of the area under the control of the Kremlin," NSC-68 warned, "would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled."

In this context then—of a world divided into two hostile power blocs, a fragile balance of power, a zero-sum game in which any gain for communism was automatically a loss for the United States—areas that previously had been of no more than marginal importance suddenly took on great significance. The onset of the Korean War in June 1950 seemed to confirm the assumptions of NSC-68 and further suggested that the communists were willing to use military power to achieve their goals. Thus in 1950 the Truman administration extended to East Asia a containment policy that had originally been applied in Europe. The first American commitment in Vietnam, a commitment to help the French suppress the Vietminh revolution, was part of this broader attempt to contain communist expansion in Asia.

There were other more specific reasons why U.S. policymakers attached such significance to Vietnam after 1950. First, the "domino theory" held that the fall of Vietnam would cause the loss of all Indochina and then the rest of Southeast Asia, with implications extending far beyond. The communists had just taken over in China. Indochina, Burma and Malaya were swept by revolution, and the newly independent government of Indonesia seemed vulnerable. Because of its location on China's southern border and because it appeared in the most imminent danger, Vietnam was considered crucial. If it fell, all of Southeast Asia might be lost, denying the United States access to important raw materials and strategic waterways.

The threat to Southeast Asia had special implications for Japan. The danger of Japanese conquest of the region in 1940 had first caused Americans to attach strategic importance to

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Indochina, producing hard-line policies that led directly to Pearl Harbor. In 1950, ironically, Americans sought to keep Southeast Asia open to Japanese penetration, fearing that the loss of raw materials and markets there could undermine Japan's economic recovery and force a crucial ally to come to terms with communism. For these reasons the United States steadily increased its aid to France and, when France was defeated in 1954, it undertook to build in southern Vietnam an independent noncommunist government as a bulwark against further communist gains in the region.

In the Kennedy-Johnson era the domino theory was supplanted by the notion of credibility, the idea that the United States must stand firm in Vietnam to demonstrate its determination to defend vital interests across the world. During this most intense and dangerous period of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers felt certain that if they showed firmness in one area, it would deter the adversary in another; if they showed weakness, the adversary would be tempted to take steps that might ultimately leave no option but nuclear war. The so-called Manchurian or Munich analogy, the lessons of the 1930s, reinforced the idea of credibility, the obvious conclusion being that a firm stand must be taken against "aggression" at the outset.

Even after the Sino-Soviet split drastically altered the familiar contours of the Cold War in the 1960s, the notion of credibility still seemed valid. China appeared to be more militant and aggressive than the Soviet Union, more deeply committed to world revolution—and it was supporting North Vietnam. Thus North Vietnam had to be deterred to prevent Chinese expansion in Asia. Even in the case of the Soviet Union, seemingly the less dangerous communist power in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, a firm stand would discourage a return to adventurism and reinforce the trend toward détente. It would also deter other potential troublemakers such as Cuba's Fidel Castro.

In searching for the sources of the American commitment in Vietnam, one other factor deserves attention: the assumption shared by administrations from Harry S. Truman to Lyndon B. Johnson that the fall of Vietnam to communism would have disastrous political consequences at home. This assumption also stemmed from perceived lessons of history: the rancorous and divisive debate following the "loss" of China in 1949 and Republican exploitation of the issue at the polls in 1952. The

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conclusion, again obvious, was that no administration, especially a Democratic administration, could survive the loss of Vietnam. Lyndon Johnson repeatedly affirmed that he would not be the president who saw Vietnam go the way of China.

The application of the containment policy to Vietnam appears in retrospect misguided. The so-called communist bloc was torn by nationalist divisions from the outset and was never a monolith. And the international situation was never a zero-sum game. What appeared to be a major victory for the Soviet Union in China in 1949, for example, turned out to be something quite different. The United States most probably exaggerated the consequences of nonintervention and, by proclaiming Vietnam a test case of credibility, may have made the consequences of its fall much greater than they would have been otherwise. In applying containment to Vietnam, U.S. officials drastically misjudged the internal dynamics of the conflict there. By rigidly adhering to a narrow, one-dimensional world view, they placed themselves at the mercy of local forces they did not understand and in the final analysis could not control.

III

It has been an article of faith among many Americans that the nation's defeat in Vietnam was self-inflicted. The United States failed, they allege, because it did not use its power wisely or decisively—the civilians forced the military to fight with one hand tied behind its back. In addition, some argue, a hostile and hypercritical media and a near-treasonous antiwar movement turned public opinion against the war, forcing Presidents Johnson and Nixon to scale back U.S. involvement just when victory was within grasp. Such arguments imply, if they do not state outright, that the United States could have prevailed had it used its military power without limit and suppressed domestic dissent. They have provided the basis for numerous "lessons," some of them applied with a vengeance in the Persian Gulf.

This revisionist view of the war is fundamentally flawed. It accepts as a given what can never be more than mere speculation. There is no way to know whether the war could have been won if it had been fought differently. More important, to attribute U.S. failure to an errant strategy and lack of will

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oversimplifies a very complex problem and provides at best a partial explanation.

The strategy applied by President Johnson and his secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, was without question doomed to failure. The theory was that if the United States gradually increased the level of military pain it would reach a point where the Vietnamese communists would decide that the costs were greater than the potential gain. The theory turned out to be wrong. The level of pain Hanoi was prepared to endure was greater than Washington could inflict.

To jump to the conclusion, however, that the unrestricted use of American power could have produced victory in Vietnam at acceptable cost raises troubling questions. We can never know whether a bombing campaign of the sort advocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Vietnam, and actually applied in the Gulf War, would have forced Hanoi to accept a settlement on U.S. terms, but there is ample reason to question whether it would have. The technology of 1991 was not available in 1965, and in any event North Vietnam was not vulnerable to air power in the way Iraq was vulnerable. The capacity of air power to cripple a preindustrial society was in fact quite limited. Even if the United States had destroyed the cities and industries of North Vietnam, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the Vietnamese were prepared to fight on, underground if necessary.

Invasion of enemy sanctuaries in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam might have made General William C. Westmoreland's attrition strategy more workable, but such steps would also have raised the costs of the war far out of proportion to the stakes and at a time when American resources were already stretched thin. Neither intensified bombing nor escalation of the ground war would have solved what was always the central problem—the political viability of South Vietnam.

The reasons why President Johnson refused to expand the war must also be considered. He feared that if the United States pushed North Vietnam to the brink of defeat, the Soviet Union, China or both might intervene, broadening the conflict to dangerous proportions, perhaps even to the level of nuclear confrontation. Whether Johnson's fears were justified can never be known, of course, but he would have been foolish in 1965–67 to have dismissed them out of hand. Destruction of North Vietnam would have been counterproductive in terms of the larger U.S. goal of containing China. In any event there

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was no reason for Johnson to push the war to the brink of a nuclear confrontation as long as he assumed that American goals could be achieved with less risk. And even if the United States had been able to militarily subdue North Vietnam without provoking outside intervention, it would still have faced the dangerous and costly task of occupying a hostile nation along China's southern border while simultaneously suppressing an insurgency in South Vietnam.

In terms of public opinion, there is no question but that after 1967 disillusionment with the war placed major constraints on policymakers, and the antiwar movement and U.S. media played a part in this. Critics of the war exposed error and self-deception in official statements, stimulating public doubt about the trustworthiness and wisdom of government and its leaders. Antiwar demonstrations also affected public opinion indirectly, contributing to the rise of domestic strife that fed a general, pervasive war-weariness, which in turn stimulated pressures for de-escalation and withdrawal. As for the media, reporting of the war was sometimes sensationalized and often ahistorical and ethnocentric. The early misreporting of the 1968 Tet offensive has been well documented, and after Tet the media undoubtedly became more critical of the war.

Still, the impact of the antiwar movement and the media on public opinion has been exaggerated. Careful studies of the polls indicate that until very late a majority of Americans considered the antiwar movement more obnoxious than the war. Thus in a perverse sort of way, and to a point, antiwar demonstrations may have strengthened support for the war. There is no persuasive evidence that it was the media that turned public opinion against the war; many social scientists contend that media content generally reinforces rather than changes existing views. In any event the antiwar movement and the media had much less impact on public opinion than the growing cost of the war in terms of lives lost and taxes paid. In this regard it is instructive to note that trends in popular support for the Vietnam War follow almost exactly those for the Korean War, where there was no antiwar movement and media coverage was generally uncritical.

The problem with all such explanations is that they are too ethnocentric. They reflect the persistence of what British writer D. W. Brogan once called "the illusion of American omnipotence," the belief that the difficult we do tomorrow, the impossible may take awhile. When failure occurs it must be our

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fault, and we seek scapegoats in our midst: the poor judgment of our leaders, the media, the antiwar movement. The flaw in this approach is that it ignores the other side of the picture. The sources of America's frustration and ultimate failure must also be found in the local circumstances of the war: the nature of the conflict, the weakness of America's ally and the strength of its adversary.

The Vietnam War posed extremely difficult challenges for Americans. It was fought in a climate and on a terrain that were singularly inhospitable: thick jungles, foreboding swamps and paddies, rugged mountains, insufferable heat and humidity. The climate and terrain neutralized America's technological superiority and control of the air. Needless to say those who had endured the land for centuries had a distinct advantage over outsiders, particularly when the latter came from a highly industrialized and urbanized environment.

In the beginning, at least, it was a people's war, where people rather than territory were the primary objective. Yet Americans as individuals and as a nation could never really bridge the vast cultural gap that separated them from all Vietnamese. Not knowing the language or culture, they had difficulty at times even distinguishing between friend and foe. Their mission was at best morally ambiguous and, however benevolent their intentions, Americans often found themselves on the wrong side of Vietnamese nationalism. In this context America's lavish and even reckless use of airpower and firepower was counterproductive, destroying, in the immortal words of the defender of Ben Tre, the very society the United States was purporting to save.

More important perhaps was the formless, yet lethal, nature of warfare in Vietnam, a war without distinct battlelines or fixed objectives, where traditional concepts of victory and defeat were blurred. This type of war was particularly difficult for Americans schooled in the conventional warfare of World War II and Korea. And there was always the gnawing—but fundamental—question, first raised by John F. Kennedy: how can we tell if we are winning? The only answer that could be devised was the notorious body count, as grim and corrupting as it was ultimately unreliable as a measure of success.

Even more important in explaining the U.S. failure was the unequal balance of forces it inherited in Vietnam. In South Vietnam, Americans attempted a truly formidable undertaking on a very weak foundation. The country to which they

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committed themselves in 1954 lacked many of the essential ingredients for nationhood. Indeed there was hardly a less promising place in the world to conduct an experiment in nation-building. Vietnam's economy had been devastated by the first Indochina war. The French had destroyed the traditional political order, and their departure left a gaping vacuum—no firmly established political institutions, no native elite willing to work with the United States and capable of exercising effective leadership. Southern Vietnam was rent by a multitude of conflicting ethnic, religious and political forces. When viewed from this perspective, there were probably built-in limits to what the United States could have accomplished there.

For nearly twenty years, Americans struggled to establish a viable nation in the face of internal insurgency and external invasion, but the rapid collapse of South Vietnam after U.S. military withdrawal in 1973 suggests how little was really accomplished. The United States could never find leaders capable of mobilizing the disparate population of southern Vietnam—the fact that it had to look for them suggests the magnitude of the problem. Washington launched a vast array of ambitious and expensive programs to promote sound government, win the hearts and minds of the people, and defeat the insurgents. When its client state was on the verge of collapse in 1965 the United States filled the vacuum with its own combat forces. Ironically—and tragically—the more it did, the more it induced dependency among those it was trying to help. Consequently, right up to the fall of Saigon in 1975, the South Vietnamese elite expected the United States to return and rescue them from defeat. This is not to make the South Vietnamese scapegoats for U.S. failure. It is rather to suggest that, given the history of southern Vietnam and the conditions that prevailed there in 1954, the creation of a viable nation by an outside power may have been impossible.

From beginning to end the United States also drastically underestimated the strength, determination and staying power of its adversary. This is not to suggest that the North Vietnamese and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam were superhuman. They made colossal blunders and paid an enormous price for their success. They have shown a far greater capacity for making war than for nation-building. Still, in terms of the local balance of forces, they had tremendous advantages. They were tightly mobilized and

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regimented and deeply committed to their goals. They skillfully employed the strategy of protracted war, already tested against France, perceiving that the Americans, like the French, would become impatient and, if they bled long enough, might weary of the war. "You will kill ten of our men, but we will kill one of yours," Ho Chi Minh once remarked, "and in the end it is you who will tire." The comment was made to a French general on the eve of the first Indochina war, but it is an accurate commentary on the second as well.

America's fatal error, therefore, was to underestimate its foe. U.S. policymakers rather casually assumed that the Vietnamese, rational beings like themselves, would know better than to stand up against the most powerful nation in the world. It would be like a filibuster in Congress, Johnson once predicted: enormous resistance at first, then a steady whittling away, then Ho Chi Minh hurrying to get it over with. Years later Henry Kissinger still confessed surprise that his North Vietnamese counterparts were fanatics. Since their own goals were limited and from their standpoint more than reasonable, Americans found it difficult to understand the total unyielding commitment of the enemy, the willingness to risk everything to achieve an objective.

The circumstances of the war thus posed a dilemma that Americans never really understood, much less resolved. Success would probably have required the physical annihilation of North Vietnam, but given the limited American goals this would have been distasteful and excessively costly. It ran a serious risk of Soviet and Chinese intervention and would have been counterproductive by creating a vacuum into which China would flow. The only other way was to establish a viable South Vietnam, but given the weak foundation from which America worked and the cultural gap, not to mention the strength of the internal revolution, this was probably beyond its capacity. To put it charitably, the United States may have placed itself in a classic no-win situation.

IV

The regional and international impact of the Vietnam War was far less than had been predicted. Outside of Indochina, the dominoes did not fall. On the contrary, in Southeast Asia the noncommunist nations prospered and attained unprecedented stability. The Soviet Union continued to build up its military arsenal in the 1970s and, perhaps spurred by Ameri-

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can failure, intervened in civil wars in Angola, Zaire and Ethiopia. Like the Americans, however, the Soviets' reach soon exceeded their grasp, luring them into their own quagmire in Afghanistan, a "bleeding wound" that Mikhail Gorbachev lacerated only at great cost.

One of the most significant and ironic consequences of the war was to heighten tensions among the communist nations of East Asia. The brutal Pol Pot regime launched a grisly effort to rebuild Cambodia from the "Year Zero," killing millions of its own people in the process. More important from the Vietnamese standpoint, Cambodia established close ties with China. In response to Khmer Rouge raids and to preserve a "friendly" government next door, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, drove Pol Pot out of power and established a puppet regime. China retaliated by invading Vietnam, provoking a short and inconclusive war. The United States, which had gone to war in Vietnam to contain China, found itself in the mid-1980s indirectly supporting China's efforts to contain Vietnam and, through the Reagan Doctrine, sending "humanitarian" aid to an unlikely collection of Cambodian bedfellows including the notorious Pol Pot.

For Vietnam the principal legacy of the war was continued human suffering. The ultimate losers were the South Vietnamese. Many of those who remained in Vietnam endured poverty, oppression, forced labor and "reeducation" camps. More than 1.5 million so-called boat people fled the country after 1975. Some perished in flight; others languished in squalid refugee camps in Southeast Asia. Between 750,000 and one million eventually resettled in the United States. The popular stereotype of the Vietnamese-American was one of assimilation and overachievement. In reality many remained unassimilated and lived near or below the poverty line, depending on minimum-wage jobs or welfare. The new immigrants also endured alienation, encountered prejudice from Americans for whom they were a living reminder of defeat, and suffered from the popular image of the successful Asian, which implied that the unsuccessful had only themselves to blame.

Even for the winners victory was a bittersweet prize. The Hanoi regime attained—at least temporarily—its goal of hegemony in Indochina, but at enormous cost. In time it was bogged down in its own "Vietnam" in Cambodia, for a decade waging a costly and ineffectual counterinsurgency against

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stubborn Cambodian guerrillas. Its long-standing goal of unifying Vietnam was achieved in name only. Historic differences between north and south were exacerbated during three decades of war, and even the most heavy-handed methods could not force the freewheeling and resilient south into a made-in-Hanoi mold. Most mortifying for many Vietnamese, long after the end of the war their country remained dependent on the Soviet Union.

For all Vietnamese the most pressing legacy of the war was grinding poverty and economic deprivation. Thirty years of conflict left the nation's economy in a shambles, and continued high military expenditures and the government's ill-conceived efforts to force industrialization and collectivize agriculture made things worse. The economic growth rate lagged at 2 percent, and per capita income averaged around $100. Responding to necessity and emulating its Soviet ally, a more pragmatic regime in the mid-1980s launched a program of *doi moi*, or renovation, hoping to stimulate economic growth by freeing up the economy, providing some capitalist incentives and seeking foreign investment. Declaring 1990 the "Year of the Tourist," Hanoi even sought to promote economic development through tourism.

Renovation brought at best modest gains. Agriculture flourished under the new system, and Vietnam again became an exporter of rice. The parallel or unofficial economy also prospered, especially in the cities, where there were signs of an incipient economic boom. There were small increases in the production of consumer goods and in foreign trade. On the other hand the infrastructure remained in horrible shape. Foreign investment did not develop as anticipated, and the economy suffered from ineffective management and lack of capital and technology. The move toward a free-market system was chaotic. Intent on insulating itself from the changes that swept the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, the regime did not join economic change with political freedoms, thus mitigating the impact of *doi moi*. The growth rate rose only to 3.5 percent by 1990, and per capita income was still estimated at no more than $175. Vietnam continued to live hand to mouth, and the termination of aid from the Soviet Union and eastern Europe threatened to offset its limited gains.

Although the United States emerged physically unscathed, the Vietnam War was among the most debilitating in its history. The economic cost has been estimated at $167 billion,

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a raw statistic that does not begin to measure its impact. The war triggered the inflation that helped to undermine America's position in the world economy. It also had a high political cost, along with Watergate, increasing popular suspicion of government, leaders and institutions. It crippled the military, at least for a time, and temporarily estranged the United States from much of the rest of the world.

Nowhere was the impact of Vietnam greater than on the nation's foreign policy. The war destroyed the consensus that had existed since the late 1940s, leaving Americans confused and deeply divided on the goals to be pursued and the methods used. From the Angolan crisis of the mid-1970s to Central America in the 1980s to the Persian Gulf in 1990, foreign policy issues were viewed through the prism of Vietnam and debated in its context. Popular divisions on the gulf crisis derived to a large extent from the Vietnam experience, and the Gulf War was fought on the basis of its perceived lessons.

Much like World War I for the Europeans, Vietnam's greatest impact was in the realm of the spirit. As no other event in the nation's history, it challenged Americans' traditional beliefs about themselves, the notion that in their relations with other people they had generally assumed a benevolent role, the idea that nothing was beyond reach. It was a fundamental part of a much larger crisis of the spirit that began in the 1960s, raising profound questions about America's history and values. The war's deep wounds still fester among some of its 2.7 million veterans, for whom victory in the Persian Gulf reinforced rather than erased bitter memories. The persisting popularity of Vietnam novels, television shows and films suggests the extent to which the war is still etched in the nation's consciousness and will probably continue to be so despite the Persian Gulf.

V

Today more than fifteen years after the fall of Saigon the United States continues to treat Vietnam as an enemy, and thus legally and technically the war goes on. Not surprisingly, perhaps, America has been far less generous with the foe that embarrassed it than with those nations it defeated in World War II. Washington refused to establish normal diplomatic relations, maintained an economic embargo under the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 and, through its veto, blocked

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aid to Vietnam from international lending agencies. Ironically its economic warfare has been far more effective than its military operations ever were, leaving Vietnam isolated politically and economically and deprived of the trade, technology and capital so desperately needed for reconstruction.

Fault for continuation of the war lies partly with Vietnam, to be sure. The victim of its own hubris, it bungled an opportunity to normalize relations in 1977 by demanding $3 billion in "reparations" as a precondition and by appearing indifferent to the fate of the more than 2,500 U.S. servicemen still listed as missing in action. Although it removed the brutal Pol Pot regime, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia gave the United States another pretext for refusing to normalize relations. As Soviet-American tensions grew in the early 1980s and the United States moved closer to China, Vietnam once more became a pawn in and victim of the great power struggle.

Perpetuation of the deadlock owes more to the United States. Seeking to break out of its isolation and to secure Western assistance, Vietnam since the mid-1980s has attempted to accommodate American demands, taking quite extraordinary steps on the MIA issue, withdrawing from Cambodia and using its influence to promote a political settlement there. Now back on top, however, the United States has taken a consistently hard line, linking normalization to resolution of MIA issues and to a final peace settlement in Cambodia. U.S. policy may be motivated in part by a desire to punish Vietnam. The Bush administration may also hope, by continuing to squeeze Hanoi, to topple one of the last communist dominoes, winning by economic means the military victory the United States was denied, thereby erasing the stigma of defeat. In addition, although public opinion polls indicate support for normalization and business groups actively promote it, the administration may see little tangible gain.

The U.S. position seems unnecessarily rigid. The number of unresolved MIA cases—2,273—is small compared to the usual wartime percentage of MIAs to casualties. With each year, it becomes harder to locate and identify remains, and it seems unreasonable to demand that the Vietnamese use their limited resources to address American concerns when their country is an economic basket case and they claim to have hundreds of thousands of MIAs of their own. A Cambodian settlement appears imminent, but it will be fragile and vulnerable to attack from numerous angles, and to make normalization

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contingent on forces the Vietnamese cannot control seems unreasonable. Perhaps never in the history of warfare has the loser been able to impose such harsh terms on the ostensible winner.

The time has come to end the Vietnam War. The United States will gain little in terms of trade or geopolitical advantage, to be sure, and normalization will not make the problems left over from the war magically disappear. Still, reconciliation is a necessary first step toward real peace, and the remaining wounds of war in and between both countries cannot be healed until such a step is taken.

VI

In light of the dramatic events of the last two years Americans may be tempted to view the Vietnam War as an anomaly. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire and the demise of communism leave the government of Vietnam an apparent anachronism, one of a handful of regimes clinging to a discredited doctrine. In this context it would be easy for Americans to regard the Vietnam War as little more than a tactical defeat in what turned out to be a strategic victory, a lost battle in a Cold War eventually won. In the larger scheme of post-World War II history, Vietnam might come to be seen as unimportant or even irrelevant.

Americans would err grievously to view their longest and most divisive war in such terms. Whether the United States in fact won the Cold War is at best arguable. In any event it remains important for Americans to understand why their nation intervened in Vietnam and why ultimately it failed. Morality and legality aside, by wrongly attributing the conflict in Vietnam to world communism, Americans drastically misjudged the conflict's origins and nature. By intervening in what was essentially a local struggle, they placed themselves at the mercy of local forces, a weak client and a determined adversary. What might have remained a local conflict with primarily local implications was elevated into a major international conflict with enormous human costs that are still being paid. Along with Afghanistan, Vietnam should stand as an enduring testament to the pitfalls of interventionism and the limits of power, something that may be more vital than ever to keep in mind after the deceptively easy military victory in the Persian Gulf.

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Stephen E. Ambrose

THE PRESIDENCY AND FOREIGN POLICY

In the half-century between 1941 and 1991 the ten men who have served as president of the United States have scored some stupendous successes in their role as unquestioned world leader, but they have also suffered some spectacular failures. The greatest successes—the turning back of Nazism, fascism and communism in Europe and of Japanese militarism in Asia—are of such an order of magnitude that they must be described as America's unique gift to the world. That the presidents and their nation did not achieve these triumphs for freedom on their own is obvious, but it is equally obvious that the triumphs could not have been achieved without their leadership and determination. The presidents' contribution to the end of another "ism"—colonialism—has been of lesser importance, though still a positive one, as also their contribution to the advent of peaceful relations between Egypt and Israel, not to mention the continuing existence of Israel.

The failures, however, have been spectacular. They include the unwillingness or inability to prevent communist takeovers in China, Southeast Asia or Cuba, or to create peaceful conditions, much less prosperity, in the Middle East, Africa and Central America. Although some progress has been made in the past few years, American presidents have failed to realize the hopes of the founders of the United Nations for a genuine collective security or an end to the arms race. And they have been unable or unwilling to slow, much less stop, the international arms trade.

The two giants among the presidents since 1941 came at the beginning of that period. Franklin D. Roosevelt committed a reluctant United States to the leading international role and, more specifically, to unalterable opposition to Nazism, fascism and Japanese militarism. Harry S. Truman committed a reluctant United States to the reconstruction of Europe, to the building of democracy in Germany and Japan, to support for

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Stephen E. Ambrose is Boyd Professor of History and Director of the Eisenhower Center at the University of New Orleans.

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

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

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Israel, to NATO and the containment of communism. Four decades later the commitments made by Roosevelt and Truman in the 1940s remain the bedrock of American foreign policy. Their successors have been successful as implementors of established policy, not as creators of new policy.

II

Almost all the presidents since 1952 have attempted to create their own doctrine, using the Truman Doctrine as a model, but without much success. The doctrines articulated by Roosevelt and Truman established the precedent for future presidents. Although not an easy task, both presidents managed to convince a permanent majority of the American people that the democracy in, and close ties with, Western Europe were in the national interest; Truman, in the immediate postwar period, would include Japan. It has been difficult, however, for successive presidents to persuade a permanent majority that America's national security is at stake in other areas, except the Middle East.

The Eisenhower Doctrine dealt specifically with the Middle East. In 1957 Congress granted President Dwight D. Eisenhower authority to use American armed forces in the Middle East "if the president determines the necessity . . . to assist any nation . . . requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism." He implemented it in 1958 in Lebanon in a minor but precedent-setting military intervention. In its broadest sense the Eisenhower Doctrine was used by President Ronald Reagan in 1983, also in Lebanon, and by President George Bush in the recent Gulf War. But neither Reagan nor Bush cited it when they acted, in sharp contrast to Eisenhower in 1958 when he cited the Truman Doctrine as a precedent for invoking his own doctrine.

Unlike the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was based on a joint congressional resolution, President Richard M. Nixon announced his own doctrine more or less casually during an informal news conference in 1969. Nixon said that "the United States is going to encourage, and has a right to expect, that this problem [communist aggression] will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves." The Nixon Doctrine, which specifically concerned Southeast Asia, was little more than a clarification of

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the president's policy of Vietnamization (turning the ground war over to the South Vietnamese) and had no lasting impact.

The Carter Doctrine addressed the Persian Gulf. In 1980 President Jimmy Carter declared, without congressional authorization, that the United States would repel a Soviet assault in the gulf "by any means necessary—including military force." The doctrine is now out-of-date, and it was not cited by Presidents Reagan or Bush when they sent U.S. armed forces to the region.

The Reagan Doctrine (circa 1983) had no specific wording and no authorization. It was more a summary of President Reagan's policies in the Third World than a doctrine. In practice it meant covert U.S. military and economic support for anticommunist forces in Nicaragua and Afghanistan. In Nicaragua democracy triumphed, contrary to predictions from the Reagan administration, which argued that the Sandinistas would never abide by the results of a fair and free election. Whether the Reagan policy of support for the contras accelerated the process and forced the Sandinistas to accept the election results is a debatable point. In Afghanistan the Reagan Doctrine certainly helped the Afghanistan rebels to force a Red Army retreat, but it has not led to the demise of the communist government there.

The post-Truman doctrines for the Middle East have not had much success. It was President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt who expelled the Soviets from the Middle East, not the Eisenhower Doctrine. Reagan's intervention in Lebanon in 1982 was a disaster. And if there were ever any danger of the Red Army moving into the Persian Gulf, it no longer exists—not because of the Carter Doctrine but because of internal Soviet problems.

An obvious reason for these relative failures was American overreach. The United States either could not or would not support armed forces in every part of the world. American influence, and thus presidential doctrines, have been limited to those areas where the nation was willing to maintain large armed forces on a permanent basis. The United States has done so in Western Europe and Japan, where its influence today is great, but it has not done so in Southeast Asia, where its influence is small, nor in the Middle East, where Presidents Eisenhower, Reagan and Bush pulled troops and ships out shortly after sending them in.

For whatever reasons—perhaps because the doctrines an-

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nounced by some of his predecessors turned out to be empty canons—President Bush has not articulated what could be called a doctrine of his own. He has established a precedent of unalterable opposition to naked aggression by one Arab nation against another. As this is based on sound principle and economic necessity, it will have more staying power than some of the earlier doctrines—if the United States is willing to maintain large armed forces in the area.

III

The great successes in U.S. foreign policy tend to come in those areas in which there is a consensus and thus a continuity in policy. (This is not an iron-clad rule; consensus on isolationism, neutrality and disarmament in the 1920s and 1930s was surely wrong.) Failures tend to come in those areas in which there is not a consensus and thus confusion and inconsistency in policy. The most obvious example of a U.S. policy failure is Southeast Asia. In 1954 Eisenhower refused to intervene in Vietnam to stop communism; in 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson entered a major war in Vietnam to stop communism, eventually sending 550,000 troops there; in 1973 President Nixon pulled the last American troops out of Vietnam, and two years later the Vietnamese communists won a total victory. By 1976 Vietnam, described by presidents through the 1960s as vital to U.S. national interest, was inconsequential to American policymakers and forgotten as a policy priority by the American people.

Beyond the absence of consensus about the importance of countries other than those of Western Europe and Japan to U.S. national interest, there are additional important causes for the rapid shifts in American foreign policy. An obvious one has been the absence of continuity in the top leadership positions. In the past fifty years there have been ten presidents, five of them Democrats, five Republicans. They were all markedly different men, in personalities, agendas, experience and political support. Only two (Eisenhower and Reagan) served more than five years; all, including Roosevelt and Truman, had major internal inconsistencies in their policies; each tried to set his own course and put his own stamp on policy; small wonder that the United States lurched first this way, then that (except in Western Europe and Japan).

The swings in the location of control of foreign policy from the White House to Congress contributed to the inconsisten-

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cies. The structural cause of these swings is constitutional. The president's most important asset in asserting control of foreign policy is Section 2, Article II, of the Constitution: "The president shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States." The Constitution, however, also gives Congress power to shape foreign policy: Section 8, Article I, "The Congress shall have power to . . . declare war . . . raise and support armies . . . and maintain a navy"; Section 9, Article I, "No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law"; and Section 2, Article II, which gives the president the power to "make treaties," but only "provided two-thirds of the senators present concur." These simple declarative sentences invite a constant struggle between the executive and the legislative branches for control of foreign policy.

On the eve of Pearl Harbor Congress was in charge of foreign policy, as it had been since the Senate rejected the Versailles Treaty in 1919. President Roosevelt had a clear policy—to get the United States involved in the European war as a major participant on the side of Britain and the Soviet Union and to block further Japanese expansion in Asia—but Congress would not appropriate the monies necessary to raise and maintain armed forces capable of carrying it out, or declare war on the Axis powers.

War came anyway. After Pearl Harbor Roosevelt took command and controlled foreign policy as commander in chief almost without reference to Congress. His two most important policies, the demand for unconditional surrender by the Axis and the Yalta accords with the Soviets, were his decisions alone.

Truman operated differently, though for obvious reasons. The war was over, and thus the power of the president was necessarily diminished. He did not have the political mandate Roosevelt enjoyed, and the Republicans controlled Congress in the critical years 1947–49. Truman needed congressional approval for his great innovations, including creating America's first peacetime alliance—NATO—and an aid package to Europe, the Marshall Plan. Whereas there had been no significant national discussion about unconditional surrender or the Yalta accords, Truman led a lengthy debate over NATO and the Marshall Plan. He eventually managed to create a consensus for the policies. His third great innovation, the Truman Doctrine, was announced during a speech to Congress on

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March 12, 1947. The Truman Doctrine committed the United States to contain communism anywhere in the world by aiding countries that requested help against Soviet expansionism. His speech persuaded a majority in Congress to support military aid to Greece and Turkey, but that support came only after a prolonged national debate brilliantly conducted by his administration.

Truman, however, implemented his doctrine in Korea without consulting Congress. This decision turned out to be a mistake. Because of the way Truman entered the Korean War and because of the way he conducted it—twice changing U.S. policy 180 degrees, from stopping aggression to liberating North Korea and then back to stopping aggression, in each case without involving Congress in any way—he lost both popular and congressional support. Two years after he intervened in Korea, Truman's approval rating in the Gallup Poll dropped to 23 percent, the lowest in the history of the poll (Johnson slipped to 28 percent in the fall of 1968, Nixon to 25 percent in the summer of 1974).

Eisenhower brought back presidential primacy in foreign policy. The threat posed by the Soviet Union, the development of nuclear weapons and long-range bombers to carry them (and by the late 1950s intercontinental missiles), combined with the Pearl Harbor legacy of fear of surprise attack, made Congress content—even eager—to leave foreign policy decisions to the president. Eisenhower informed, rather than consulted with, congressional leaders about his major decisions: to accept a ceasefire in Korea without liberating North Korea, to stay out of Vietnam in 1954, to use the CIA to support coups in Iran in 1953 and in Guatemala in 1954, not to go to war with China over the off-shore islands (Quemoy and Matsu), not to support the Hungarian rebels in 1956 or the British/French/Israeli cabal in Suez in 1956, to force Israel to pull out of the Sinai Peninsula in 1957, to extend aid to Tito in Yugoslavia and to hold down the cost of defense. In every case, except Vietnam in 1954, a majority of Republicans and perhaps of Congress as a whole wanted Eisenhower to adopt different policies. But thanks to his immense prestige and congressional fears he got his way.

In his less than three years in office President John F. Kennedy ran foreign policy almost without reference to Congress, most notably in the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, but also in dealing with the

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problems of Berlin and Vietnam. Kennedy did not have Eisenhower's prestige or his political mandate, but he was the nation's leader at a time when Congress was most willing to support the president in foreign policy because the Cold War was at its hottest and American hubris at its highest.

In 1964, in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, Congress gave President Johnson even broader powers in Southeast Asia than it had given Eisenhower in the Middle East, another reflection of the congressional attitude that "the president knows best." But although Johnson managed to get a near-unanimous vote for the resolution, he did so in the middle of a presidential election campaign and rushed it through Congress without any meaningful debate. Many congressmen later claimed they had been tricked into voting for the measure because Johnson painted the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin almost as if it were Pearl Harbor revisited. In other words the sense of permanent crisis that prevailed in the worst years of the Cold War allowed Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson to act almost as unilaterally as Roosevelt had during World War II by drawing on their constitutionally given strength as commander in chief.

The agony of Vietnam caused the pendulum to swing back. Congress used its power of the purse to limit President Nixon's ability to carry out policies he thought necessary and eventually forced him to agree to a ceasefire that left the United States far short of the goals he had set. It blocked his détente initiative by refusing most-favored-nation status to the Soviets. In the 1973 War Powers Resolution Congress attempted to take control of foreign policy out of the president's hands by limiting his military option through legislation—unthinkable in previous administrations—and it rejected President Ford's pleas to support South Vietnam in its final crisis.

Perhaps exhausted by its major effort in the Nixon/Ford years, certainly relieved that the Vietnam War was over, Congress retreated from its active role during the Carter presidency. It was not involved in Carter's major triumph, the Camp David accords, except to provide the money that made the agreement possible, and it played virtually no part in the major crises of 1980—Nicaragua and the Sandinistas, Iran and the hostages, Afghanistan and the Soviet invasion.

Nor did Congress play as active a role in the eight years of Reagan's presidency as it had in the Nixon/Ford years, certainly not in his interventions in Grenada (1983) and Lebanon

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V

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VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a trial, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation no later than the commencement of the trial, and the limited assistance of Counsel.

VII

In suits of common law, a standard code of bail, punishments and fines shall be imposed, and that once established, this code not be subject to reinterpretation, except as it may be expanded by the Executive.

VIII

Slavery or involuntary servitude shall defray Judiciary costs, and the rights of citizens accused of such crimes shall not be abridged on account of race, sex or any other reason, and further that female slavery not be exempt from absolute prohibitions.

IX

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

X

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(1983–84), his air strike against Libya (1986) or his attempt to swap arms for hostages in Iran. Reagan simply ignored the one attempt by Congress to control policy—the Boland amendment forbidding aid to the contras in Nicaragua. (Although in that case Congress was able to use its power of the purse to limit somewhat his intervention.) In general Congress followed the shifting winds of Reagan's policies. When Reagan was hostile to the Soviet Union, Congress appropriated massive funds to support his military buildup (in large part because of the Soviet buildup of the 1970s). When Reagan turned to détente, Congress went along.

To date President Bush has been able to set and carry out his own foreign policy, although like Truman before the Korean "police action" he has been careful to involve Congress in the debate over the use of force. In the gulf crisis of 1990–91 he persuaded Congress to vote for the functional equivalent of a declaration of war.

One of the president's assets in the struggle over control of foreign policy is his ability to act, to shoot first and answer questions later. This power was greatly strengthened during the Cold War as the United States built and maintained permanent standing armed forces. The congressional attempt to diminish this asset through the War Powers Resolution has had at best minimal effect.

One congressional asset in the struggle for foreign policy control is the power to investigate, but this can be asserted only after the fact—as in the extended hearings into the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the agreement reached at Yalta, Truman's dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur, U.S. involvement in Vietnam (the prolonged Foreign Relations Committee hearings), possible wrong-doings within the CIA (the Church committee hearings) and the Iran-contra arms deals. Such hearings can embarrass the president and sometimes, as with Vietnam or the CIA, have an impact on policy.

Still, congressional hearings are at best a cumbersome way to make foreign policy, partly because they typically come after the fact, partly because partisanship is seldom more clearly in evidence than in a congressional hearing, and increasingly because of a divided government. Eisenhower was the only Republican president who had a majority in both the Senate and the House. This situation lasted for only two years, and during that time the Republicans in the Senate tried to pass an amendment to the Constitution (the so-called Bricker amend-

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ment) designed to limit the president's power to enter into executive agreements with foreign nations (read Yalta).

IV

Since Roosevelt the only presidents to leave office with high approval ratings have been Eisenhower and Reagan. Truman, Johnson and Nixon had less than a 30 percent approval rate at the end of their terms; Carter and Ford could not win reelection even as incumbents; Kennedy's approval rate was at about 50 percent when he was assassinated. There were many reasons, mostly domestic, for these relative failures, but certainly not least was the inability of the presidents to achieve their own stated foreign policy goals in "the American century." Their commitment to the Truman Doctrine played a role. The policy of containment was inherently frustrating and especially so to a nation that had totally defeated the Nazis and the Japanese in an all-out offensive but had to go over to the defensive in dealing with Stalin and his successors.

Roosevelt was successful in achieving the unconditional surrender of America's enemies, and in the Yalta accords he got the postwar settlement he wanted (whether he would have been better able than his successors to enforce the accords cannot be known but must be doubted). Truman successfully contained the communists in Greece and South Korea, established NATO and the Marshall Plan.

Their successors hoped for, and the public expected, such spectacular victories in other areas of the world, but these have been beyond America's grasp or willingness to pay. Even so it cannot be said too often that they have all held firm to the commitment to NATO and Japan. Bush was fortunate enough to be in office when the Truman Doctrine won its great victory, the retreat of communism from central and eastern Europe. Credit for this triumph goes to all the presidents since 1945.

V

One obvious cause of the relative failures in foreign policy has been the shift in the world economy and America's position in it. When Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower led the United States, it was an exporter of oil, steel, automobiles and other commodities. America was the world's creditor and enjoyed a highly favorable balance of trade.

By 1965 this situation was rapidly changing; by 1975 the United States was a major importer of oil; by 1985 the country

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had an unfavorable balance of trade and had become a debtor nation. Europe had recovered and then some; Japan was booming beyond the wildest expectations; the remainder of noncommunist Asia was not far behind. America was richer than ever, but its relative position in the world economy had been sharply reduced. This hampered the presidents in their attempts to be the world leader. For example, in 1956 Eisenhower was able to force the British and French out of Suez and Israel out of Sinai by threatening an oil boycott and other economic sanctions. But in 1973 Nixon could not persuade the Europeans to help him implement his policy of rearming Israel during the Yom Kippur War, and in 1981 Reagan was unable to persuade the Europeans to join in an economic boycott of Poland and Russia when the Soviet Union forced the Polish government to impose martial law in order to crush the Solidarity movement.

The military balance also shifted dramatically between 1941 and 1991. In 1941 the United States had a minuscule armed force, which was the major reason Roosevelt had so little influence on world events from the Munich crisis of 1938 through the German invasion of the Soviet Union in mid-1941. By 1945 the American armed forces were vastly superior to those of the rest of the world combined. After World War II the United States made possible the rearming of Western Europe, stopped communist aggression in Korea and had a virtual monopoly on nuclear weapons. In 1962 Kennedy used America's overwhelming superiority to force Nikita Khrushchev to back down in the Cuban missile crisis.

But the Cuban experience, plus the continuing expansion of the American arsenal instituted by Kennedy, caused Khrushchev to start his own crash program of building nuclear weapons and missiles. Kennedy had aimed to stockpile enough weapons and missiles to give the United States clear-cut nuclear superiority, but in 1968 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced that the Soviets had caught up with United States in terms of nuclear weapons. McNamara argued, however, that this was not undesirable, since the behavior of both states was now constrained by mutual assured destruction (MAD).

In conventional forces, meanwhile, the United States cut back its number of ships, planes and tanks, while the Soviets expanded theirs. The number of men and women in the U.S. armed services also decreased after Nixon introduced the

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all-volunteer force. The U.S. military, which had boasted in 1960 it could fight two-and-a-half major wars at once, by 1980 had become a pitiful helpless giant, capable of destroying the world in a nuclear spasm but incapable of fighting even one-half a war with much hope of success.

The power to destroy is not the power to control. Power is the man on the spot with the gun in his hand, and increasingly the United States was incapable of putting him there. This too hampered American presidents in their attempts to exert world leadership and led to inconsistencies in their policies. Simultaneously two ideas came to dominate presidential thinking and behavior. First, the world was bipolar and contained two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union. Excluding the superpowers, no other nation mattered very much (the British attended the first two summit meetings, at Yalta and Potsdam, as equal partners; Eisenhower took care to involve the British and French at the Geneva and Paris summits; but since 1960 summits have been limited to the United States and the Soviet Union).

Second, American hubris and the astonishing growth of the White House staff combined to reinforce the so-called Imperial Presidency, so that just as the relative importance of the president was decreasing, the presidents' views of themselves and what they could accomplish was increasing. The public agreed, which led to great expectations with each new president after Eisenhower, only to be followed by disillusion as the presidents failed to achieve their goals.

In 1960 Kennedy had set out to create a first-strike capability. By 1968 Soviet nuclear weapons deployment and advances in weaponry led to the concept of MAD. In 1970 Nixon said that he would be satisfied with strategic sufficiency, which apparently meant nuclear parity with the Soviets. In 1972 Nixon signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), an agreement with the Soviets that conceded superiority in some categories of missiles.

These fundamental policy shifts after 1960 were matched by shifts in each president's posture. Kennedy came into office full of bellicose rhetoric. He wanted to go on the offensive worldwide, ready to "pay any price, bear any burden," to ensure the triumph of freedom everywhere. He sponsored an invasion of Cuba—and then backed down at the critical moment. He took a strong stance on Berlin—and then backed down when Khrushchev built the Wall. He escalated the war in

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Vietnam—and then allowed the CIA to participate in a plot to overthrow the South Vietnamese president, Ngo Dinh Diem. He faced down Khrushchev in the Cuban missile crisis—and then entered into an agreement in which he promised that the United States would never invade Cuba, a promise he had no authority to make and that, had he presented it to the Senate in the form of a treaty, would never have been ratified.

VI

The gap between Johnson's rhetoric and promises on the one hand and his performance on the other was even greater. Johnson said he would not send American boys to Asia to do the fighting that Asian boys ought to be doing themselves, but he then ended up sending 550,000 American soldiers. Johnson said he sought no wider war, even as he widened the war. He said he would never play politics with peace and then called a bombing halt one week before the 1968 election. He said he would see to it that there was no reward for aggression and then offered to negotiate the removal of American troops while the communists held large portions of South Vietnamese territory.

Nixon extracted the United States from Vietnam, opened the door to China, promoted détente with the Soviet Union and negotiated the first Cold War arms control agreement. In each case what he did represented a retreat, for America and for Nixon, who had stridently advocated opposite policies for two decades. When he withdrew U.S. troops from Vietnam, Nixon claimed to have achieved peace with honor. From the perspective of the South Vietnamese, what he had achieved was surrender with humiliation. What he had accomplished was to get America out of Vietnam without setting off a right-wing revolt within the United States and to give the Saigon government a chance to stand on its own two feet—not much of a chance, to be sure, but still a chance. That was an accomplishment Nixon could have pointed to with pride but, Nixon being Nixon, he had to grossly exaggerate and claim peace with honor. Saigon fell because of the incompetence and corruption of its own government. It was not Nixon's fault, but he must shoulder some of the blame for failing to make that government reform itself.

If Nixon was the man most responsible for opening the door to China in 1972, he was also one of the key men who had been most responsible for keeping it closed for the preceding 23

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years. When he changed his mind, he sprang his new policy on the nation as a surprise. There had been no national debate on the subject, and thus no constituency had emerged behind it. The door, therefore, did not open very wide. Nixon was not able to solve the problem of Taiwan or establish diplomatic relations or trade agreements with China, much less enter into an alliance with that country.

Détente with the Soviets, for all its promise, was also substantially flawed by Nixon's penchant for secrecy. He negotiated in secret, especially using back-channels to cut out the State Department. Rather than consult with the Senate, he tried to go over its head or around it. He thus left his policy vulnerable to ambitious senators, led by Henry Jackson (D–Wash.), who used their power to scuttle such critical aspects of détente as most-favored-nation status for the Soviets. Détente had no staying power—recall that President Ford banned the use of the word détente in the White House—and at least part of the reason was Nixon's love of surprise and secrecy.

Carter also was unable to set a course and hold to it. In sharp contrast to the realpolitik of the Nixon/Ford administrations, the chief characteristic of the Carter administration was its idealism. In his inaugural address in 1976 Carter said he wanted to eliminate nuclear weapons and to stop arms sales abroad. He made a firm commitment to human rights, calling them "the soul of our foreign policy." But the nuclear arsenal grew during the Carter years at the same pace as in the Nixon/Ford years. Arms sales abroad actually increased. Carter's emphasis on human rights badly damaged America's relationship with many of its oldest allies. It caused resentment in the Soviet Union and contributed to Carter's failure to reach arms control agreements and to the downfall of America's most important ally in the Middle East, the shah of Iran.

Human rights had been good politics for Carter as a candidate. The issue pleased both right-wingers, who could and did use it to criticize the Soviet Union, and left-wingers, who could and did use it to criticize Chile, Brazil, South Africa and others for their human rights abuses. But the issue made for terrible policy. It was directed against America's allies, who were vulnerable to Carter's pressures, rather than its enemies, who were basically immune. It made little sense to weaken such allies as South Korea, Argentina, South Africa, Brazil, Taiwan, Nicaragua, Iran and others because of objections to their human rights record while continuing to advance credits,

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

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sell grain and ship advanced technology to the Soviet Union, which had one of the worst human rights records in the world and was clearly no friend of the United States.

The Carter human rights policy represented American hubris at its most extreme, willfully ignoring the reality of America's power and ability to dictate developments abroad. It makes no sense to commit to a policy that one has no power to enforce. This applies to Roosevelt's policy toward Poland as enunciated in the Yalta accords of 1945, to the Republican promise of liberation for Eastern Europe as enunciated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1952, to the policy of paying any price to ensure the survival of freedom around the world as enunciated by Kennedy in 1961, and to Carter's human rights policy.

Further, Carter's preaching to the Soviet Union on its human rights obligations contradicted U.S. attempts to improve relations with the Kremlin. The president tried to assure the Soviet leaders that a new day had dawned in Washington, but as he pulled back from America's advanced positions around the world, for example by ordering the removal of nuclear weapons from Korea without demanding some balancing arms reduction by the Soviets, the Soviets responded by moving forward. They continued their arms buildup and became involved both in the Horn of Africa and Angola.

The climax came in December 1979 when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Carter's reaction was extreme, as was the triggering Soviet action. He placed an embargo on grain sales to the Soviets and on high technology goods. He withdrew SALT II, drawn up by Nixon and endorsed by Ford, from the Senate ratification process. He sharply increased defense spending and announced that restrictions on CIA activities would be lifted. These were serious steps that reversed long-standing policies, not to mention his own stated goals. When Carter left office, relations with the Soviet Union were much worse than they had been when he was inaugurated. Each side had more bombs and missiles, less trade and trust. Carter in 1980 was the antithesis of Carter in 1977. By 1980 the word most often used to describe his foreign policy was "waffle." It was a stinging indictment.

Nonetheless Carter did manage some solid foreign policy successes. Most notably, the president was instrumental in negotiating the Camp David accords in 1979, the first peace treaty between Israel and an Arab state, Egypt. Another

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notable success was the Panama Canal treaty in 1978, returning full sovereignty over the canal zone to Panama. The treaty had been denounced by presidential candidate Reagan, endorsed by Ford and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Carter put the full weight of the presidency into the debate; the treaty narrowly passed. He also established full diplomatic relations with China. But he failed completely to achieve his stated goals of ending the Cold War, improving human rights, stopping the arms race or eliminating nuclear weapons.

With regard to the event that led to Carter's defeat in the 1980 election, the Iranian Revolution and the taking of American hostages by the revolutionaries, he moved from blunder to blunder. He praised the shah far beyond any justified level (on the eve of the revolution he called Iran an island of stability in a turbulent sea). He failed to support the shah when the revolution began. He failed to open lines of communication with the revolutionaries. He recognized a government in Iran that could not govern. He decided to allow the shah into the United States despite clear warnings about the repercussions. He had a highly emotional and grossly exaggerated response to the taking of the hostages, insisting absurdly that he was spending every waking moment on the hostage problem. He delayed and then botched the use of a military rescue option.

Reagan was also inconsistent. He came into office as the most belligerent president since Kennedy, denouncing the "evil empire," and ended up as Mikhail Gorbachev's friend and virtual ally. He entered office aiming for a first-strike capability and ended up signing the first arms reduction agreement of the Cold War. He promised never to pay ransom for hostages, then secretly sold weapons to the Iranian government in return for the release of hostages (a policy that never resulted in the release of hostages and completely undermined the U.S. boycott of arms sales to Tehran). Reagan did preside over a major increase in America's armed forces, but more often than not he was frustrated in his attempt to use the military option, as in Nicaragua. In Lebanon he was hamstrung by contradictions in his policies. He sent the marines to Beirut with no clear mission, putting them in a provocative position with orders not to shoot. In Richard Neustadt's telling judgment, he succeeded in "combining ignorance with insistence."

Still, Reagan had some impressive firsts. His administration

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coincided with a number of arms reduction agreements, and it managed eight years without a major war (but with a popular invasion of Grenada and an even more popular military strike against Libya). According to his admirers, Reagan's arms buildup was responsible for the retreat of communism from central and eastern Europe. They argue that the Soviet effort to keep up with the Americans bankrupted the communists. This may be true, although critics argue that communism collapsed because it is a rotten system and that it lasted as long as it did only because of the perceived threat against the Warsaw Pact nations by the Reagan buildup. Back in 1953 Eisenhower had said that the proper policy for the West was to keep up its defenses, not to threaten and to wait for communism to self-destruct. That was a restatement of the Truman Doctrine, and it worked, thanks to its support by all of Truman's successors.

In any case, with regard to Reagan's policies, it was the contradictions that stood out. He launched the most expensive weapons development program in history, the Strategic Defense Initiative, even as he sought arms reduction. In 1986 at the conclusion of the Reykjavik Summit with Gorbachev, Secretary of State George Shultz reported that the two leaders had agreed on the elimination of all nuclear weapons and the missile systems to deliver them, and that this process of disarmament was to be completed in ten years. It seemed too good to be true, and it was. Shultz went on to say that these agreements in principle had been abandoned because Reagan refused to accept Gorbachev's demand that the United States stop its SDI program. In the Iran-contra affair, the administration violated the law and tried to cover it up, to the point that Reagan might have been impeached had the Democrats not felt that one threatened impeachment a century is enough. His administration survived, but revelations in the Iran-contra hearings seriously crippled his ability to conduct foreign policy. When he left office, Reagan was popular with the public as a person, but his policies were in danger of becoming an object of ridicule.

To date President Bush's policies have been, except toward China, popular and successful. America's relative power position in the world has continued to decline, and congressional attempts to cut back on the powers of the Imperial Presidency through investigations and revelations from Watergate through Iran-contra have proved embarrassing for the White

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House. Yet in his first major crisis Bush was able to mobilize public opinion within his country and around the world, leading a serious debate, fully involving Congress and consulting constantly with other leaders. In the process he demonstrated beyond all doubt that the American president is still the most important person in the world. No other world leader could have put together the coalition that fought the Gulf War. Bush also demonstrated that no other nation could project so much power so far from home as the United States. A year later, in August 1991, Bush's condemnation of the coup leaders in the Soviet Union as criminals, his support for Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, brought him praise and thanks from Soviet leaders, who said that his policy was of fundamental importance to the democratic elements in Moscow.

VII

This brief survey of a half-century of presidential foreign policy demonstrates some basic truths: realism is more effective than idealism; a strong military is essential to implementing an activist foreign policy; Congress is less likely to sustain an activist policy than the president; the struggle between Congress and the president over foreign policy will continue so long as the Constitution lasts; and consistency in foreign policy is difficult to achieve but immensely powerful when it happens.

But the great lesson is that secrecy and surprise are the enemies of democracy; open and prolonged debate are the great power of democracy. The policies that have failed have tended to be those adopted by presidents without meaningful debate—Roosevelt's Yalta policy toward Poland, Kennedy's intervention in the Bay of Pigs, Johnson's intervention in Vietnam, Nixon's détente and China policies, Carter's human rights policy, Reagan's Iran-contra policy, among others. The polices that have succeeded have been adopted by Congress and the people after meaningful debate—Roosevelt's commitment to total victory, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and NATO, Carter's Panama treaty, and the Camp David accords, arms control (where the debate has been too long and too strident, but where a consensus is building), Bush's policy of using all-out force to turn back naked, unprovoked aggression. Of course there are exceptions (unconditional surrender in World War II, Nixon's China opening and others), but when the president involves Congress and the people in the

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creation of new policy it is most likely to work and have staying power.

For the historian looking back over a half century what stands out is the strengthening of the president's power to conduct foreign policy. When one contrasts how hampered Roosevelt was before World War II by a Congress determined to impose its policy—neutrality and disarmament—with the adoption by all presidents since Roosevelt of his policy of collective security and military preparedness, the adjective that comes to mind to characterize that strengthening is "enormous." Obviously, in such a diverse country with such volatile politics over such a long period of time, it has not been a straight line of growth. In this connection it is ironic that the most innovative of the Cold War presidents, Nixon, was the one most frustrated by congressional interference. Nevertheless in general over the past half century, the Oval Office is where foreign policy for better or worse has been made. Except for the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, that had not been the case in the first four decades of the twentieth century and seldom in the nineteenth century. Since Pearl Harbor the best way to describe the situation is that as America's role as world leader increased, so has the power of the president.

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II

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David Kahn, an op-ed editor at *Newsday*, is author of *The Codebreakers* and *Seizing the Enigma*.

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nese diplomatic messages told American negotiators just how far they could push the Japanese.

But in 1929 Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, believing that mutual trust worked best in international affairs and that therefore "gentlemen do not read each other's mail," refused to expend State Department funds for cryptanalysis. When Yardley, out of work in the Depression, wrote an indiscreet book in 1931 revealing the inside story, Japanese officials lost face, the Japanese press fulminated, relations with the United States deteriorated—and Japan improved its diplomatic cryptosystems. Tokyo adopted machine ciphers more complex than the system employing simultaneous use of multiple codebooks that Yardley and his team had cracked.

But the dissolution of Yardley's agency had not killed American codebreaking. Both the army and the navy had their own units. The navy's began almost by accident, after naval intelligence, having rifled the trunk of a Japanese naval officer in New York in 1923, found itself with a codebook but without means to exploit it. In January 1924 the navy established a four-man unit to gain information from Japanese communications. Its head was Lieutenant Laurance F. Safford, ranked fifteenth in the Annapolis class of 1916. Since the codebook was Japanese, and since the navy regarded Japan as its most likely enemy, Safford started setting up listening posts in the Pacific.

Safford also hired a brilliant, 32-year-old woman who proved to be an outstanding cryptanalyst. Agnes Meyer Driscoll, who had taught mathematics and music and had worked for Yardley, attacked the messages in the photographed code. The book listed Japanese words, syllables and phrases opposite five-digit codegroups, such as 48771, which replaced them. The codegroups were not used plain, however. They were themselves enciphered. It was the job of "Miss Aggie" to break through this armor and recover the original codegroups. Incessantly turning the pages of the photographed book with the rubber tip of her eraser, she eventually succeeded. The codegroups then yielded Japanese text, which a husband-and-wife team translated.

But in December 1930 the code, which by then was 12 years old, was replaced by a new one. The hardest part of breaking a code is getting started. As one of the naval codebreakers explained: "It first off involved what I call the staring process. You look at all of these messages that you have; you line them

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up in various ways; you write them one below the other; you'd write them in various forms and you'd stare at them. Pretty soon you'd notice a pattern; you'd notice a definite pattern between these messages. This was the first clue."

Miss Aggie, who by then had learned the ships' names, the communications patterns and the frequently used phrases of the Japanese fleet, no doubt utilized a form of this process first to dissolve the codeword encipherment and then to reconstruct the new 85,000-group code. For years it gave the U.S. Navy insight into Japanese forces and tactics, as expressed during fleet exercises.

And it was only one source of communications intelligence. During the 1930s, the navy attacked and often solved other Japanese naval codes—for administration, merchant ships, logistics, intelligence—and several cipher machines. When codebreaking failed, traffic analysis provided much information. Traffic analysis infers an organization's structure and operation from message routing, message volume, call signs and operators' chatter. A prime tool, direction-finding, locates a radio transmitter. Much as a portable radio can be rotated to bring in a station most strongly, a sensitive antenna can find the direction from which a signal is coming. If two antennas take bearings on the source of a signal, a control center can draw the lines of direction on a map; their intersection marks the position of the transmitter. Such a fix can tell where, for example, a ship is. Successive fixes can plot its course and speed. A study of call signs, combined with direction-finding, can show which stations are talking to which and which of those are communications centers and, therefore, presumably headquarters. Finally, increased volume in one area may suggest increased activity. The intercept and direction-finding stations that Safford swung in a vast arc across the central Pacific furnished both the intercepts that the cryptanalysts solved and the data for the traffic analysts. All of these sources gave the U.S. Navy a fairly complete picture of the Imperial Japanese Navy's forces, organization and movements throughout the 1930s and into 1941.

III

While the navy was expanding its communications intelligence organization, so was the army. The Signal Corps had hired in 1921 a 29-year-old who was even then one of the world's great cryptanalysts. William F. Friedman had written

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some theoretical treatises of landmark importance and had solved German codes in France during World War I. Friedman's job now was to improve the army's cryptosystems. With the closing of Yardley's agency, the Signal Corps added foreign codebreaking to its responsibilities, and Friedman became the head of a new Signal Intelligence Service. The first new hire was Rowlett, who was 21 at the time. After a couple of years of training in cryptanalysis under Friedman, Rowlett and two colleagues began attacking Japanese diplomatic cryptosystems, mainly because diplomatic intercepts were available and Japanese army intercepts were not. The three cracked a simple code that served for personnel matters and expenses of Japanese diplomats. Then they turned their attention to what appeared to be a machine system that seemed to protect the more important messages. The army cryptanalysts reconstructed the machine and named it RED.

That solution made codebreaking the nation's premier source of secret intelligence. It easily surpassed espionage: except for a few local agents who provided observations to naval attachés, the United States had no spies anywhere in the world. And codebreaking outperformed the diplomats, gaining information long before they did and in a highly specific form, namely, word-for-word instructions and reports. In March 1937, for example, the intercepts revealed advance information about Italy's possible adherence to the German-Japanese anti-Comintern pact—six months before American diplomats began reporting on it. Later the intercepts revealed part of the text of the treaty. In 1937, for the first time, solutions of intercepted foreign messages began flowing to the White House.

Then, on March 20, 1939, three messages in a new cryptosystem were intercepted. Within three months, the new system had displaced RED, whose mechanisms were wearing out. Japan's major diplomatic messages had become unreadable. Faced with the loss of the nation's paramount intelligence, the Signal Intelligence Service mounted a concentrated attack on Japan's new machine. Friedman put Rowlett in charge. The Americans called the new machine PURPLE.

Rowlett's team was assigned to two rooms of the Munitions Building. Rowlett worked in Room 3416, his mind focused. He never hummed or chewed his pencil or muttered to himself; he looked out the window onto the neighboring wing only when something distracted him; he never drank coffee, but he

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did puff on a pipe. Most mornings he held a conference with the other cryptanalysts. Afterwards they collectively scrutinized the intercepts. Most of these had been teletyped in from army intercept stations that monitored the commercial radio circuits used by the Japanese Foreign Ministry for most of its messages. The cryptanalysts' work consisted of matching proposed plaintext—a guess as to the text of the original message—against the text of the cryptograms. The proposed plaintext came from circular telegrams sent simultaneously in the readable RED and in PURPLE during the three months that both systems served, from formulaic diplomatic language, and in a few cases from the State Department's supplying of the text of notes to or from the Japanese ambassadors.

Friedman, who had assembled the team, supervised. He did not engage in any of the actual cryptanalysis but made sure the unit had all the support it needed. Determination pervaded Rowlett's co-workers, who remained confident that they would break PURPLE the way RED had been broken. The summer of 1940 arrived. Rowlett drove his Ford to work. Belgium, the Netherlands, France fell. England braced for invasion. Japan, persisting in its three-year-old aggression in China, seemed now to cast a covetous eye on orphaned French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. In July President Franklin D. Roosevelt embargoed the export of aviation fuel and high-grade scrap metal to Japan.

Though the cryptanalysts followed these developments in the newspapers, their inspiration came less from the pressure of events than from fascination with the cryptologic problem. They struggled to envision what kind of electromechanical device could produce these groups of incoherent letters from Japanese plain language. A hypothesis emerged. As they sought to test it, construction workers began to build an additional floor above them. Hammers pounded; men shouted. If the cryptanalysts closed the windows to reduce the noise, they sweltered in the non-air-conditioned offices; if they opened them, they could barely think. Still they persisted. Just as the new structure was finished, a fire destroyed it—and it had to be built all over again.

Then on September 20, cryptanalyst Genevieve Grotjan spotted a particular pattern among the letters she was scrutinizing. The 26-year-old codebreaker looked for another. Soon another member of the PURPLE team noticed that she seemed to be concentrating extremely intently. He spoke to

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Grotjan about it and then he, Rowlett and another cryptanalyst came to her desk. At once they grasped the significance of what Grotjan was showing them: the pattern confirmed the team's theory of how the PURPLE machine worked. One of the team members dashed around the room; another shouted "Hooray!" Rowlett jumped up and down, crying: "That's it! That's it!" Grotjan's discovery capped one of the greatest cryptanalyses of all time: enciphered Japanese diplomatic cables were now comprehensible. And how did the codebreakers celebrate? They sent out for Cokes!

A week later, the day the Tripartite Pact established the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis and a day after Roosevelt prohibited the export of all iron and steel scrap to Japan, the Signal Intelligence Service handed in its first two solved PURPLE messages. These two drops of intelligence marked the trickling start of what, a year later, would grow into a stream. By late 1941 solutions of messages in PURPLE and in lower-level Japanese diplomatic cryptosystems soared to 50 to 75 messages a day. The most important of these, selected by army and navy intelligence officers, went to the president, the secretaries of state, war and the navy, the chief of staff, the chief of naval operations and a handful of top-level officials. (The secretary of war was Stimson, who had closed Yardley's unit in 1929 but now welcomed the intercepts. He was not inconsistent: he believed that codebreaking was a legitimate function of a military service but not of a diplomatic one.) These intercepts provided insight into the thoughts and activities of Japan's Foreign Office and corroborated the evidence from negotiations and events, such as Japan's occupation of French Indochina, that matters were approaching a crisis.

For example a PURPLE message on July 31, 1941, from the foreign minister in Tokyo to the ambassador in Washington declared: "There is more reason than ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war." The occasional instruction to seek a peaceful solution, such as one on November 15, was overwhelmed by belligerent indications. On November 19, the Foreign Office arranged with its embassies and legations that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications," the phrase "east wind rain" would be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language shortwave newscast to indicate Japanese-American relations were threatened. "When this is heard please destroy all code papers," the

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Foreign Office instructed. On November 30, Tokyo told its ambassador in Berlin to "say very secretly to them [Adolf Hitler and Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop] that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking-out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams."

But the Japanese diplomatic PURPLE and other intercepts did not reveal military or naval plans. The army had not solved any Japanese army codes because it could not intercept enough messages. The navy had made scant progress on the main Japanese operations code, JN25, whose second, enlarged edition, JN25b, had been introduced on December 1, 1940. With Miss Aggie and reserve Lieutenant Prescott Currier leading the attack, the navy had stripped off most of the additive groups that concealed the underlying codegroups, but had recovered only a small number of these, so that by December 1941 only about 10 percent of the text of an average JN25b message could be read. This was due less to Japanese cryptographic superiority than to the navy's insufficiency of cryptanalysts, in part because it was helping the army decipher PURPLE messages (once the machine had been solved) while also helping the British break U-boat messages in the German navy's Enigma cipher machine.

Nor did other sources provide much insight into the specifics of Japanese military or naval planning. U.S. military attachés furnished 90-page reports on weapons, tactics, personalities and organization but had no solid information on the intentions of the Japanese armed forces. The diplomats concentrated on the political situation and, likewise, had little hard information on military developments. In January 1941 Ambassador Joseph Grew duly reported that a Peruvian colleague had heard that Japan was planning an attack on Pearl Harbor. The rumor was false, for at the time no attack was being planned. Washington, in any event, filed the report and forgot about it. William J. Donovan, named in July 1941 to head what became the Office of Strategic Services, had no secret agents and thus no independent source with which to make predictions.

Only one form of intelligence appeared to offer relatively solid information about Japanese naval matters: traffic analysis. For years traffic analysts watched with precision the ships and squadrons of the Japanese fleet and their maneuvers. Two

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tense situations in 1941 reconfirmed their ability. During the war scare of February, when Japan was moving on French Indochina with the apparent intention of attacking Singapore (which might have brought the United States into the war), various forms of intelligence observed the southward movements of Japanese warships. Traffic analysis added to this. When its monitors picked up no communications either to or from the aircraft carriers, its analysts concluded that these vital units were standing by in home waters as a covering force in case of an attack on Japan's main islands. Later intelligence confirmed this analysis. In July, when Japan occupied French Indochina, carrier communications again went dead. Again traffic analysis decided that the carriers had been in home waters. Twice, then, a complete blank of communications with the carriers, together with indications of a strong southward thrust, had meant the presence of the carriers in Empire waters. A pattern seemed to have emerged.

IV

Throughout the fall tension between Japan and the United States escalated. Negotiations all but ended after an American démarche on November 26, the acceptance of whose demands would have required Japan to pull out of China and in other ways to reverse its foreign policy. Japan then finalized its decision for war with a nation whose population was twice as large and whose industrial output nine times as great as its own. Why did Tokyo make this apparently irrational move? Premier Hideki Tojo told the Privy Council on December 1 that, if Japan were to submit to American demands, "Japan's existence itself would be endangered. . . . Japan has now no other way than to wage war against the United States." Japan had never intended to invade the United States. It planned only to cripple the main American instrument of war—the U.S. Pacific Fleet—and then wait behind a ring of impregnable defenses until the Americans wearied of the struggle and quit, leaving Japan to wax fat on its conquests and to reign as master of East Asia.

American officials did not think Japan would attack their country. To start war with so superior a power would be to commit national hara-kiri. To Western modes of thought, it made no sense. This rationalism was paralleled by a racism that led Americans to underrate Japanese abilities and will. Such views were held not only by common bigots but by

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opinion-makers as well. These preconceptions blocked out of American minds the possibility that Japan would attack an American possession.

Yet on December 3, 1941, an intercept revealed Tokyo instructing its Washington embassy to burn codes and destroy cipher machines. How else could it be interpreted but as a preparation for war? On the evening of Saturday, December 6, Roosevelt, who had excused himself from a large dinner party, and his aide Harry Hopkins read an intercept in his lamplit White House study as the naval lieutenant who had delivered it watched. "This means war," the lieutenant remembered the president saying in effect. What could he have meant? Perhaps eventual or accidental hostilities, perhaps hostilities following a Japanese conflict with Britain through a move against the Malay Peninsula, at whose tip lay Singapore.

An attack on Pearl Harbor was seen as all but excluded. Though senior army and navy officers knew that Japan had often started wars with surprise attacks, and though the naval air defense plan for Hawaii warned of a dawn assault, officials also knew that the base was the nation's best defended and that the fleet had been stationed that far west not to attract, but to deter, Japan.

The evidence available early in December seemed to confirm American preconceptions. Reports from consuls, attachés, and ships' masters told of Japanese forces moving southward. American reconnaissance airplanes saw Japanese submarines, cruisers, transports and destroyers in Camranh Bay and elsewhere along the French Indochina coast. On December 5, British aircraft spotted three Japanese convoys rounding Cambodia Point and entering the Gulf of Siam. American traffic analysis further indicated an advance to the south. Many Japanese units were heard as they headed that way. Yet no communications went to or came from the carriers. As in February and July, the carriers were apparently in home waters. So certain were American officials of this southward move that, in a staff meeting on the morning of December 7, as Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall was about to warn Pacific commands that Japan was breaking off negotiations at 1 p.m. Washington time, one general shouted out to the communications officer that if there were a question about priority, the first message should go to the Philippines.

As he was saying this, six of the carriers thought by traffic analysis to be lying in home waters were in fact plowing the

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seas north of Hawaii. They had launched airplanes for a Sunday morning attack on the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Japan's strategic plan would prove unsuccessful. The attack so enraged and unified the American people that they would never tire of the struggle but would battle on to total victory. Yet Japan's tactical plan worked to perfection: the raid achieved complete surprise.

V

American intelligence had failed. Evidence warning of an attack could have overcome American preconceptions, but intelligence—which relied almost solely on the *diplomatic* transmissions via PURPLE—had found no such evidence. Japan had sealed all possible leaks. The ambassadors in Washington were not told of the attack. Knowledge of it was limited in Tokyo to as tight a circle as possible. Plans for it were distributed by hand to the ships of the task force. No reference to a raid on Pearl Harbor ever went on the air, even coded. The February and July situations misled traffic analysts. JN25b messages intercepted before the attack, but solved after the war, show that even if that naval code had been fully solved and those messages read before December 7, they would not have foretold the attack. And though war with Japan was indeed expected, that expectation did not—could not—imply knowledge of an attack on Pearl Harbor, for it is impossible in logic to leap from a general belief to a specific prediction.

Some historians, pointing out that officials saw the intercepts only day by day, claim that had someone sat down and looked through them all at one time, he or she would have seen a pattern indicating the attack. This is extremely unlikely. There was nothing in either the diplomatic or the naval intercepts about an attack on Pearl Harbor. Indeed such a collation might have pointed *away* from Hawaii. Of solved messages reporting ship movements between August 1 and December 6, 1941, 59 dealt with the Philippines, 23 with the Panama Canal and only 20 with Pearl Harbor.

In her 1962 study, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*, Roberta Wohlstetter argues, "We failed to anticipate Pearl Harbor not for want of the relevant materials, but because of a plethora of irrelevant ones." In the terms of information theory that Wohlstetter uses, this means that the noise was too great for the signal to be picked out. But she errs. There was a dearth of intelligence materials. Not one intercept, not one

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datum of intelligence ever said a thing about an attack on Pearl Harbor. There was, in Wohlstetter's terms, no signal to be detected. Intelligence officers could perhaps have foreseen the attack if the United States, years before, had insinuated spies into high-level Japanese military and naval circles, flown regular aerial reconnaissance of the Japanese navy, put intercept units aboard ships sailing close to Japan to pick up naval messages that a greatly expanded codebreaking unit might have cracked, or recruited a network of marine observers to report on ship movements. The intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor was one not of analysis, as Wohlstetter implies, but of collection.

For many people, Pearl Harbor remains an enigma. "We were breaking the codes," they cry. "Roosevelt must have known!" Or, as Congress's Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack put it: "Why, with some of the finest intelligence available in our history, with the almost certain knowledge that war was at hand, with plans that contemplated the precise type of attack that was executed by Japan on the morning of December 7—Why was it possible for a Pearl Harbor to occur?" The simple answer is that the intelligence, good though it was in certain areas, was not good enough.

To some people the intelligence failure was deliberate. They contend that President Roosevelt provoked the attack by his intransigence toward Japan and ensured its success by suppressing intelligence and withholding information from the commanders at Pearl Harbor. His purpose, the theory goes, was to trick a reluctant United States into the war. After the war, when the cryptologic details became public, the conspiracy theories blossomed.

The naval commander at Pearl, Admiral Husband Kimmel, complained that he was taken by surprise in part because he had not been allowed to receive the diplomatic intelligence obtained from PURPLE. But its additional details of the deteriorating situation could not have alerted him more than the November 27 message of the chief of naval operations, which began, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning."

Safford, who was head of the naval codebreaking and codemaking unit on December 7, insisted that the "winds" code had been executed and that evidence of it had been suppressed. On December 3 or 4, he said, Japan had broadcast

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"East wind rain," meaning war was imminent with the United States. The intercept with the serial number JD-1:7001 was not in the files; this was obviously the "winds" execute, Safford charged, and it was missing because higher authority had ordered the removal of this evidence. The first problem with this theory, which incriminates Roosevelt and his aides, is that interception of a such an order would not have told anybody anything more than he or she already knew. The second problem is that it raises the incredible picture of Admiral Harold Stark, the chief of naval operations, rummaging through file drawers in an office with which he was unfamiliar to find and abstract a piece of paper. No one ever reported his presence in the office or said they had received orders from him to destroy a government record. Finally, naval officers reported that serial numbers were sometimes canceled for legitimate reasons, such as duplication.

More recently a book by intelligence writer James Rusbridger and former Australian codebreaker Eric Nave, *Betrayal at Pearl Harbor*, claims that a British codebreaking unit at Singapore, where Nave worked, solved JN25 before the Pearl Harbor attack. This revealed the forthcoming Japanese strike to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who said nothing about it to Roosevelt because, according to the authors, he wanted the United States in the war with him. A massive coverup, they assert, has kept this information from coming out.

Several flaws destroy this theory. Churchill wanted the United States in the war against Germany, not Japan. A British codebreaker's diary states that the prime minister was surprised by the attack. The code in use from December 1, 1940, was not JN25, but the quite different JN25b. The British and the Americans exchanged codegroup recoveries in this system, so the Americans would have been able to discover the same things the British had. Finally, none of the presumed JN25b solutions the authors cite even mention Pearl Harbor.

Upon similar close examination, the other anti-Roosevelt conspiracy theories likewise fall apart. Most spring from a wish to defend Kimmel or the army commander at Pearl, General Walter Short, or from a hatred of Roosevelt. They demonstrate their fundamental illogic by forgetting, for example, that had the army lieutenant who headed a radar unit at Pearl Harbor, which had spotted the incoming flight of Japanese bombers, not told the radar operators to "forget it," the Roosevelt plot would have been frustrated. They ignore that

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both Stimson and Frank Knox, the secretary of the navy, were Republicans (Knox had, in fact, run in 1936 as GOP vice presidential candidate against the Roosevelt ticket). They demonstrate their total misreading of character by implying that General Marshall would let people die in so cynical a way and then lie about it. They seem not to realize that, even if Roosevelt had wanted war, he would not have wanted to enter it with his fleet badly weakened. The concocters of these theories are unable to accept that humans sometimes do things wrong or do not do them at all, that accidents happen, that in the complex system that is the world improbable events occur.

VI

Pearl Harbor was the greatest shock ever sustained by the United States. It destroyed the national myth of isolation and invulnerability. This was one of the reasons the United States "unencapsulated" itself after World War II and reached out to other nations in a network of alliances. And Pearl Harbor reverberated throughout the Cold War as a fear of surprise attack. The nation spent billions on early-warning radar lines and intelligence satellites and, for decades, kept its missiles ready to fire within minutes.

These general legacies of Pearl Harbor were joined by two specific ones. Because it appeared that lack of coordination between the army and the navy commands had contributed to the disaster, the joint congressional committee recommended that "immediate action be taken to ensure that unity of command is imposed at all military and naval outposts." Some moves toward this had already been made. During the war each theater had a single commander, who controlled both army and navy units in that theater. Thus Admiral Chester Nimitz commanded all forces within the Central Pacific theater, General Douglas MacArthur all in the Southwest Pacific theater. After the war, and despite bitter objections from the navy, the nation forged a unified Defense Department, which remains today.

The second major development was the centralization of intelligence. It had begun, however feebly, even before the war. In July 1941 Roosevelt created the post of Coordinator of Information "with authority to collect and analyze all information and data, which may bear upon national security . . . and to make such information and data available to the president." The independence and centrality that this implied was, how-

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ever, curtailed 11 months later when Roosevelt converted the COI into the Office of Strategic Services and subordinated it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An espionage and evaluating agency, the OSS served through the war but was abolished by President Harry S. Truman less than a month after Japan surrendered. At the same time, however, and probably with the surprise Japanese attack in the back of his mind, Truman ordered that plans be drawn for "a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all federal agencies concerned with that type of activity." A few months later Congress's Pearl Harbor committee recommended "that there be a complete integration of army and navy intelligence agencies." This gave powerful impetus to Truman's establishment a year later of the Central Intelligence Agency. As former President Herbert Hoover wrote in 1955 in a report of his Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government: "The CIA may well attribute its existence to the attack on Pearl Harbor."

But the OSS's spying had not produced intelligence comparable to that from codebreaking, which became the Allies' prime source of secret intelligence. The solution after Pearl Harbor of Japanese naval codes engendered three critical American victories: the battle of Midway, the midair assassination of Japan's leading strategist and architect of the Pearl Harbor attack, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, and the strangling of the island empire through the sinking of its merchant marine. In the Atlantic, the British-American exploitation of the German Enigma cipher machine, called "the most important sustained intelligence success in the history of human conflict," helped defeat both the U-boats and German land forces. The breaking of PURPLE, though unable to prevent Pearl Harbor, later yielded astonishing insights into Hitler's plans, gleaned from the messages of the Japanese ambassador in Berlin. All of this noticeably shortened the conflict.

This priceless result was achieved by cryptologic organizations enormously enlarged from the prewar handful of analysts. The army's comprised 10,000 men and women in the Washington headquarters alone, excluding theater operations; the navy's, 6,000 likewise. Stimson, believing that one cause of Pearl Harbor was inadequate analysis of the intercepts, established a special unit to correlate the diplomatic solutions with other information and present finished intelligence to the president and other high officials. But codebreak-

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ing was divided between the two services, and the cooperation that had begun before Pearl Harbor with a joint assault on PURPLE, and later with the sharing of the work of daily recovery and intercept reading, declined during the war to a mere division of labor and exchange of information.

Americans were impressed, however, by the success of Britain's sole codebreaking agency, achieved in part because sections attacking the cryptosystems of various enemy armed forces all worked in one place and shared knowledge, manpower and mechanical aids. This made clear the values of unification, and in 1949 Truman created the Armed Forces Security Agency, which three years later was broadened to the National Security Agency, today the largest of the nation's intelligence bodies.

Both the CIA and the NSA have bolstered national security through the long twilight struggle of the Cold War. The CIA, combining data from photographic satellites with information from other sources, has counted Soviet missiles and Warsaw Pact forces and warned of troops and missiles in Cuba. Among its successes, the NSA is said to have sucked up radiotelephone conversations of Soviet officials in their cars and to have provided American arms negotiators with vital information about Soviet negotiating positions on, for instance, antiballistic missile defense systems. The NSA is also reported to have overheard Libyans plotting to bomb the La Belle discotheque in Berlin. That intercept was used by the Reagan administration as justification for a retaliatory air strike against Libyan military targets at Tripoli and Benghazi on April 14, 1986.

Does today's astonishing sophistication preclude surprise attacks? It does to a greater extent than in 1941, but not entirely. Though eyes-in-the-sky make it hard to mass troops, dispatch warships or launch airplanes or missiles undetected, not all messages will be radioed so that they can be intercepted, and—most important—not every leader can always be persuaded that his or her nation is going to be hit. But by searing into the American psyche the perils of insufficient intelligence, Pearl Harbor has taught the United States to gather more information and to evaluate it better. That unforgotten lesson of a half-century ago still matters; it is why Americans, even today, remember Pearl Harbor.

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

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PEARL HARBOR: Documents

Samuel Eliot Morison

THE RISING SUN IN THE PACIFIC[1]

On 6 December President Roosevelt played his last card for peace—a personal message to Emperor Hirohito, begging him for the sake of humanity to withdraw the military and naval forces from southern Indochina which threatened the Philippines, Malaya, Thailand and "the hundreds of islands of the East Indies." Hirohito did not want war with the United States, but he wanted still less to lose his throne. Showa Restoration would have been turned into Showa Deposition if he had refused to go along with Tojo at this point. So he said nothing.

On Sunday morning, 7 December 1941—the "day that will live in infamy"—the Japanese ambassadors, as instructed by their government, asked for an interview with Mr. Hull at 1300 in order to read Tojo's reply to the proposals of 26 November. That time had been selected because it was just twenty minutes before the scheduled hours (0750 Honolulu time) of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Owing, it seems, to a delay by the embassy staff in deciphering and translating this note, the interview was postponed until 1400. Mr. Hull had already been handed a copy of Admiral Kimmel's message, "Air attack on Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill," but he thought it might be a mistake; and having no official word of war he believed he should hear what Nomura and Kurusu had to say. So he received them at 1420.

It was now 0900 December 7 in Hawaii. The first sad and bloody hour was over. The burned and shattered bodies of more than a thousand Americans lay strewn along airfields, on charred decks, or trapped beneath the waters of Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was but a part, and in their estimate not the most important part, of a comprehensive plan for the Greater East Asia War. Formulated bit by bit, this plan was finally brought together at a Supreme War Council on 6 September 1941. Not Pearl, but pearls of greater price were the objective: populous islands fabulously rich in natural resources and strategic materials, possession of which would enable the Japanese to dominate East Asia and, finally, the world. As Admiral Yamamoto put it in his "Top Secret Operation Order No. 1" issued to the Combined

[1]Excerpted from *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, Vol. III. Reprinted by permission of Little, Brown and Company.

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Fleet on 1 November 1941, Japan intended "to drive Britain and America from Greater East Asia, and to hasten the settlement of the China Incident. . . . When Britain and America have been driven from the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines, an independent, self-supporting economic entity will be firmly established. The vast and far-reaching fundamental principle, the goal of our nation—*Hakko Ichiu*—will be demonstrated to the world."

The comprehensive war plan was this: first, without a declaration of war, to invade Thailand [Thailand had been infiltrated and the government suborned in advance; it issued an order to its troops to cease firing about three hours after the attack began on 8 December], destroy the United States Pacific Fleet and deliver air strikes on the Malay Peninsula and Luzon. After the initial surprise, to effect conquest of the Philippines, Borneo, British Malaya (including Singapore) and Sumatra. When these were secure, Japanese amphibious forces would converge on the richest prize, Java, and mop up the rest of the Dutch islands. Intensive development of Netherlands East Indies resources would begin at once, and to secure these new possessions a "ribbon defense" or defensive perimeter would be established, running from the Kurile Islands through Wake, the Marshalls and around the southern and western edges of the Malay Barrier to the Burmese-Indian border.

Although the Japanese knew that America had ample resources to stage a comeback, they expected that, with Australia and New Zealand isolated, and the Japanese Navy operating from interior lines, any attempt of the British and American Navies to break through the defensive perimeter could be beaten back for eighteen months or two years. By that time, it was hoped, the English-speaking powers would be so stricken by fighting a two-ocean war as to be ready to make peace on the basis of Japan's retaining most of her conquests. She could then proceed at leisure to complete subjugation of China. Over half the world's population would then be under the economic, political and military control of the Son of Heaven. If not eight corners of the world, five at least would be under "one roof" as Emperor Jimmu once predicted.

No such vast plan of quick conquest had ever been formulated in modern history. Apparently it never occurred to the average Japanese that there was anything morally wrong with it. Japan's divine mission to realize *Hakko Ichiu* was taken for granted, and so all means to that end were proper. Surprise attacks, regardless of plighted word, were part of *Bushido*, the code of the warrior. The earlier wars of Japan on Russia and China had begun that way and both had been successful; Heaven obviously approved.

The place of the Pearl Harbor attack in this comprehensive scheme was purely and simply to eliminate the United States Pacific Fleet so that it could not interfere with the numerous amphibious

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operations necessary to conquer the "Southern Strategic Area." It was "a strategic necessity," said Admiral Nagano.

Up to about 1940 the Japanese planned in the event of war with the United States to keep their Combined Fleet in home waters. The high command either knew or guessed correctly that the United States naval plan was to fight its way across the Pacific via the Marshalls and Carolines, taking Truk en route, in order to relieve the Philippines. The Japanese proposed to make this voyage very unpleasant for the United States Fleet, by submarine attacks and land-based or tender-based air attacks mounted from sundry airfields and lagoons in the Marshalls and Carolines. Whatever ships survived would be pounced upon by an overwhelmingly superior Combined Fleet in the Philippine Sea, and there annihilated. That was sound strategy; fortunately for us, the Japanese abandoned it for something more spectacular and less effective.

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Joint Congressional Committee

THE ATTACK[2]

The beginning of the attack coincided with the hoisting of the preparatory signal for 8 o'clock colors. At this time—namely 7:55 a.m.—Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, and within the next few seconds enemy torpedo planes and dive bombers swung in from various sectors to concentrate their attack on the heavy ships moored in Pearl Harbor. It is estimated that nine planes engaged in the attack on the naval air station on Ford Island.

At the time of the attack, our planes—patrol flying boats, float planes, and scout bombers, carrier type—were lined up on the field. These planes caught fire and exploded. Machine-gun emplacements were set up hastily and manned, although the return fire from shore on Ford Island was pitifully weak. Then as suddenly as they had appeared, the Japanese planes vanished. No further attack on this air station was made during the day. However, 33 of our best planes out of a total of 70 planes of all types were destroyed or damaged.

As soon as the attack began, commander, Patrol Wing 2 broadcasted from Ford Island the warning: "Air raid, Pearl Harbor—This is not a drill." This warning was followed a few minutes later by a similar message from the commander in chief, United States Fleet.

At approximately the same time that the Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, other low-flying planes struck at Kaneohe Naval Air Station on the other side of the island. The attack was well executed, with the planes coming down in shallow dives and inflicting severe casualties on the seaplanes moored in the water. Machine guns and rifles were brought out, and men dispersed to fire at will at the low-flying planes. After a period of 10 to 15 minutes, the attacking planes drew off to the north at a low altitude and disappeared from sight.

About 25 minutes after the first attack, another squadron of planes similar to one of our light bomber types, appeared over Kaneohe and commenced bombing and strafing. Number 3 hangar received a direct hit during this attack and four planes in the hangar were destroyed. The majority of the casualties suffered at Kaneohe resulted from this attack. Most of the injured personnel were in the squadrons attempting either to launch their planes or to save those planes not as yet damaged. When the enemy withdrew, some 10 to 15 minutes later, salvage operations were commenced, but it was too late to save No. 1 hangar, which burned until only its steel structural

[2]The following are excerpts from hearings conducted in November 1945 by a Joint Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack.

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work was left. Only 9 out of the 35 planes at Kaneohe escaped destruction in this attack. Six of these were damaged and three were in the air on patrol south of Oahu as previously described.

Meanwhile, the Marine air base at Ewa was undergoing similar attack. Apparently the attack on Ewa preceded that at Pearl Harbor by about 2 minutes. It was delivered by two squadrons of 18 to 24 single-seater fighter planes using machine-gun strafing tactics, which came in from the northwest at an altitude of approximately 1,000 feet. These enemy planes would descend to within 20 to 25 feet of the ground, attacking single planes with short bursts of gunfire. Then they would pull over the tree tops, reverse their course, and attack from the opposite direction. Within less than 15 minutes, all the Marine tactical aircraft had been shot up or set on fire. Then the guns of the enemy fighters were turned upon our utility aircraft, upon planes that had been disassembled for repair, and upon the Marines themselves.

Effective defense measures were impossible until after the first raid had subsided. Pilots, aching to strike at the enemy in the air, viewed the wreckage which until a few minutes before had been a strong air group of Marine fighters and bombers. All together 33 out of the 49 planes at Ewa had gone up in smoke. Some marines, unable to find anything more effective, had tried to oppose fighter planes with pistols, since the remaining 16 planes were too badly damaged to fly.

Although in phase I of the attack on the ships at Pearl Harbor Japanese dive bombers were effective, the torpedo planes did the most damage. They adhered strictly to a carefully laid plan and directed their attacks from those sectors which afforded the best avenues of approach for torpedo attack against selected heavy ship objectives. Thus they indicated accurate knowledge of harbor and channel depths and the berths ordinarily occupied by the major combatant units of our fleet. At least in the great majority of cases, the depth of water in Pearl Harbor did not prevent the successful execution of this form of attack. Shallow dives of the torpedoes upon launching were assured by the use of specially constructed wooden fins, remnants of which were discovered on enemy torpedoes salvaged after the attack.

Four separate torpedo-plane attacks were made during phase I. The major attack was made by 12 planes which swung in generally from the southeast over the tank farm and the vicinity of Merry Point. After splitting, they launched their torpedoes at very low altitudes (within 50 to 100 feet of the water), and from very short distances, aiming for the battle ships berthed on the southeast side of Ford Island. All the outboard battleships, namely, the *Nevada*, *Arizona*, *West Virginia*, *Oklahoma*, and *California*, were effectively hit by one or more torpedoes. Strafing was simultaneously conducted

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from the rear cockpits. A recovered unexploded torpedo carried an explosive charge of 1,000 pounds.

During the second of these attacks, the *Oklahoma* was struck by three torpedoes on the port side and heeled rapidly to port, impeding the efforts of her defenders to beat off the attackers.

The third attack was made by one torpedo plane which appeared from the west and was directed against the light cruiser *Helena* and the minelayer *Oglala*, both of which were temporarily occupying the berth previously assigned to the battleship *Pennsylvania*, flagship of the Pacific Fleet. One torpedo passed under the *Oglala* and exploded against the side of the *Helena*. The blast stove in the side plates of the *Oglala*. Submersible pumps for the *Oglala* were obtained from the *Helena*, but could not be used since no power was available because of damage to the ship's engineering plant.

The fourth wave of five planes came in from the northwest and attacked the seaplane tender *Tangier*, the target ship *Utah*, and the light cruisers *Raleigh* and *Detroit*. The *Raleigh* was struck by one torpedo, and the *Utah* received two hits in succession, capsizing at 8:13 a.m. At first it was feared that the *Raleigh* would capsize. Orders were, therefore, given for all men not at the guns to jettison all topside weights and put both airplanes in the water. Extra manila and wire lines were also run to the quays to help keep the ship from capsizing.

The *Utah*, an old battleship converted to a target ship, had recently returned from serving as a target for practice aerial bombardment. As soon as she received her torpedo hits, she began listing rapidly to port. After she had listed to about 40 degrees, the order was given to abandon ship. This order was executed with some difficulty as the attacking planes strafed the crew as they went over the side. Remnants of the crew had reached Ford Island safely. Later knocking was heard within the hull of the *Utah*. With cutting tools obtained from the *Raleigh*, a volunteer crew succeeded in cutting through the hull and rescuing a fireman second class who had been entrapped in the void scape underneath the dynamo room.

In the eight dive-bomber attacks occurring during phase I, three types of bombs were employed—light, medium, and incendiary.

During the second of these attacks, a bomb hit exploded the forward 14-inch powder magazine on the battleship *Arizona* and caused a ravaging oil fire, which sent up a great cloud of smoke, thereby interfering with antiaircraft fire. The battleship *Tennessee* in the adjacent berth was endangered seriously by the oil fire.

The *West Virginia* was hit during the third of these attacks by two heavy bombs as well as by torpedoes. Like the *California*, she had to be abandoned after a large fire broke out amidships. Her executive officer, the senior survivor, dove overboard and swam to the

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Tennessee, where he organized a party of *West Virginia* survivors to help extinguish the fire in the rubbish, trash, and oil which covered the water between the *Tennessee* and Ford Island.

The total number of dive bombers engaged in this phase is estimated at 30. Most of the torpedo damage to the fleet had occurred by 8:25 a.m. All the outboard battleships had been hit by one or more torpedoes; all the battleships had been hit by one or more bombs with the exception of the *Oklahoma*, which took four torpedoes before it capsized, and the *Pennsylvania*, which received a bomb hit later. By the end of the first phase, the *West Virginia* was in a sinking condition; the *California* was down by the stern; the *Arizona* was a flaming ruin; the other battleships were all damaged to a greater or lesser degree.

Although the initial attack of the Japanese came as a surprise, defensive action on the part of the fleet was prompt. All ships immediately went to general quarters. Battleship ready machine guns likewise opened fire at once, and within an estimated average time of less than 5 minutes practically all battleships and anti-aircraft batteries were firing.

The cruisers were firing all antiaircraft batteries within an average time of about 4 minutes. The destroyers, although opening up with machine guns almost immediately, averaged 7 minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into action.

During this phase of the battle there was no movement of ships within the harbor proper. The destroyer *Helm*, which had gotten under way just prior to the attack, was outside the harbor entrance when at 8:17 a submarine conning tower was sighted to the right of the entrance channel and northward of buoy No. 1. The submarine immediately submerged. The *Helm* opened fire at 8:19 a.m. when the submarine again surfaced temporarily. No hits were observed.

II

Phase II—8:25–8:40 a.m.—is described as a lull only by way of comparison. Air activity continued during this phase although somewhat abated, with sporadic attacks by dive and horizontal bombers. During this phase an estimated total of 15 dive bombers participated in 5 attacks upon the ships in the navy yard, the battleships *Maryland*, *Oklahoma*, *Nevada*, and *Pennsylvania*, and various light cruisers and destroyers.

Although three attacks by horizontal bombers occurred during the lull, these appear to have overlapped into phase III and are considered under that heading.

At 8:32 a.m. the battleship *Oklahoma* took a heavy list to starboard and capsized.

During phase II, there was still relatively little ship movement within the harbor. The ready-duty destroyer *Monaghan* had received

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orders at 7:51 a.m. (Pearl Harbor time) to "proceed immediately and contact *Ward* in defensive sea area." At about 8:37, observing an enemy submarine just west of Ford Island under fire from both the *Curtiss* and *Tangier*, the *Monaghan* proceeded at high speed and at about 8:43 rammed the submarine. As the enemy vessel had submerged, the shock was slight. The *Monaghan* thereupon reversed engines and dropped two depth charges.

The *Curtiss* had previously scored two direct hits on the conning tower. This submarine was later salvaged for inspection and disposal. The *Monaghan* then proceeded down the channel and continued her sortie. At the same time that the *Monaghan* got underway, the destroyer *Henley* slipped her chain from buoy X-11 and sortied, following the *Monaghan* down the channel.

III

The so-called lull in the air raid was terminated by the appearance over the fleet of eight groups of high-altitude horizontal bombers which crossed and recrossed their targets from various directions, inflicting serious damage. Some of the bombs dropped were converted 15- or 16-inch shells of somewhat less explosive quality, marked by very little flame. According to some observers, many bombs dropped by the high-altitude horizontal bombers either failed to explode or landed outside the harbor area.

During the second attack (at 9:06 a.m.) the *Pennsylvania* was hit by a heavy bomb which passed through the main deck amidships and detonated, causing a fire, which was extinguished with some difficulty.

The third group of planes followed very closely the line of battleship moorings. It was probably one of these planes that hit the *California* with what is believed to have been a 15-inch projectile equipped with tail vanes which penetrated to the second deck and exploded. As a result of the explosion, the armored hatch to the machine shop was badly sprung and could not be closed, resulting in the spreading of a serious fire.

Altogether, 30 horizontal bombers, including 9 planes which had participated in earlier attacks, are estimated to have engaged in phase III. Once more it was the heavy combatant ships, the battleships and cruisers, which bore the brunt of these attacks.

Although phase III was largely devoted to horizontal bombing, approximately 18 dive bombers organized in 5 groups also participated.

It was probably the second of these groups which did considerable damage to the *Nevada*, then proceeding down the South Channel, and also to the *Shaw*, *Cassin*, and *Downes*, all three of which were set afire.

During the fifth attack, a Japanese dive bomber succeeded in

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dropping one bomb on the seaplane tender *Curtiss* which detonated on the main-deck level, killing 20 men, wounding 58, and leaving one other unaccounted for.

During this same phase, the *Curtiss* took under fire one of these bombers, which was pulling out of a dive over the naval air station. Hit squarely by the *Curtiss'* accurate gunfire, the plane crashed on the ship, spattering burning gasoline and starting fires so menacing that one of the guns had to be temporarily abandoned.

Considerable ship movement took place during phase III. At 8:40 a.m. the *Nevada* cleared berth F-8 without assistance and proceeded down the South Channel. As soon as the Japanese became aware that a battleship was trying to reach open water, they sent dive bomber after dive bomber down after her and registered several hits. In spite of the damage she had sustained in the vicinity of floating drydock No. 2, and although her bridge and forestructure were ablaze, the ship continued to fight effectively. At 9:10, however, while she was attempting to make a turn in the channel, the *Nevada* ran aground in the vicinity of buoy No. 19.

Meanwhile the repair ship *Vestal*, also without assistance, had gotten underway at about 8:40, had cleared the burning *Arizona*, and at about 9:10 anchored well clear northeast of Ford Island.

Soon after the *Nevada* and *Vestal* had cleared their berths, tugs began to move the *Oglala* to a position astern of the *Helena* at "Ten-ten" Dock. The *Oglala* was finally secured in her berth at about 9:00, but shortly thereafter she capsized.

At 8:42, the oiler *Neosho* cleared berth F-4 unaided and stood toward Merry Point in order to reduce fire hazard to her cargo and to clear the way for a possible sortie by the battleship *Maryland*.

IV

By 9:45 all enemy planes had retired. Evading our aerial searches, both shore-based and from carriers at sea, the Japanese striking force retired to its home waters without being contacted by any of our units.

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Hanson W. Baldwin

AMERICA AT WAR: THREE BAD MONTHS[3]

The history of our first three months at war must be painted in somber colors. The United States Navy suffered the worst losses in its history. Guam and Wake were captured by Japan. In quick succession the enemy overran most of the Philippines, seized Hong Kong, swept over Singapore, principal bastion and base of the United Nations in the Far East, and reduced various strategic points in the Netherlands East Indies one by one. As these lines were written, the surging tide of conquest was nearing Rangoon, entry port for the Burma Road, and was imperiling India. Southward it was menacing Australia. In the West, the Anglo-America "life line" to Britain and Iceland had been safeguarded and strengthened; but Germany had commenced long-range submarine raiding operations in our coastal waters. All over the world, ship sinkings were increasing to totals which approximated those of the war's worst months, and freight storage yards at American seacoast cities were clogged with products of the "Arsenal of Democracy" awaiting merchant shipping which could transport them to the fighting fronts.

Thus in less than 90 days the strategic picture of the war had been considerably altered. The United Nations had suffered their worst defeats since the fall of France. As spring approached, the short-range prospects were grim. From the long-range viewpoint, however, the basic factors which have been the strength as well as the weakness of the United States have not in every case been modified by the events of its first three months of participation in a shooting war. We still possess many advantages.

Until December 7, 1941, the military struggle which had been in progress could be described in the truest sense as a battle for the domination of Europe. For more than two years the headlines had been telling of its progress. The Nazi legions had swept across country after country, raising the swastika from the North Cape to the Acropolis. Even the battles in Africa had been, strategically speaking, part of the struggle for the Old World; and the German invasion of Russia came as one of its final chapters. But already the war quite evidently was "growing out" of Europe.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor did not merely add to the list of belligerents. It enlarged the theater of military operations

[3]The following are excerpts from an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1942.

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from a continent to the world. Today, though a number of nations still are ostensibly neutral, there are really no non-belligerents. This has become the greatest war in history, the first to deserve absolutely the term "World War." In one sense it is a war of hemispheres, waged over the continents and the seven seas. In the fullest sense it is total war; it touches all fields, all values, of human interest.

In this war of the world the United States occupies strategically and geographically a central position. It lies behind two great oceans, between a Europe which is virtually dominated by Hitler and an Asia of which the eastern portion is dominated by Japan. We dominate the western shores of the Atlantic and the eastern shores of the Pacific. But the opposing coasts, thousands of miles away, are in the hands of our enemies. Russia also occupies a central position between two enemies, the European Axis states and Japan. But Russia is a great sprawling land mass, in the midst of a continent, with few and precarious gateways to the warm seas and without adequate communications with the other United Nations.

Our strategic position is, in the main, fairly clear. . . . Wars can be won only by carrying the fighting to the enemy, by the offensive. In total wars what is demanded is the *offensive à outrance*. This is particularly true in this war. There can be no victory for us if Germany retains control of most of Europe, if Japan creates her "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" and holds China's coasts in fief and exploits Malaya's tin and rubber and the rich supplies of the Indian archipelago. We cannot hope to alter either situation by *defensive* operations. Only conquest can counter and redeem conquest. If Germany and Japan are to be defeated, if the world is to resume something like its former political shape, the United Nations, and particularly the United States, by far the most powerful of the partners, must reconquer Europe and Asia. The war must be carried to the enemy.

Once we accept this as an axiom of victory, we must also accept some of the disadvantages that geography has imposed upon us. . . . To carry the fighting to our enemies, to win the war, we must transport troops, planes, men and supplies in amphibian operations of unprecedented magnitude across thousands of miles of the Atlantic and Pacific. And no matter where we choose to strike, it is Japan in the Far East and Germany in Europe who will be able to move their forces the most quickly over the shorter distances. This is one continuing strategic disadvantage which we must recognize, accept and overcome if we are to win this war.

Yet we still have a great advantage. The United Nations possessed, and still possess, territories and bases in the Western Pacific-Asiatic theater of war and in the European theater. So far, no Axis Power possesses territory or bases in the western hemisphere (Martinique and Guadeloupe possibly excepted). This means that so

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long as we hold bases in the enemy's sphere, and so long as we can deny him bases in the western hemisphere, we can carry the war to him but he cannot carry the war to us. Submarine operations off our coasts and occasional air raids on our coastal cities can be conducted from transoceanic bases, but at long range our enemies cannot undertake serious, prolonged, intensive and continuous offensive measures against us at home. So long, moreover, as we hold our overseas bases and keep the enemy from securing bases in this hemisphere, the factories of our "Arsenal of Democracy," unlike those of any warring nation, can operate without much fear of prolonged interruption.

Germany and Japan understand this. Their primary strategy has been, therefore, to reduce the bases on which the power of the United Nations depends in the European theater and in the Far Eastern theater. The greatest, most heavily defended and most important of these bases—perhaps the only one which is absolutely indispensable to victory and must be held at all costs if we are to avert defeat—is the British Isles. As soon as we entered the war, then, we at once took steps to make absolutely sure that Britain will not be cut off. . . .

The Japanese assault upon Pearl Harbor, a modern duplicate of the attack on Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War, was disastrous in its consequences, though not so disastrous as much loose talk might indicate.

Pearl Harbor did not fundamentally and permanently alter the strategic picture in the Pacific; that picture already had been altered by deliberate policy. But the loss of the battleships *Arizona* and *Oklahoma*, and the severe damage done to other capital and lighter units, reduced the ratio of our overall superiority vis-à-vis the combined Axis navies and in the Pacific further increased the Japanese superiority.

Japan's strategical plan, of which the attack on Pearl Harbor was an integral part, was boldly conceived and skillfully executed. Its outstanding characteristic was the same as has distinguished all the German operations—complete coordination of effort. Wake and Guam were captured (the former with unexpectedly heavy losses to the Japanese as a result of the brilliant defense by our marines) and our direct line of communications to the Philippines thus was severed. In the Philippines, the two principal airfields on Luzon, where we had been trying to build up a striking force of heavy bombers, were bombed heavily in a surprise attack launched from the Japanese bases on Formosa; and by the second day many of our bombers had been destroyed on the ground. The Philippines also were invaded at a number of points. Simultaneously Hong Kong and Malaya were assaulted. . . .

The first and main task is to halt the Japanese surge of conquest,

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if not at Java then on the coast of northern Australia and in Burma. Our gigantic long-range convoys across the Pacific, unprecedented in the history of war, have begun to build up stockpiles of materials in Australia; and the supply routes have been strengthened by the garrisons we have placed on the islands along the way. But now that the Japanese are in possession of Malaya and the Indies, their need for oil and other raw materials is largely met, whereas we must transport most of our oil supplies to Australia. Because of this, Australia's role will be, for the time being, that of a defensive barrier rather than an offensive base.

The pattern of our eventual victory has already, in part, been set; the Fleet's raid upon the mandated Marshall Islands follows the traditional strategy long ago envisaged in case of a war with Japan. Such offensive operations must be, surely will be, extended in scope and power. For this is a war for survival, and only by smashing assaults can we hope to save our lives.

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Seweryn Bialer

THE DEATH OF SOVIET COMMUNISM

In the dark winter of 1990–91 many asked how the Soviet Union, trying to save itself, would end. With a bang or a whimper? King Solomon would have liked the answer that came after three historic days in August 1991: it ended with both. Those fateful days were obviously a potentially deadly putsch, but also a failure of such enormous proportions that they cannot even be considered a full-fledged coup d'état. While the putschists arrested Mikhail Gorbachev, their real targets escaped: Boris Yeltsin, Democratic Russia and the separatist republics. That failure has not only contributed to the myth surrounding the emergence of a new Russian state, but it also pushed the Soviet Union well beyond any parameters envisioned by the very process of reform the putschists were attempting to stem.

Gorbachev emerged in March 1985 from the struggle among his Politburo colleagues to become general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and the effective leader of the Soviet state. At that time the Soviet Union seemed a very weary yet immensely powerful country. It was decaying economically, but politically it still appeared to be stable. The crisis in the Soviet regime was over its domestic and international effectiveness; its survival was not in doubt. Even before they took power, however, Gorbachev and his closest associates realized their country was stagnating, but they termed it a "pre-crisis situation." So although they perceived some crisis of effectiveness in the regime, they did not yet comprehend its depth. They thought the regime only needed reform.

Six and a half years later the Soviet Union and Soviet communism were dead. What happened in those years that finally led to disintegration rather than salvation through grand reform? What happened to Mikhail Gorbachev? He once seemed an immensely energetic and attractive leader, speaking about national renewal by a new generation of leaders in words almost reminiscent of John F. Kennedy. Yet

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

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

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

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

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

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today one cannot forget the image of that worn man as he descended the ramp from the aircraft that brought him back to Moscow from his Crimean captivity.

To answer these questions one must first examine the various economic, social and political trends in place even before the Gorbachev leadership attempted its reforms. Only then can the response by Soviet leaders and institutions be assessed, and the summer's dramatic outcome be properly understood.

II

After Leonid Brezhnev's death in 1982, two extraordinary successions within a period of three years served to demonstrate the severity of the Soviet crisis that had been accelerating since the mid-1970s. Yuri Andropov, who immediately succeeded Brezhnev and who is considered Gorbachev's "founder," understood the need for change. During his short term he took both ideological and political steps to try to prepare the Soviet Union's ruling elites for a more efficient, disciplined and realistic communist regime. Under his tenure the brooding dissatisfaction of the regime's intelligentsia became more vocal and daring. This was the crucial gestation period for Gorbachev's views. Gorbachev's wife, Raisa, once pointed out to a visiting American first lady the picture of Andropov in her residence, saying, "This is the man to whom we owe everything." She was right.

But in some ways, and for very different reasons, the brief reign of Konstantin Chernenko provided the real catalyst for change. Chernenko's absolute grayness and incompetence engendered in the communist intelligentsia, parts of the elite and, of course, the Soviet people themselves a particular feeling of not only hopelessness but also deep embarrassment and shame. Hopes for a dynamic new leader who would make some change were completely buried.

The Soviet economic crisis was clearly visible in declining growth rates, increasing scarcity of exploitable resources and, most important, the worsening imbalance between military production and that for the general economy, especially consumer goods. The Soviet economy and society seemed mobilized for war, much more than even Nazi Germany at the height of World War II. In the consumer sector a very large portion of the capital stock was not only underproductive but was also simply at the limit of its physical capacity. Yet it was

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not being replenished. In the 10 years before perestroika began, according to Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev, only 15 percent of investment in the Russian republic went to consumer industries. Military industries, on the other hand, were continuously supplied with new technologies. Certain farsighted generals, especially those in technical services, tried to break the hold of traditional strategy that emphasized numerical superiority, only to be thwarted by high command.

The enormous Soviet bureaucracies, including the party apparatus, shifted from the limited autonomy of the Stalinist era toward a more corporatist system. They increasingly neglected their goal of service to the state and society in favor of self-aggrandizement. Political and economic corruption, which has existed throughout Soviet history—tempered somewhat by fear—increased systematically in the years before Gorbachev came to power. The size of the "second" or illegal "shadow" economy eventually accounted for 25 to 30 percent of the market and became essential to the functioning of the economy as a whole. Moreover corruption was less and less camouflaged, and by the end of the Brezhnev era many in the bureaucracy were almost openly accepting sizable bribes. It is likely that the party apparatus had previously been less involved in illegal enrichment than the administrative bureaucracy. But it, too, was becoming as bad as other bureaucracies, especially at its lower levels. In the mid-1980s a private Soviet "businessman" even commented, "You know, I would have never thought that there would come a time when I would walk into a Raikom [a regional Communist Party Committee] and talk serious business."

The corruption of the bureaucracies only separated them further from the people they were supposedly in place to serve. The actual depoliticization of the people themselves, in the world's most ceremonially political regime, went so far that cynicism, hopelessness and passivity developed as a shield against the authorities. It thus became increasingly difficult to mobilize the population in almost any sphere of life.

The quality of the Soviet leadership was deteriorating as well, especially at the top, but also in the middle. This was true not only in terms of intelligence and organizational talent, let alone commitment, but also in a physical sense. Members of the Politburo and Central Committee of the Communist Party were aged, dogmatic and lacked spark. The respect and fear they once generated were rapidly declining in an increasingly

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young and educated country. Yet the party elites loved Brezhnev. Nikita Khrushchev may have given them security from threats to their lives, but Brezhnev gave them security in office, the good life, the blessing of domestic tranquility and tolerance—unless, of course, they crossed him personally. There were nevertheless many younger provincial party secretaries as well as officials of the central apparatus who were growing impatient waiting for promotion.

The weakness of political dissent within the Soviet Union was also important to the crisis. Under Khrushchev and in the early Brezhnev years political dissent grew rapidly and had great importance beyond its actual influence inside the Soviet Union. It planted seeds of antitotalitarianism and anticommunism in the native soil, especially among the young intelligentsia, and showed the West that the spirit of freedom was not dead in Russia. But by the late 1970s and early 1980s the most important dissenters were either silenced or abroad. Sympathy for their ideas was growing, but the political potential for active dissent inside the Soviet Union seemed to have sunk to a low. Dissent could have become immensely important to a process of renewal, if only internal conditions for its development would have changed.

Finally the nationalities question in the Soviet Union—relations between non-Russian nations and ethnic groups and the Russian center—was also important. It was potentially the most lethal yet insoluble crisis in the system, because both modernization and backwardness worked against Moscow. To the extent that non-Russian ethnic regions maintained underdeveloped, peasant cultures, the depth of their attachment to traditional national culture and its religious context remained extraordinarily strong. These regions therefore were able to resist with surprising force subordination to Russian culture or submersion in the supranational conception of the Soviet state. Alternately, to the extent that non-Russian regions were swept up by the tide of modernization, they developed an intensely urban-centered orientation. The newly educated classes and the creative and managerial intelligentsia became the main carriers of this new kind of ethnic identity. Thus lack of development led to cultivation of old ethnic identities, while the process of modernization only created new strains.

Even by the time perestroika began, communism had not been able to create a Soviet "nation." Soviet federalism contained a potentially dangerous dualism. It denied all but the

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slimmest margin of autonomy to federated nationalities. At the same time, its symbolic institutions and administrative framework provided the base from which the struggle for national autonomy could be waged. There were communist elites and part of the intelligentsia who had diverse ethnic origins. But even here tension between Russian and non-Russian segments was quite pronounced. An overwhelming majority of non-Russian communist elites worked exclusively in their own native republics. Their careers stopped at their republics' borders, and their promotion to the center in Moscow was very limited. With their vertical mobility thus constrained, they pressed hard to extend control within their own republics, at the cost of the center.

During the late Brezhnev period a process described as "feudalization" became highly pronounced in the non-Russian republics, particularly in Central Asia and Transcaucasia. These republics became truly the fiefdoms of long-entrenched native communist leaderships and elites. These elites paid lip service to Moscow and enormous bribes to central inspectors; they amassed fortunes and engaged in an intricate network of private "business" contacts. (My favorite example is from Uzbekistan, where a harvest of one million tons of cotton was hidden from Moscow and sold for private profit.) These centrifugal tendencies of the native communist elites, combined with growing nationalism among the intelligentsia and broader population alike, became a major worry for the Russian center.

Even though the Soviet Union had lost its internal vitality, the powers of the regime were still immense. Decay was probably unavoidable, but disintegration did not at all seem to be an immediate prospect. Yet the crisis of effectiveness—absent major countervailing actions—did have the potential for becoming a crisis of survival. The irony is that the countervailing actions themselves—the deep changes initiated by perestroika—almost certainly accelerated the demise of communism and the disintegration of the empire. It was as Tocqueville had warned: "The most perilous moment for a bad government is when it seeks to mend its ways."

III

Gorbachev started on a journey into the unknown. Yet even before he took power, there was a long period in which his basic idea began to take shape: to make communism more

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effective and more decent. The image of Gorbachev as an improviser rather than a planner is, in reality, erroneous. He was both. He had a vision and kept to that vision to the end. He had a strategy, and he kept to that strategy to the end as well. He improvised *within* his strategic plan as the situation changed and he faced resistance. But he failed not because he lacked a goal or strategy, but because he stuck too closely to them. His immutable goal and rigid political plan became increasingly unrealistic and dangerous to his own power.

The crisis of the Soviet system was certainly "objective" in nature. But even an objective crisis can be perceived differently, depending on the interests of the leader and, perhaps more important, on his perceptual apparatus. Gorbachev did not fit the stereotype of the party apparatchik. He was bright and quick, personally adaptable, dynamic and courageous. Indeed it is difficult to comprehend how this man could have been shaped in the ranks of the Communist Party. It is easy to forget that he had the same one-sided educational and cultural background as the majority of Soviet leaders, including many of today's "democrats." This does not make Soviet leaders less wise or less intelligent than their Western counterparts. Gorbachev probably read more about America than President Bush about Russia, and Gorbachev was also thoroughly briefed. Yet he still may not truly understand democracy or capitalism. What is essential here is that the problems of perception and understanding apply not just to other countries, but to one's own, particularly in times of rapid change.

Gorbachev's perception of the Soviet crisis did change as he became conscious of its much greater depth. Yet in essence his perception was not much different than that of Khrushchev, who characterized Stalinism as "the boil on the healthy body of Soviet socialism." Gorbachev and his associates did increasingly comprehend, of course, that the infection was bigger and the "body" less healthy than Khrushchev ever imagined. But still they believed that the organism could be cured, the bad cells cut out, and a renewed and healthy Soviet Union could again demonstrate socialism's true potential.

Gorbachev was even confident and optimistic that the task could be accomplished quickly. He expected, for example, that by 1990 the Soviet machine-building industry—a quarter of all Soviet industrial output—would have 90 percent of its product up to the standards of the advanced capitalist societies. By the mid-1990s Gorbachev expected personal computer use to be

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as widespread in Russia as it was in western Europe. Even Gorbachev's chief economic adviser, Abel Aganbegyan, who was the first to convince the new leader of the severity of the crisis, expected Soviet national income to approach that of the United States by the year 2000.

It is interesting now to reread views of perestroika given only two years ago, or more recently, by those most committed to the process. I will not quote Gorbachev, because he is often suspected of tactical subterfuge. But even as most of Gorbachev's closest associates and supporters criticized his timidity and the limitations of his vision, they still considered purified Leninist ideology to be the compass the country should follow. Perestroika was perceived as a struggle to eradicate the vestiges of Stalinism and to restore the "purity, morality and tolerance" of the period when Lenin was alive, particularly of the New Economic Policy of the 1920s. Some saw the one-party system as necessary and good; others simply could not envisage a multiparty system. All basically subscribed to the defining characteristic of the Communist Party—"democratic centralism"—although they stressed its tempering "democratic" dimensions. The idea of a "bourgeois democracy," however, was positively rejected. They were staunch supporters of "market socialism," again with different weights being attached to "market" or "socialism." But they were in effect promoting the use of market instruments only within a modified command economy. Private property played at best a tertiary role.

The most glaring example of the regime's limited perception concerned relations among the Soviet Union's different nationalities. The republics strongly opposed Russian chauvinism and supported human rights of minorities in Russia and other republics. But in the best Marxist tradition, the Gorbachev leadership did not perceive the true dimensions of the problem. To a large extent it thought the issue would fade once the excesses of Stalin's nationality policy were rectified and a new policy of tolerance introduced. The leadership's focus was on "excesses" and "extremes." Included among those extremes, of course, were republican desires for real sovereignty and independence. But the question was primarily approached as an emotional reaction to past oppression, which would eventually be overtaken by rationality and self-interest.

In this respect the Gorbachev leadership was within the mainstream that even included a large part of the Western

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intelligentsia. For their own reasons of security and stability the governments of the West supported policies that would preserve the Soviet Union as a union. While recognizing the principle of self-determination of nations, Western governments were in effect urging these suppressed nations not to assert that right. They were also urging Moscow to try to contain national drives toward true sovereignty without, of course, using force or violating human rights.

Early on Gorbachev identified his program as a revolution. But his was truly a reformist goal that, while almost continuously radicalized, was never intended to cross the threshold of transforming the system. His basic strategy was reformation, not transformation. That goal, as defined by Gorbachev and accepted by his compatriots, was an honorable choice. It was indeed the only possible road, even if it also increasingly seemed the most effective means for Gorbachev to preserve his own power. It is inaccurate, however, to characterize Gorbachev as a Moses who did not enter the "promised land." The main characteristics of today's Soviet reality were not in fact his chosen destination. Yet despite Gorbachev's intentions, perestroika was a historic accomplishment and its consequences clearly went far beyond the limits of mere reform.

Even by 1987 Gorbachev's strategy and goal for perestroika still had not changed. His strategy was one of resolute and determined "centrism"; his aim was to accomplish grand reform. He was initially able to create a coalition for reform by skillfully offering something to almost every group: modernization to the military, workers' discipline to industrial management, glasnost to the intelligentsia. His energy, style, successes and stature abroad and his "iron teeth" produced not only an aura of awe, fear and respect but also a heterogeneous base of support. But it was a strategy that would become increasingly precarious to balance.

Even as the political center of gravity he sought to control became more and more radical, Gorbachev refused to yield his plan. He remained the determined centrist. Gorbachev's political strategy eventually ran up against a wall of rising expectations, a wall he himself had built. When the Soviet leader finally was no longer able to fulfill each sector's political wish-list, his "positive support" among party and bureaucratic elites eroded, his popularity with the Soviet people fell off sharply, and public distrust of his "real" goals rose dramatically. Soon both left and right, whose positions Gorbachev

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himself had helped fortify, began to see him only as a harbinger of their worst fears and increasingly used the gifts Gorbachev had given them—their power resources—against him.

The sociopolitical environment surrounding perestroika changed significantly from 1988, and the changes accelerated after March 1990. It became increasingly apparent that the Soviet Union itself was disintegrating. The various horizontal and vertical ties that bound the Soviet Union as an economic entity were themselves unraveling; production was collapsing and hyperinflation was threatening. As desperation grew in major population centers, industrial workers and other employees wanted order in their lives and improvement in their living standards. Yet Gorbachev could no longer mobilize them or respond credibly to their demands. The Soviet population thus became increasingly responsive to anticommunist radicals and, to some extent, even reactionaries.

The radical aspirations of ethnic nationalism intensified beyond Gorbachev's and the other centrists' worst expectations. The quest for sovereignty was no longer confined only to nationalist forces. It was also embraced by centrist and even conservative leaderships that were dominant in many republics and the largest forces in the Ukraine and Byelorussia. The reasons for this varied. The most decisive was probably political and pragmatic: in an atmosphere of growing nationalistic fervor, opposing greater sovereignty meant losing influence all the more rapidly. Ironically the most important declaration of sovereignty took place not on the periphery, but in Russia itself, the very heart of the Soviet Union. The Russian parliament's declaration of sovereignty was a revolutionary watershed. It destroyed the Soviet Union.

IV

Russia *was* the Soviet Union. The Russian republic was first among the fifteen; Russian authority and Soviet power were synonymous. Russians ruled the Soviet Union, even as local non-Russian communist elites ran the day-to-day affairs of their own regions. Every other republic had its own Communist Party, but the Russians did not need a separate party because the entire Communist Party of the Soviet Union was theirs.

Now there were two Moscows: Moscow of the Kremlin, the capital of the Soviet Union, where foreign dignitaries paid

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their respects to Gorbachev; and the Moscow that was capital of the Russian Republic, its leaders housed in a white building a mile from the Kremlin's red walls. The Kremlin represented the historical past, but its contact with the people had been terminated, or at least suspended. As a capital, Moscow now represented the Russian people and no one else. The Kremlin still had all the accoutrements and instruments of power, and it was still feared. But when it lost the Russian homeland, it lost its only base of legitimacy and support.

The collapse of messianic Bolshevik ideology, the demise of Russia as a superpower, the overwhelming sense of spiritual, cultural, economic and political catastrophe, and the exhaustion of the Russian nation itself—all prompted Russia, for the first time in many centuries, to turn away from its imperium. Whether this disposition will last is impossible to say, but its consequences are already historic.

Meanwhile Gorbachev's turn toward the old guard from December 1990 through the spring of 1991 showed that the movement toward real sovereignty or even independence could only be suppressed in certain republics by Russian occupation and massive force. But the fundamental problem was still that of Russia itself, as well as the Ukraine. There the use of force, even if at all possible, would risk civil war.

By 1991 and even before, the time had arrived when cooperation with the most important republics in fact meant agreeing to far-reaching separation. Gorbachev is often blamed for being too late in offering the republics concessions. It is said, for example, that the autonomy he offered in 1990 would have been gratefully accepted in 1989, when his power and status were still high. Such measures might have succeeded in calming the republics, but they might also simply have encouraged them to increase their demands, eventually leading to the same situation.

In any case, by the spring of 1991 it was no longer a question of Gorbachev granting concessions to the most important republics, but rather the reverse: whether they would make concessions to him to preserve some diluted central institutions. By April, when agreement was reached on the idea of a union treaty, legitimate power flowed not from Gorbachev to the republics, but from the republics to the center, and they were delegating only limited authority.

The central Communist Party still controlled its own organizational apparatus, many public buildings and national

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transportation and communication links, but the nature of its power was decisively changed. It was now using its power to sabotage reforms, but it could not present an alternative program of any real attraction. The legitimacy of its ideology had disintegrated—to such an extent that those who would lead the August putsch would not even mention Marxism-Leninism or the party in their statement declaring martial law.

The most dramatic change, however, was the emergence of legitimate anticommunist forces in the Russian republic with a freely elected leader who had his own structural base of support. These radical counterweights—Boris Yeltsin, Democratic Russia, the separatist movements—all made Gorbachev's centrist strategy more and more untenable. While anticommunist radicalism may have served as a foil to the reactionaries, it nonetheless increased the polarization between the two sides that Gorbachev sought to balance. Reactionaries on the right increasingly despaired; radicals on the left grew bolder and more impatient.

Thus perestroika's endgame now forced Gorbachev, in his balancing act, to swing to further extremes—far to the right in the winter of 1990–91, then back to the left by April, when he helped shape the new union treaty. This oscillation undermined what little remained of Gorbachev's credibility on either side. Even as Gorbachev treated them like pawns that had no alternative but to follow, each wing had by now learned his game. They knew that his any step could be followed by another in the opposite direction. Gorbachev's room for maneuver had become far narrower and his position more dangerous. His centrist strategy was at last failing him as his ability to manipulate either side diminished. A revolutionary process was setting in.

V

The international aspects of perestroika were also yielding fewer dividends. The greatest achievements of Gorbachev's strategy had been the radical changes he instituted in Soviet foreign policy. But in real terms these achievements were nothing less than progressive capitulation to the West. This is not to suggest that all his foreign policy was deliberate. Rather it was developed in the very process of retreat. Moreover his policy in eastern Europe was forced by a virtual lack of alternatives—intervention would have destroyed perestroika. Yet capitulation it was.

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These policies had tremendous impact on perceptions of Gorbachev both at home and abroad. Most important, they affected the Soviet people's own view of his domestic goals and policies. Gorbachev had accommodated the West far beyond expectations. He became not only credible to his Western adversaries but almost loved by those leaders to whom he conceded.

Gorbachev was convinced he could not pursue grand reform at home without freeing his hands abroad, and without gaining Western support for his domestic policies. But while his popularity among Soviet reformers and the democratic intelligentsia increased, he sowed seeds of hostility among the traditional establishment, which still controlled the military, security forces, party apparatus and major economic bureaucracies. Gorbachev's investments in the West eventually yielded both tangible and intangible dividends that were crucial to him after mid-1990. But his financial rewards were incommensurately small.

The superpower status of the Soviet Union was nevertheless destroyed. Gorbachev had less and less to offer the West, partly because of his declining authority at home. At his July 1991 meeting with the Group of Seven leading industrialized nations in London, it finally became clear that the doors to substantial Western aid and investment were closed, unless Gorbachev crossed the Rubicon at home. Gorbachev's domestic credibility consequently declined even further. He was no longer able to use in domestic politics the once powerful resource of "delivering" the West. His monopoly on speaking for the Soviet Union, and particularly for Russia, was crumbling. Then came the putsch.

VI

Most of the putschists were obviously second rate, but the danger of their actions was nonetheless real. The "criticism" of the putschists for their ineptitude and failure obscures some important elements that constrained their freedom of action. First, the putsch was primarily political, not military. Second, the group was forced by circumstances to try to usurp power in an ostensibly legitimate, constitutional manner. Third, a major part of their plan was the belief that they would be able to reach a compromise with Gorbachev once they confronted him with a fait accompli.

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However unrealistic the putschists were in their expectations, they were realistic enough to know that a coup against democratic and separatist forces might provoke civil war, and this they wanted desperately to avoid. A civil war would split the army and completely devastate the union they sought to preserve, and the odds against a clean victory were probably, even in their own minds, prohibitive. The immense accomplishments of Gorbachev's perestroika and the anticommunist forces, which had acquired legitimacy through popular support, created a situation in which the army—even some of its elite units—would not shoot at Russians or their Slavic brothers. The coup's leaders thus had to be confined to a group drawn from the old establishment, and the forces at their disposal to those that might be reliable only on a "surgical" scale.

The coup leaders underestimated the unwillingness—because of conditions created by perestroika—of local military and security command even to feign a show of force, let alone shoot. This was especially the case around key urban centers like Leningrad and Kiev. One may legitimately ask how the putschists could be so unrealistic. The obvious answer is that they were desperate. They needed to preempt the planned signing of the Union Treaty on August 20. In part this is true. One may say again that they were second rate or drunkards, and this is again partly true. But the smaller group that was the brain of the putsch, men like Baklanov, Pugo, Kryuchkov and Lukyanov (if he took part) were different from most of the others who participated. Their failure can be explained by their strong belief that Gorbachev would ultimately "recognize reality" and, to prevent a civil war, agree to compromise.

Gorbachev's selection of these men was part of a deliberate policy on his behalf, a move to balance the old guard. In selecting them genuine loyalty, talent or vigor, let alone commitment to perestroika, were not Gorbachev's criteria. Rather, the dangerous and ironic criteria used were the extent of the threat they posed to him and to his centrist policy, and the extent to which each would be able to mobilize his own apparatus against Gorbachev himself.

The minister of defense, Dmitri Yazov, was a symbol of the old guard within the military, but he was confused and indecisive about the grand picture evolving from perestroika. He was not a leader of younger generals as much as the chief of the air force, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov or, probably the most

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dangerous of the military commanders, General Boris Gromov, who was liked and admired in the army as commander in chief of Soviet forces in the last phase of the Afghan war.

Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, who committed suicide after the coup, would have been a tremendous threat to Gorbachev as minister of defense. He was too honest. As a first-rate professional he had deep communist convictions and enormous authority in the armed forces. He was a decisive and outspoken man who, when he disagreed with Gorbachev, would say so outright. Instead Gorbachev took him in as chief military adviser, to keep him close at hand, neutralize him, and use his mantle of authority to bolster his own military and foreign policy.

Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman of the KGB, was a good candidate for the post from Gorbachev's point of view. After the coup Gorbachev explained Kryuchkov's appointment by saying he was a specialist in foreign intelligence; the domestic side of the KGB's activities was marginal to his experience. But Gorbachev in fact picked him because he seemed no match for his own intelligence and cunning; Gorbachev thought he was a man who could never successfully mobilize the KGB against him.

Valentin Pavlov, the prime minister, was an immensely limited man, disliked by the state administration, the army command and the KGB. He was mocked as "fininspektor," which in literal translation means bank auditor, but in the Russian language implies ridicule and the lowest possible status. This was a man who could make noises when people pushed him, but he himself could mobilize no one.

Even Boris Pugo, who was probably a major figure in the putsch's inner circle, partly fit this bill. He was an intelligent man of deep Bolshevik convictions; he had been chairman of the KGB in his native Latvia for four years, and was then selected as chairman of the party's Control Commission, which imposed party discipline with abusive power. But he had a reputation for personal incorruptibility that made him feared and isolated within the apparatus.

Oleg Baklanov, the first deputy chairman of the U.S.S.R. Defense Council (Gorbachev was the chairman), was a smart man as well, with real authority in the military-industrial complex. But Gorbachev also promoted his rival, Arkady Volsky, a pragmatic, talented man who gained more authority after the putsch. His League of Scientific and Industrial

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Associations of the U.S.S.R. provided major industrial managers with an alternative to Baklanov's reactionary position.

The role of Anatoly Lukyanov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet and Gorbachev's friend of 40 years, is most murky. Some democrats are convinced he was the brain behind the putsch. He had written an article prior to the putsch, published on its first day, violently attacking the union treaty and warning that it meant the end of the Soviet Union. Despite such speculation, it seems more likely that his role was similar to that of Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov among the 1960 "anti-party group" that tried to wrest power from Nikita Khrushchev. In the aftermath of that defeated attempt Shepilov was always listed as the man who "joined them."

After the putsch many asked how Gorbachev could have surrounded himself with such a crew. Almost all of those in his high circle were either part of the coup, embraced it enthusiastically or easily capitulated to it. When Gorbachev returned from his Crimean captivity he explained that he was deeply shocked by the betrayal of these men, whom he had trusted. From what we know about Gorbachev, how he selected his associates and the game he was playing, it is mind boggling to think he trusted them at all. What Gorbachev could not say publicly was that he did not think these men had it in them to be decisive enough or smart enough to put together a putsch against him. After the putsch Gorbachev had only two alternatives to explain his embarrassed position: either he was so skillful a politician that he outsmarted himself, or he was so naïve a politician that he was outsmarted by crooks. For a number of reasons, the second alternative was better for his continued political survival.

Gorbachev's commitment to his own power, evolutionary reform and the preservation of some form of a union cannot exclude the possibility that even on the eve of the coup he wanted to improve his own position—to create pressures from the old guard in order to use them to moderate the demands of democrats and separatists in any further negotiations over the union treaty. Such pressures would have demonstrated to the radicals that he was still indispensable to their welfare. But Gorbachev underestimated the leadership of the old guard by not believing they could undertake a dangerous initiative on their own. It is possible that Gorbachev was attempting to continue his dangerous oscillation, playing off right against left, up to the very end.

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After the coup Gorbachev's former associate, Aleksandr Yakovlev, commented, "He still doesn't understand the situation into which the country has moved." The implication, of course, was that Gorbachev had not understood it before the coup either. Yet it was precisely how far the country had moved along the road of Gorbachev's own plan for reform that saved the Soviet leader. Perestroika created the conditions that made it impossible for the coup to succeed. Those who acted against Gorbachev believed that intimidation would still be decisive, as it had been for decades. The hoary clique could not see that much of the Soviet population had finally overcome its fear. Tanks on the streets were no longer enough.

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THE COLD WAR AS COOPERATION: SUPERPOWER COOPERATION IN REGIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT. Edited by Roger E. Kanet and Edward A. Kolodziej. Baltimore (MD): Johns Hopkins, 1991, 437 pp. $48.50.

This intriguing book develops the thesis that Soviet-American competition in the past four decades actually imposed constraints on the Cold War that kept it from turning hot. The management of superpower rivalry, paradoxically, forced Washington and Moscow to cooperate through signals to each other and self-restraint. This was particularly true in regional situations, examined here by an impressive array of specialists. The controlled nature of the Cold War, seen in retrospect, was due to both the countervailing strengths of the superpowers and the resistance of third parties to their threats and blandishments. But this work is too serious and honest not to recognize that there were some close calls—e.g., the Cuban missile crisis and Berlin in both 1948 and 1961—which could have led to devastating conflict. The end of the Cold War—since this book was written—only served to make this excellent work more valuable.

QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD. By Robert H. Jackson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 225 pp. $49.50.

A controversial thesis underlies this theoretical book: much of the Third World consists of "quasi-states" that exist because of their formal acceptance by the international community rather than their post-colonial attributes. These countries, it is asserted, are unable to protect human rights or provide social benefits and economic welfare. Thus they have "negative" rather than "positive" sovereignty. There is too much pessimism here and the whole concept of the "Third World" now needs reexamination (where is the "Second World" today?).

GEOPOLITICS AND GEOCULTURE: ESSAYS ON THE CHANGING WORLD-SYSTEM. By Immanuel Wallerstein. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 242 pp. $39.50 (paper, $12.95).

This is a work of sociology with a grand historical sweep. Wallerstein sees the end of the Cold War as leading to the termination of Pax Americana rather than a strengthening of America's international position. He has strong doubts about the long-term future of capitalism and discusses the possibilities of a new "world culture" or civilization. There are many original and stimulating thoughts here, though the reader is left uncertain as to their ultimate significance.

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A view from Washington

Nuclear Waste: Steady Progress to a Known Solution

Americans live in fast forward. We prize quick results and easy answers, fast food and instant gratification. I sometimes wonder if we are losing our capacity to understand and manage complex issues and difficult problems that demand steady, persistent, long-term attention.

This certainly seems to be true of nuclear waste.

I cannot count the number of people who have told me that they would gladly support construction of new nuclear power plants to meet our growing need for electricity...if only we knew what to do with the nuclear waste.

The fact is, we have known what to do with nuclear waste for over 30 years, long before the world's first nuclear power plant started up at Shippingport in Pennsylvania, in the late 1950s. We knew then that we would isolate the waste deep underground, in stable rock formations, locked away behind carefully engineered barriers, and monitored to ensure that radioactive material does not escape.

Thirty years of study and analysis have confirmed the wisdom of this approach. It is endorsed without question by leading independent scientific organizations around the world, including the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the American Physical Society, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. "There is no scientific or technical reason to think that a satisfactory geological repository cannot be built," said the National Academy of Sciences' National Research Council last year. "There is a strong worldwide consensus that the best, safest long-term option for dealing with high-level waste is geological isolation."

Where does the U.S. nuclear waste program stand? In 1987, Congress ordered the U.S. Department of Energy to conduct a comprehensive scientific evaluation of Yucca Mountain, a remote spot in the Nevada desert, as a possible site for safe, permanent nuclear waste disposal. Yucca Mountain seems to have the necessary requirements. It's isolated. The climate is arid. And the area seems geologically stable.

The Energy Department is conducting a massive scientific investigation of Yucca Mountain, which will determine whether it is a suitable site for nuclear waste disposal.

This may be the most comprehensive, careful and systematic assessment of a piece of real estate ever conducted. It will require 10 years of on-site and laboratory investigations and analyses, cost more than $4 billion, and involve some 500 scientists and engineers. And at every turn, the scientific work is monitored by independent agencies, including the National Academy of Sciences, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (an independent group of experts appointed by the President), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the General Accounting Office and the state of Nevada.

If the scientists conclude that Yucca Mountain is suitable for nuclear waste disposal, we can all have complete confidence in that decision, and in the process that produced it.

It is true that the U.S. nuclear waste program and the work of Yucca Mountain have experienced setbacks. The Energy Department did not have a permanent director for the program from 1987 until 1989, and this lack of leadership caused delays. The Department's choice of a contractor to manage the program day-to-day was challenged in court, which led to further delays. And the state of Nevada has delayed the scientific work at Yucca Mountain, by refusing to grant necessary permits.

Fortunately, the Energy Department program now has a permanent director and a prime contractor, and all the state's challenges have been struck down in court. The U.S. nuclear waste program is now firmly on the right track.

Let us remember that periodic setbacks are almost inevitable in any program as lengthy as this one. There will probably be occasional reversals in the years ahead, but ingenuity and persistence will overcome those, too.

Nuclear waste disposal is a serious undertaking. It deserves careful, methodical treatment. This is no place for quick and easy answers. You cannot see a glacier's movement with the naked eye, but that does not mean the glacier isn't moving. The process of evaluating possible sites for nuclear waste disposal is slow because it should be deliberate and careful. Progress will not always be visible from day to day, or even from year to year. But don't make the mistake of assuming there is no progress.

Phillip Bayne
President and CEO
U.S. Council for Energy Awareness

A View From Washington is a series of essays sponsored by corporations and associations. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the magazine.

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POWER AND LEADERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING: THE PATH TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. By Shibley Telhami. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, 280 pp. $40.00.

Much has already been written about the Camp David accords. This book goes a step further, by placing the negotiations in the context of bargaining theory. A political scientist at Cornell, the author assesses the distribution of military and economic power between Egypt and Israel and argues that both were more interested in buttressing their relationship with the United States than in their own bilateral relations. Moreover Egypt was no longer in a position to actively advocate pan-Arabism and had much more to gain than to lose, economically and politically, by making peace. Most of this volume is devoted to an intricate examination of the bargaining process preceding and throughout the accords.

TURBULENCE IN WORLD POLITICS: A THEORY OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY. By James N. Rosenau. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1990, 479 pp. $55.00 (paper, $14.50).

Nothing less than the role of turbulence and change in world politics and man's behavior are suggestively analyzed in this broad-ranging volume by a highly regarded political scientist. Like many theoretical works today, it goes back to fundamentals and questions them rather than building on the work of others. This is an intelligent work, written for the academic community, and it should leave its mark there.

General: Military, Scientific and Technological

Gregory F. Treverton

COLD WARRIOR. By Tom Mangold. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991, 462 pp. $24.95.

James Jesus Angleton: even the name is an enigma, the middle name an inheritance from his Mexican mother. So was the person, a remote Anglophile who was an orchid raiser and adept fly fisherman. For more than twenty years as counterintelligence chief of the CIA, Angleton was "spycatcher for the Western world." Mangold, a BBC producer, has interviewed carefully and even-handedly and writes this fascinating story in sturdy prose. Yet the book is a commanding indictment: in spydom's wilderness of mirrors, Angleton slipped from caution to obsession. Passionately committed to the truth as revealed by one Soviet defector, Anatoly Golitsyn, he dismissed contrary evidence, stopped all else to turn the CIA upside down in his search for a KGB mole and, in the process, did grievous harm to the agency he loved.

HOW CNN FOUGHT THE WAR: A VIEW FROM THE INSIDE. By Perry M. Smith. New York: Birch Lane Press, 1991, 256 pp. $18.95.
THUNDER IN THE DESERT: THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR. By James Blackwell. New York: Bantam Books, 1991, 252 pp. $12.50.

These two books by CNN's military analysts during the Gulf War demonstrate how much a fixture in foreign affairs the network has become. A retired air force general and West Point classmate of General Norman Schwarzkopf, Smith has written an engaging account of his encounter with

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a new tribe, the electronic media. Blackwell's reporting of the war, from sitzkrieg to "Schwarzkrieg," is as upbeat as befits the military outcome. The allies were good people moved by a good cause, and American forces fought the war more unified than ever before; the Goldwater-Nichols act had vested control in the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Colin Powell, and especially the theater commander, Schwarzkopf. As regards weaponry: "The good news is that everything worked. The bad news is that we still cannot afford it all."

MILITARY MISFORTUNES: THE ANATOMY OF FAILURE IN WAR. By Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch. New York: Random House, 1991, 296 pp. $11.00 (paper).

This is a delightful—if that is the right word for a book about wartime fiascos—collaboration between a young American military scholar and an eminent British historian. Their cases range across a century, and from Europe to the Middle East to Korea. Generalship matters, as does luck—hence the title's "misfortunes"—but they locate the roots of failure squarely in military organizations and their cultures. Thus the same army can score a stunning victory in one circumstance but suffer a disastrous defeat in the next. There are no sweeping remedies, only watchwords reinforced by rich examples: adapt, anticipate, be flexible.

U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE 1990s. Edited by Daniel J. Kaufman, David S. Clark and Kevin P. Sheehan. Baltimore (MD): Johns Hopkins, 1991, 273 pp. $42.50 (paper, $14.95).

Defining strategy as how a nation connects its means to its objectives, the editors, from West Point's political science department, have assembled a thoughtful snapshot of America's best thinking. Not all the arguments are new, but the authors, ranging from Samuel Huntington to Michael Doyle, could hardly be improved upon. They move from describing threats to proposing alternative future American strategies. The result admirably serves the editors' purpose of advancing the national debate.

DESIGNING DEFENSE FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER: THE MILITARY BUDGET IN 1992 AND BEYOND. By Earl C. Ravenal. Washington: CATO Institute, 1991, 82 pp. $9.95 (paper).

Ravenal has been a disengager in season and out for two decades, and this might be his season. In eccentric but provocative prose, he foresees no threats to America's essential security, and he sees President Bush's "new world order" as foredoomed in a world of "regionalized" power and "general unalignment." He would phase out U.S. commitments to NATO, Japan and Korea, and cut military spending to match.

BALKAN IMBROGLIO: POLITICS AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE. By Daniel N. Nelson. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 136 pp. $24.95.

Those of us under sixty did not study much of what was called before the last world war the "nationalities" question, and we now suffer for it. Nelson, now a staffer of Representative Richard Gephardt, cannot fill all our gaps, but his book is a good history and he is the best of those few younger Americans who know southeastern Europe well. Sadly, the book's premise—"the most populous, demographically fastest growing and poor-

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est region of Europe is, simultaneously, its most volatile"—has proven since its writing to be on the mark.

COMMAND PERFORMANCE: THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. By Paul B. Stares. Washington: Brookings, 1991, 240 pp. $29.95 (paper, $11.95).

It is no criticism to observe that most of our analyses, and surely our publications, lag behind a reality that is changing more in months than we expected it to change in decades. Based on scores of interviews, this careful study documents what had been a nagging worry during the Cold War: that NATO had focused much on numbers and weapons but less on communications and control, hence the disadvantage of geography—forward defense on the old German-German border—had left its wartime command arrangements dangerously vulnerable. The dramatic changes of recent years render this analysis largely historical but not entirely so. For instance, Stares emphasizes that the devolution of authority produced by Cold War fears of surprise attack can, and should, now be withdrawn.

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. By Constantine Menges. Washington: AEI Press, 1991, 269 pp. $24.95.

Menges came to America as a child, his parents refugees from Nazi Germany. He went on to become one of the most outspoken anticommunists of President Reagan's national security staff, specializing in Latin America. In this history he returns to the center of the East-West confrontation, Germany. The perspective is apt, for the great strategic change of our era so far is German unification. If Menges's speculations about the future now seem overtaken by their assumption that the Soviet Union would remain a great and unified power, they still remind us of the forces at play if it—or Russia—were to regain that status.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Anthony H. Cordesman. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991, 224 pp. $44.95.
DOOMSDAY WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF MANY: THE ARMS CONTROL CHALLENGE OF THE '90s. By Kathleen C. Bailey. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1991, 158 pp. $22.95.

Bailey, a former official, writes with broad strokes across the clutch of proliferation issues, from how nuclear weapons are made to what the United States might do to restrict the spread of ballistic missiles. Hers is an accessible and affordable introduction to the subject for the newly interested, or worried. By contrast, Cordesman is a military expert, often seen on television during the Gulf War, who knows the Middle East well. His case studies are detailed, his knowledge is that of the insider, and his lessons—about arms control, for instance—are always thoughtful and sometimes challenge our intuition.

ALLIANCE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE: FRANCO-GERMAN MILITARY COOPERATION AND THE EUROPEAN PILLAR OF DEFENSE. By David G. Haglund. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 213 pp. $35.00 (paper).
THE EUROPEANIZATION OF THE ALLIANCE. By Robbin Laird. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 143 pp. $27.50 (paper).

Two studies by specialists. Haglund, a good Canadian scholar, argues

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that a "Carolingian" core of France and Germany has been hard to swallow for those excluded—Britain in particular—or seemed unnecessary in the burst of enthusiasm for pan-European arrangements. His argument puts a finger on the lack of serious west European cooperation in security matters—a lack encouraged by American policy and that now seems distressingly evident in the Yugoslav crisis. Laird's book is a wide-ranging collection of essays by an American who knows Europe well and who systematically interviews European officials and observers.

EUROPEAN SECURITY BEYOND THE COLD WAR. By Adrian Hyde-Price. London: Sage, 1991, 272 pp.
AFTER THE COLD WAR: EUROPE'S NEW POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE. By Alpo M. Rusi. New York: St. Martin's, 1991, 198 pp. $39.95.

Hyde-Price, an English scholar, repaints in modern colors the four traditional scenarios for European security—Atlanticist, west European, pan-European and de Gaulle's (and Thatcher's) *Europe des états*. He emphasizes that Europe's future will be more collage than architecture; there will be no single overarching organization. And both he and Rusi, a Finnish diplomat and scholar, point wisely to the future of the Soviet Union as the looming uncertainty, though neither can know—nor can we—how far Europe's institutions will or should stretch to deal with Soviet disintegration. Rusi's book is more a history of détente than an architecture for the future. He foresees a long period of transition, of "conflictual peace" in Europe, yet he is hopeful that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe can become Europe's confederation.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

ON A HINGE OF HISTORY: THE MUTUAL VULNERABILITY OF SOUTH AND NORTH. By Ivan L. Head. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991, 244 pp. $35.00.

The "hinge" of the title is created by threats to the environment, the "potentially irremediable" results of nuclear war, and the existence of enough resources and knowledge to show that "human misery will henceforth be the result of human indifference." Nevertheless, the governments of industrial countries do seem indifferent to "the extraordinary imbalance . . . between North and South" and the resulting dangers. Using a wide range of historical and contemporary data, Head argues for a new social contract "based on scientific reality and tempered by humanitarian constraints." This often eloquent book combines realism and idealism, runs from alarm to a certain optimism, and steers fairly clear of the oversimplification that usually besets writing in this field. The author was an adviser on foreign affairs to Prime Minister Trudeau and then head of the International Development Research Center in Ottawa.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES. By Sidney Dell. Durham (NC): Duke University Press, 1991, 378 pp. $49.95 (paper, $19.95).

Hard-hitting, well-reasoned criticism of the policies of the industrial countries toward the Third World has been the hallmark of the writings of

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Sidney Dell, a Cambridge-educated English economist, during his long career at the United Nations. The thoughtful and often challenging papers in this volume—on trade, investment, debts, market forces and other major matters—gain from being tied together by a first-rate introductory essay. The half-truths that Dell saw in much of the conventional thinking that dominated the 1970s and 1980s is all that some readers will allow to his own analyses, but the volume has lasting value and is a worthy tribute to the intelligent and persistent author who died while it was in press.

OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS: AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY AFTER GORBACHEV. By Robert A. Solo. Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1991, 216 pp. $34.95.

"The goal is full employment and stable prices," and few would disagree with Solo, of Michigan State, that new methods will have to be found to reach these old objectives. He makes some strong points about the need to blend the activities of government and business and to mix the play of market forces with a certain purposeful direction of the national economy. It is hard, however, to give enthusiastic support to a set of prescriptions that includes devices to force foreign trade into balance, the stabilization of much international movement of capital, a world of benevolent and largely autarkic blocs and an idealized American version of Japan's MITI.

THE TECHNOLOGY PORK BARREL. By Linda R. Cohen and Roger G. Noll. Washington: Brookings, 1991, 400 pp. $36.95 (paper, $16.95).

Nearly three-quarters of this useful book is made up of six case studies of government-financed projects intended to make certain technologies commercially useful, mostly to space and energy industries. Results, costs, management, congressional votes and other political ramifications are all carefully examined with a variety of analytical tools. The principal conclusion is that "American political institutions introduce predictable, systematic biases into R&D programs so that, on balance, government projects will be susceptible to performance underruns and cost overruns." The indefatigable authors nevertheless make detailed recommendations for improving matters since they believe, quite realistically, that the country will not give up trying.

MILLENNIUM: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE COMING WORLD ORDER. By Jacques Attali. New York: Times Books, 1991, 130 pp. $17.00.

The picture of the future in this lively essay is a sometimes confusing combination of probable causes and apocalyptic effects. A borderless world coexists with national governments, supranational institutions and regional integration. There are rich nomads with portable technology and poor ones who are the poor countries and people. Japan is the most likely winner; the big losers are the poor countries and the environment. He has some original ideas, such as the need to restore the sacredness of some things to offset the self-destructiveness of democracy and the market. Current events clearly have their impact on the vision of this French intellectual, and it is not surprising to find several pages devoted to the relations between eastern and western Europe in a book by the head of the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

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THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND EASTERN EUROPE. By John Pinder. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1991, 188 pp. $14.95 (paper).

As one of the most experienced observers of East-West relations in Europe, Pinder uses his subtle perception and long perspective to set out the policies the European Community will need if it is to pursue seriously its interest in helping east Europeans create pluralist democracies and market economies. His detailed discussion of the "Europe Agreements" the EC has worked out with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the rather different ways the EC can best approach the other countries of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union shows that the process will be a lengthy and perhaps costly one. It will also require more unified action by EC countries than they have shown in the past.

THE PLANNED ECONOMIES AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS. By Jozef M. Van Brabant. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 314 pp. $57.50.

This is the most comprehensive study yet of the difficulties of fitting centrally planned economies into the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and, especially, GATT. A longtime student of the issues, Van Brabant examines broad principles, analyzes the experience of the U.S.S.R. as well as the socialist countries of eastern Europe and suggests ways in which the institutions could be made truly universal. It is unfortunate that the exigencies of publication kept the author from giving more than a few hints as to how the events of the past two years have altered the issues, removed some difficulties and created others.

EASTERN EUROPE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. By László Csaba. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 403 pp. $54.50.

It remains to be seen whether a close examination of some major aspects of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is entirely a matter of history, or may include points that will be relevant to the adjustment of economic relations among the countries of eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. Either way, this enlarged and revised version of an older Hungarian study has much to recommend it. There is a large bibliography and a useful statistical appendix.

BRITAIN, GERMANY, AND 1992: THE LIMITS OF DEREGULATION. By Steven Woolcock, Michael Hodges and Kristin Schreiber. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1991, 120 pp. $14.95 (paper).

Will national deregulation lead to reregulation by the European Community in 1992? How seriously will the remaining differences in national practices interfere with the creation of a single market? Through close analysis and numerous interviews the British and German authors of this valuable study examine the prospects for mergers and acquisitions, public procurement, technical standards, telecommunications and financial services. They fit a remarkable amount of essential detail into a small book and bring out interesting contrasts between the way nominal liberalism works in Germany and Britain.

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GLOBAL LINKAGES: MACROECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND COOPERATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. By Warwick J. McKibbin and Jeffrey D. Sachs. Washington: Brookings, 1991, 277 pp. $36.95 (paper, $16.95).

Much of what is said about the value of international coordination of national economic policies rests on loose generalities. These two economists try to show how things work, and what action is likely to produce what result, by testing ideas as to what went on the 1980s. There is more modelling and mathematics than most readers will care for, but the aims, methods and results are set out in usually simple prose.

THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND THE WORLD ECONOMY. Edited by Charles F. Doran and Alvin Paul Drischler. Washington: The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1991, 100 pp. $14.95 (paper).

Although the four essays by Americans and Canadians are short, they make some good points about the politics of the distribution of gains and losses under the free trade area agreement: the protectionist bias of arrangements for common trade policies toward the rest of the world; the discrepancy between the attention to services and the results; how freer trade in goods may also create internal pressures in Canada for further liberalization of services; and the range of domestic issues that will arise if any further steps are taken concerning investments.

EL ACUERDO DE LIBRE COMERCIO MEXICO-ESTADOS UNIDOS. By Luis Rubio F. and others. Mexico: Editorial Diana, 1991, 291 pp.

This excellent study by the Centro de Investigacion para el Desarrollo is broad-gauged but at the same time quite detailed in making the case that a free trade agreement with the United States would strengthen the Mexican economy. The authors believe the agreement would enhance recent reforms and help get rid of traditional narrow nationalism and excessive government intervention. Above all they see it as essential to equipping Mexico to live in an internationalized world economy. They take the challenging view that although a "silent integration" of Mexico and the United States has been going on for some time, a formal and thorough-going agreement would prove to be, as their subtitle puts it, "a road to strengthen sovereignty."

RACE TO THE SWIFT: STATE AND FINANCE IN KOREAN INDUSTRIALIZATION. By Jung-en Woo. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, 280 pp. $35.00.

To construct a "different" interpretation of the history and political economy of modern Korea, Woo, of Northwestern University, says she had to engage in "a good bit of excavation" and "discover new materials." Her conclusion is that firm government control of the financial structure was the key factor enabling South Korea to build a strong state and an economy emphasizing heavy industry against all conventional wisdom about development. The discussion of the many factors leading to the liberalization of finance in the 1980s seems more tentative and, in light of her earlier analysis, ascribes a surprising amount of influence to the United States.

A LEVITE AMONG THE PRIESTS: EDWARD M. BERNSTEIN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM. By Stanley W. Black. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 127 pp. $31.95.

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"A Levite among the priests" is how Edward Bernstein described himself when J. M. Keynes gave him credit for the successful monetary negotiations at Bretton Woods in 1944. In what is essentially oral history, the American economist goes well beyond the title to give an exceptionally interesting account of the key part he also played in other work in the U.S. Treasury—as the first director of research at the International Monetary Fund and in the years when international monetary reform was under way. Bernstein speaks quite frankly of the dozens of people who come into the story, and his own personality shines through the words.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT: A MEMOIR. By Clark Clifford with Richard Holbrooke. New York: Random House, 1991, 709 pp. $25.00.

This beautifully written autobiography follows the author's Washington career from his beginning as naval aide and then special counsel to President Truman—when he helped define American policy at the outset of the Cold War and did much to engineer Truman's 1948 election—through the Vietnam War to the present. The chapters describing his 1965 opposition to committing American troops to Vietnam, his seeming hawkishness after troops were committed and his reversal as Secretary of Defense in 1968 are the best. The overall serenity of the volume is interrupted by a long self-exculpatory footnote on his alleged connection to the Bank of Credit and Commerce International scandal.

THE CERTAIN TRUMPET: MAXWELL TAYLOR & THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM. By Douglas Kinnard. Washington: Brassey's, 1991, 252 pp. $22.95.

General Taylor, as adviser to the president, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and ambassador to Saigon, was intimately involved with the Vietnam War for eight years. This succinct and balanced study explores his role with emphasis on why he did not press his doubts about the wisdom of committing ground troops in 1965 to the point of changing a disastrous course.

A QUESTION OF CHARACTER: A LIFE OF JOHN F. KENNEDY. By Thomas C. Reeves. New York: The Free Press, 1991, 510 pp. $24.95.

A relentless cataloguing of J.F.K.'s sexual immorality: enough detail to depress even the most dedicated hero-worshipper, but thin on the deeper implications of personal misbehavior for American politics.

VISIONS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HOW JOURNALIST HECTOR C. BYWATER DEVISED THE PLANS THAT LED TO PEARL HARBOR. By William H. Honan. New York: St. Martin's, 1991, 346 pp. $22.95.

The subtitle is misleading, because this well-researched and entertaining book is a full biography of the leading naval journalist (and a sometime secret agent) of the first part of this century rather than simply an account of the 1925 volume, *The Great Pacific War*, which presciently outlined how Japan might attack.

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PEACE WITHOUT HIROSHIMA: SECRET ACTION AT THE VATICAN IN THE SPRING OF 1945. By Martin S. Quigley. Lanham (MD): Madison Books, 173 pp. $22.95.

The author, under cover as a representative of the American motion picture industry, was a secret OSS agent who opened a secret channel of communication through the Vatican to the Japanese government in 1945. For many reasons, including the compartmentalization of American high strategic policy, this approach to possible peace was not effectively pursued, and the war ended with the atomic bombings. A fascinating account of a might-have-been.

AMERICA RECOMMITTED: UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS IN A RESTRUCTURED WORLD. By Donald E. Neuchterlein. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1991, 269 pp. $28.00.

A clear and optimistic analysis of the broad options facing American foreign policy, ending with the prediction that, if George Bush remains president, the nation will follow an internationalist rather than a neo-isolationist course.

ESSAYS OF A CITIZEN: FROM A NATIONAL SECURITY STATE TO DEMOCRACY. By Marcus G. Raskin. Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1991, 321 pp. $27.50.

The author has long been an articulate critic of rigid and excessively militarized foreign policy. Here he brings together a selection of essays written over the last 15 years. One particularly timely chapter contains the text of a "Draft Treaty for a Comprehensive Program for Common Security and General Disarmament." It deserves careful attention.

The Western Hemisphere

Abraham F. Lowenthal

A NATION OF ENEMIES: CHILE UNDER PINOCHET. By Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela. New York: Norton, 1991, 367 pp. $24.95.

Drawing admirably on their respective talents as a journalist and scholar, Constable and Valenzuela have provided the best overview thus far available of the long authoritarian chapter in Chile's democratic history—its causes, evolution and demise. Written with sensitivity, creativity and verve, it takes up the roles of military officers, lawyers, technocrats, the business elite, politicians and the poor in shaping General Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship and eventually in making possible the return to democratic life. A compelling account.

ORDER AND PROGRESS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF BRAZIL. By Ronald M. Schneider. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 488 pp. $55.00.

Brazil is a mega-country: fifth in the world in area, sixth in population, tenth in economic production, seventh in steel production, the world's fourth largest agricultural exporter, and increasingly an industrial power. Yet its full promise is still unrealized, in large part because the country has never resolved the tension between the two goals enshrined in its national

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motto: order and progress. Drawing on nearly forty years of study, four years of research in Brazil and 38 periods of field work (including twice yearly visits during the past decade), a veteran scholar synthesizes an extensive and diffuse literature to provide a well-documented overview of Brazil's history. Thoughtful, balanced, well-informed and written in accessible prose.

ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED STATES: A CONFLICTED RELATIONSHIP. By Joseph S. Tulchin. Boston: Twayne, 1990, 193 pp.

Despite the power of pan-Americanism and the Western Hemisphere idea, the fact remains that Buenos Aires is nearly twice as far from Washington as is London. It should not be surprising that relations between Argentina and the United States have often been distant, marred by misunderstanding, flawed communications, tensions, economic competition and political rivalry. These difficulties crystallized during World War II, when Argentina remained neutral until the war's final days, leading to a strenuous U.S. effort after the war to displace Argentina's strongman, Juan Perón. One of this country's foremost historians of inter-American relations, and also an authority on Argentine political history, Tulchin skillfully analyzes the sources and consequences of Argentine-U.S. conflicts as well as the recent drift toward rapprochement.

VENEZUELA: TARNISHED DEMOCRACY. By Daniel Hellinger. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 236 pp. $34.00.

Although Venezuela is usually considered a stable and successful political democracy, Hellinger warns that the country's *partidocracia* is fragile, and that the violent rioting that took place in February 1989 may foreshadow a broader national crisis. Hellinger argues that unless Venezuela's somewhat complacent leaders open up broader participation, economic and political, the country's power structure will be threatened by labor unrest, grass-roots pressure, class-based violence and renewed military involvement in politics. National and international economic imperatives, however, are pushing Venezuela in the opposite direction, toward greater concentration of economic and political power.

UNAVOIDABLE RESTRUCTURING IN LATIN AMERICA. By Fernando Fajnzylber. Durham (NC): Duke University Press, 1990, 207 pp. $42.50 (paper, $15.95).

This ambitious and insightful study aims, no less, to explain why Latin American countries seem peculiarly unable to achieve high economic growth combined with equity. Some have been economically dynamic but socially disintegrated; others have been equitable but stagnant; several are both stagnant and unintegrated; but the "box containing countries with both dynamism and equity is empty." A Chilean-born economist with broad international exposure, Fajnzylber argues that experience elsewhere, especially in Asia, shows that this conflict between goals is not inevitable. He suggests that Latin American countries have been unable to absorb, innovate and analyze technological knowledge in productive activities mainly because they lacked an equitable agrarian transition and profound concern for democratization. These things would allow Latin American nations to incorporate the ongoing participation of societal segments that have not benefitted from current consumption patterns. The main key to

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progress is the right sequence: first equality, then austerity, then growth and competitiveness, and the author proposes regional industrial restructuring based on this concept. A stimulating work, contradicting much current orthodoxy on Latin America's needs.

EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal. Baltimore (MD): Johns Hopkins, 1991, 422 pp. $55.00 (paper, 2 vols., $12.95 each).

This fat volume on an important topic comes from one of the most indefatigable academic entrepreneurs in the field. The chapters range from the very good (Lorenzo Meyer on Mexico; Joseph S. Tulchin and Knut Walter on Nicaragua) to the coyly tendentious (Lawrence Whitehead on "imposing democracy"). Overall the tone is cautious. Lowenthal concludes that "the recurrent effort by the government of the United States to promote democracy in Latin America has rarely been successful."

But there are important lacunae. No overall discussion of Carter administration policy is provided, odd since Carlos Escudé, in his chapter on Argentina, makes the argument that "the Carter administration's loud condemnations of human rights abuses not only came together with considerable U.S. government support but with the most massive influx of private U.S. funds ever received by Argentina." Nor are the antipathetic effects of F.D.R.'s "good neighbor policy" dealt with; a policy of nonintervention, to be sure, but also a policy that allowed Latin American dictatorships to flourish. More editorial discussion of the contradictions among the essays would have been helpful. Kenneth Maxwell

IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY: U.S. POLICY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA IN THE REAGAN YEARS. By Thomas Carothers. Berkeley: University of California, 1991, 309 pp. $29.95.

During the 1980s a regionwide turn toward democratic politics coincided with a declared U.S. policy to promote democracy. Himself a former participant in the U.S. government's democracy promotion efforts, Carothers knowledgeably and dispassionately analyzes the relationship between announced U.S. policy and Latin America's democratic trend and concludes that, on balance, U.S. policies contributed little. "The United States did play a clearly positive though not determinative policy in some countries; in several countries U.S. policy was harmful to democracy and its prospects." Closely reasoned, clearly written and persuasive.

INTERVENTION OR NEGLECT: THE UNITED STATES AND CENTRAL AMERICA BEYOND THE 1980s. By Linda Robinson. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991, 223 pp. $14.95 (paper).

From the turn of the century to the present, U.S. involvement in Central America has been cyclical: periods of intense intervention have been followed by withdrawal and neglect. After the deep, if not obsessive, U.S. concern with Central America during the 1980s, a combination of trends in the region and broader international changes have created the new prospect of U.S. withdrawal. Robinson counsels sensibly that Washington should avoid both the impulse to intervene and the temptation to withdraw, but should "shift its focus and resources from defending the region against security threats to promoting democratization and economic development." She puts forward a number of constructive policy proposals,

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many of them previously recommended by the Sanford Commission, but does not fully address the central question: In a radically changing world, why should the U.S. concern itself much with Central America?

UNDERSTANDING THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CRISIS: SOURCES OF CONFLICT, U.S. POLICY, AND OPTIONS FOR PEACE. Edited by Kenneth M. Coleman and George C. Herring. Wilmington (DE): Scholarly Resources, 1991, 240 pp. $40.00 (paper, $13.95).

The second and very considerably revised version of a symposium first published in 1985. This volume argues that, on the whole, the confrontational policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations in Central America did not achieve success, as many commentators now contend, but instead produced disastrous immediate, mid-term and long-term consequences. A useful corrective to easy complacence about the aftermath of the 1980s, but thin on implementable policy recommendations for the future.

THE LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT DEBATE: NEOSTRUCTURALISM, NEOMONETARISM AND ADJUSTMENT PROCESSES. Edited by Patricio Meller: Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 220 pp. $37.50.

Nine leading Latin American academic economists, most of them Chilean and many now in policymaking positions in the Aylwin government, contribute to this symposium assessing Latin America's disastrous economic downturn of the 1980s and evaluating proposals for reviving sustainable growth with equity. Dry, but rewarding.

A REVOLUTION ABORTED: THE LESSONS OF GRENADA. Edited by Jorge Heine. Pittsburgh (PA): University of Pittsburgh, 1990, 348 pp.

Led by Marxist-influenced intellectuals drawing on an admixture of Black Power doctrines, socialist theory and nationalist appeals, in 1979 the New Jewel Movement took power in Grenada, a tiny island in the Caribbean with a total population of less than 100,000. Interfactional struggles and U.S. opposition combined to abort the movement in October 1983. Discussions of Grenada at the time tended to focus on the NJM's connections with Cuba and the Soviet Union and their implications for geopolitics; this volume takes the NJM experience seriously on its own terms and assesses its lessons for those who favor radical social and economic change in the Caribbean islands.

"I'LL BE WITH YOU IN A MINUTE, MR. AMBASSADOR": THE EDUCATION OF A CANADIAN DIPLOMAT IN WASHINGTON. By Allan Gotlieb. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991, 161 pp. $30.00 (paper, $12.95).

Canada's former ambassador to the United States shows how traditional diplomacy has undergone radical transformation as a result of changes in the U.S. system over the past 15 years. The new diplomacy, as he calls it, is largely public diplomacy and requires different skills, techniques and attitudes. Gotlieb is at his best when contrasting his initial expectations with the realities of his role as ambassador. Diplomacy devoted to the executive branch, advises the author, must always be part of a larger strategy that includes lobbying congressional committee and subcommittee members and staff. "I'll be with you in a minute, Mr. Ambassador" is the refrain he

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often heard while waiting around the offices of distinguished congressmen and senators. This lean volume provides many insights and some amusing anecdotes. David S. Fondiller

AFTER THE COLD WAR: CANADA AMONG NATIONS, 1990–91. Edited by Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991, 280 pp.

The pivotal essay in this excellent collection is "The Canadian Malaise and Its External Impact" by Gilles Paquet. It raises the question if four separate nations—Quebec, Ontario, Western Canada and the Atlantic provinces—might have a greater international impact than one internally divided state. The volume places far more emphasis on Canada and the Americas than one would have seen a generation ago. Gaddis Smith

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

AMERICA'S GERMANY. By Thomas Alan Schwartz. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1991, 432 pp. $29.95.

A splendid portrait of John J. McCloy as first High Commissioner to the newly created Federal Republic. He helped shape postwar German policies, combining American interests with German needs and wishes, avoiding conflicts wherever possible, certain of his own and America's rightful responsibility. Schwartz, an American historian, depicts achievements and controversial decisions, especially in regard to the leniency McCloy showed German war criminals. Widely researched, wisely analyzed, eminently readable; a fine work, of interest to all who are concerned with the postwar years in American foreign policy and the history of the Federal Republic.

HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH. By Ingo Müller. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1991, 368 pp. $29.95.

More an indictment than a scholarly assessment of the failure of the German judicial system, which undermined Weimar and facilitated the establishment of Hitler's totalitarian regime. The book, built—excessively, even for a German law professor—on a recital of individual examples, does present a persuasive case that the guardians of the law helped to pervert it. Somewhat flawed in organization and translation, it is nevertheless an important contribution to our knowledge of the Nazi period—and a reminder that those charged with high responsibility often acted most irresponsibly.

IN THE SHADOW OF THE REICH. By Niklas Frank. New York: Knopf, 1991, 371 pp. $23.00.

Hans Frank was an early Nazi, a cultivated lawyer and judge, who became Nazi governor general of that part of Poland not annexed by Germany. For his horrible crimes he was hanged at Nuremberg. Some 40 years later his son, seven years old at his father's death, writes a bitter, taunting indictment of his brutal, lying, sentimental father, interspersing it with excerpts from the father's notebooks. The son, born in 1939, a journalist in the old Federal Republic, is scathing also about the West

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German willingness to allow other high Nazis, including judges, to retain their posts. Strong medicine.

TEN DAYS TO DESTINY: THE SECRET STORY OF THE HESS PEACE INITIATIVE. By John Costello. New York: Morrow, 1991, 600 pp. $23.50.

A much-touted work on the dramatic lives of British appeasers and their willingness in 1940–41 to come to terms with the Nazis. The claims to novelty are much overstated, and the information gleaned from the KGB file is enticing rather than conclusive. The emphasis is on British appeasers—to what extent they encouraged Hess's flying venture remains unclear. The book does sharpen our sense for questions that remain only partially answered.

A NAZI LEGACY: RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN POSTWAR GERMANY. By Rand C. Lewis. New York: Praeger, 1991, 208 pp. $39.95.

This clearly written study traces the development of radical right-wing movements in Germany from 1945 to the present, filling a gap in the historical literature. The author, a professor at Duquesne University, shows how the Nazi influence that permeated a small portion of postwar Germany's population led to the rise of a small but growing number of neo-Nazi groups, many of which became openly active in the 1980s. He stresses the continuation of Hitler's legacy through the evolution of militant groups such as the Nationalist Socialist Action Front and the Military Sports Group Hoffman, both of which are banned. "At present, the neo-Nazis do not present a major threat," he writes, "but they do have a history, albeit short, of using terrorism, which could propel them into a far more visible arena." David S. Fondiller

THE VICHY SYNDROME: HISTORY AND MEMORY IN FRANCE SINCE 1944. By Henry Rousso. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1991, 384 pp. $37.50.

A young French historian analyzes the successive and often contradictory efforts by French writers and artists to account for the dark years of Vichy and the terrible divisions of that time. This comprehensive account of shifting public opinion, myth-making, evasion and moments of truth traces the story from 1944 to the present and substantiates the author's hypothesis—that "internal quarrels left deeper scars than either the defeat or the German occupation." The French are still trying to grapple with the deep historic roots of Vichy's "National Revolution" and the Franco-French conflict of that time and later. The book examines—sometimes too laboriously—the dominant myths and their appeal and the slow efforts by historians to confront what Rousso calls "the civil war." A book of far-reaching and even immediate implications: the newly liberated countries in eastern Europe face similar tasks of judging a terrible past where collaboration and resistance are conventional categories that often becloud the complexities of life under oppression.

SEARCHING FOR THE NEW FRANCE. Edited by James F. Hollifield and George Ross. New York: Routledge, 1991, 332 pp. $45.00 (paper, $15.95).

A very useful collection of essays by different scholars on various aspects

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of France in the past 30 years, with particular emphasis on the modernization of the economic realm and related changes in the politics, education and culture.

THE LEFT UNRAVELED: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW LEFT CHALLENGE IN BRITAIN AND WEST GERMANY. By Thomas A. Koeble. Durham (NC): Duke University Press, 1991, 162 pp. $34.95.

A political scientist examines the causes of decline in the British and German social democratic parties. Some interesting arguments and statistics, but weak on the context in which these two parties operate. The author believes the parties are far from doomed; they need a new vision and better intra-party order.

JEAN MONNET: THE PATH TO EUROPEAN UNITY. Edited by Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett. New York: St. Martin's, 1991, 226 pp. $45.00.

The best of these interesting essays assembled by the American Council for Jean Monnet Studies are those in which people who worked with him discuss Monnet's personality, ideas and methods, as well as Robert Nathan's account of the Frenchman's part in stimulating rearmament before Pearl Harbor. William Diebold, Jr.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Robert V. Legvold

THE FUTURE BELONGS TO FREEDOM. By Eduard Shevardnadze. New York: The Free Press, 1991, 280 pp. $22.95.

Shevardnadze does much more than even the scores with critics of the foreign policy revolution he did so much to author, although that appears to be the major reason he has written this, his first book in any language. He does more than trace the intellectual and political odyssey that led to the great breakthroughs in U.S.-Soviet relations, Soviet-European relations and the Sino-Soviet conflict, although that is the particular value of the book. He also succeeds in conveying an engaging and compelling self-portrait, a part of which is a remarkable capacity for both self-criticism and at times startlingly deep insights into the nature of Russia, Georgia and the Soviet order. The book, as he is at pains to underscore, is not a "history of the personalities of perestroika," not an insider's tale of politics behind the scenes.

NATIONALISM AND POLICY TOWARD THE NATIONALITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Gerhard Simon. Boulder (CO): Westview, 1991, 483 pp. $38.50.

This was a prescient book when first published in German in 1986. Sensitive to the growing self-assertion of national elites in the Soviet Union, Simon's study traces better than any other the background of this summer's Soviet collapse. With a minimum of fuss and excess, he leads the reader from the 1920s and the original Bolshevik notions of nation-building in the non-Russian lands through the 1970s and the flowering of a "new nationalism" in the republics. By then Stalin's harsh policies of modernization and integration, like Khrushchev's more sophisticated and moderate sequel,

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were proving to contain the seeds of their own failure. The drama, as Simon correctly foresaw, would begin in the Baltic and spread west to east.

THE COLLAPSE OF STATE SOCIALISM. By Bartlomiej Kaminski. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1991, 264 pp. $39.50 (paper, $14.95).

Kaminski, a former Polish professor of economics and now an American professor of government, has written a theoretically elaborate and sophisticated explanation for the degeneration and disintegration of state socialism. Although Poland in the 1980s is the case in point, the theory is a general one. He starts from the conviction that the pre-1989 system was not merely a pathological type within a general political and economic universe, but a "unique symbiosis of the state with society and the economy," subject to laws of life and death unto itself. As for the theory, he argues that because the system is structurally incapable of generating economic growth and social benefit from private behavior, the state is left to do the job alone, something which for further structural reasons it cannot do efficiently. Indeed it is ultimately undone by a lethal paradox: "policy actions designed to improve performance only accelerate its decay." If that reminds the reader of another theory, one can be reassured that the case is developed with elegance and subtlety.

THE RISE OF NATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by Michael Mandelbaum. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991, 115 pp. $14.95.

Mandelbaum and his five co-authors provide a handy and timely set of essays anticipating the problems raised for the West by a disintegrating Soviet Union. Because it was written originally for a conference held in October 1990, the policy agenda sketched for the West is preliminary and somewhat superficial. Because it was written by able people, three of whom, Jeremy Azrael, Alexander Motyl and Ronald Suny, have a deep understanding of the national issue in the Soviet Union, they offer a firm, self-confident prediction of what would happen and, in general terms, why.

EASTERN EUROPE IN THE POSTWAR WORLD. By Thomas Simon. New York: St. Martin's, 1991, 246 pp. $39.95.

Simon, U.S. Ambassador to Poland, went to teach at Brown University in 1989. It must have been a very good course. These are the lectures, lively, thoughtful, spare and compassionate. Simon has spent a diplomat's career serving in Europe and the Soviet Union or working on the region in Washington, and he brings the insight and wisdom of this practical encounter to the last twenty years' literature on the subject. The result is a seamless, highly readable essay on the twentieth century history of eastern and central Europe, up to and after 1989.

THE SOCIALIST ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION: A PRIMER ON SEMI-REFORMED SYSTEMS. By Robert W. Campbell. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991, 234 pp. $35.00 (paper, $12.95).

This is a powerful little book. Not merely is it the first serious effort to explore the netherworld that formerly centrally planned economies now inhabit, having undone the props of the old order without yet building "a market-driven, price-regulated, private-property system." It is also an

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unusually clear and imaginative exploration of the essence of the "administered-command economy," particularly as it operated in the Soviet Union, of the obstacles that confront its reform and of the path that may lead out of the impasse to a world where markets rule.

STALIN: TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY. By Dmitri Volkogonov. Translated and edited by Harold Shukman. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, 672 pp. $29.95.

Two features distinguish this political biography. First is its author, the son of a Stalin purge victim but himself once a seemingly orthodox colonel general among the military's political commissars and, more lately, a radical critic of the Soviet military and a Yeltsin confidant. Second, the author has worked with party, army and state archives previously unseen by Stalin's Western biographers. Volkogonov began writing the book in 1978 and completed much of it by 1985, polishing it over the next four years before its Soviet publication in 1989. The polishing did not remove all hagiolatry of Lenin and party, but no matter; the result makes an interesting and at times rich companion to the major biographies of Stalin by Robert C. Tucker and Adam Ulam. Unless read as a companion volume, however, the history it recounts is incomplete and uneven.

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR. Edited by Robert Jervis and Seweryn Bialer. Durham (NC): Duke University Press, 1991, 356 pp. $45.00 (paper, $19.95).

An unusually interesting mix of authors offers thoughtful reflections on what a world without the Cold War will mean to the United States and, to a lesser extent, to the Soviet Union. Therein lies the rub: the frame of reference is post-Cold War, not post-Soviet Union. Still, in its effort to integrate, rather than divorce, the effects on policy of domestic politics and the international setting, the volume offers a useful analytical advance. In some of the chapters not overtaken by events, such as Toby Gati's discussion of the United Nations, it provides ongoing insight.

RESTRUCTURING THE SOVIET ECONOMY. By Nicolas Spulber. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991, 328 pp. $39.50.

Although intended as a scholarly primer on Soviet economic reform, this book has more to say about the Soviet economy itself. Spulber, who has studied the Soviet economy for many years, understands both the mechanisms of command and production within the old Soviet mold, and he brings his great knowledge to bear in laying out the problem. The discussion of reform, however, is more fleeting and circumscribed by a focus on what Gorbachev and his colleagues were earlier offering as reform.

FIVE YEARS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD: GORBACHEV'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION. By Harley D. Balzer. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 267 pp. $39.95 (paper, $14.95).

If this set of essays, written in 1990, is judged as an attempt to size up the first five years of the Gorbachev era, it helps to consolidate criteria for making judgments, to single out major features of change in the Soviet Union, for good and ill, and to compare the effects of perestroika on society, culture, politics, economics and foreign policy. If, however, it is

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judged as an explanation for why the history of the Soviet Union has taken the dramatic turn of the last several months, the reader will have trouble finding a clear set of roots.

GORBACHEV'S RETREAT: THE THIRD WORLD. By Melvin A. Goodman. New York: Praeger, 1991, 206 pp.

Goodman has been one of the U.S. government's most experienced and measured students of Soviet policy in the Third World. His rich experience echoes throughout this thoughtful recounting of the revolution Gorbachev brought to Soviet involvement in these regions. Most of the analysis concentrates on the dramatic shift in the Soviet approach to regional conflicts (from Central America to Southeast Asia, with Afghanistan featured), including the concomitant adjustments in military behavior. The book is best in describing the great changes in Soviet thinking and doing. It is less energetic in explaining from where these came.

THE USSR AND MARXIST REVOLUTIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD. Edited by Mark N. Katz. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 153 pp. $34.50.

Three old hands, Mark Katz, Wayne Limberg and Neil MacFarlane, provide overarching essays on the central but specific issue of Soviet support for Third World Marxist regimes. MacFarlane addresses the historic question (from 1917 to Gorbachev), Katz, the Gorbachev era, and Limberg, the matter of military support. The premise of the book is now doubtless wrong: that the past will provide important insight into how Moscow will in the future deal with Marxist regimes in the Third World. But as we round out the story of a defunct Soviet foreign policy, it is good to have succinct, broad, summary judgments on the matter.

YUGOSLAV-AMERICAN RELATIONS SINCE WORLD WAR II. By John R. Lampe, Russell O. Prickett and Ljubisa S. Adamovic. Durham (NC): Duke University Press, 1991, 249 pp. $35.00.

The task is divided by three authors—an American professor of history, a business consultant and former foreign service officer, and a Yugoslav professor of economics. Lampe traces the history of postwar U.S. economic involvement with Yugoslavia; Prickett deals with the practical details of U.S. policy and the challenges of engaging Western investment in Yugoslavia; Adamovic writes about Yugoslav economic reform. This is a serious, sustained study.

UNQUIET DAYS: AT HOME IN POLAND. By Thomas Swick. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1991, 286 pp. $19.95.

American journalist Thomas Swick went to Warsaw as an English instructor in 1979 and returned several times during the 1980s. He fell in love with it despite the pervasive drabness, the monotonous diet and the fierce winters. (It may be worth noting that he now lives in Fort Lauderdale.) This is an evocation of what quotidian life was like during the years of Solidarity and later martial law. There is a moving, even stirring account of the annual mass pilgrimage to the Black Madonna in Jasna Gora. A charming and useful memoir that should be read by all would-be sojourners in Poland.

Lucy Despard

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The Middle East

William B. Quandt

MY TURN TO SPEAK: IRAN, THE REVOLUTION AND SECRET DEALS WITH THE U.S. By Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr. New York: Brasseys, 1991, 224 pp. $19.95.

This English translation of the 1989 French text is a rambling, self-serving series of reminiscences by Iran's former president. Compiled by a journalist from interviews, the book is long on sensational allegations and devoid of documentation that might lend credence to Bani-Sadr's claims. What is one to make of his assertion that Henry Kissinger plotted to set up a Palestinian state in—guess where—Khuzistan, the Arabic-speaking part of Iran? He is also convinced that Zbigniew Brzezinski met with Saddam Hussein to cook up the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980. His allegations that Reagan campaign officials met with Iranians during 1980 to delay the release of the hostages (and to bring about the downfall of Bani-Sadr) will be taken more seriously, and Bani-Sadr has repeatedly claimed that he can offer proof. But the reader will not find it here. Bani-Sadr quotes Khomeini as follows: "Bani-Sadr loses control of what he says and gets completely carried away. He often says things before thinking them through." He also notes a CIA report about him that concluded he was "self-seeking and unreliable." His book gives substance to both assertions.

THE WATER'S EDGE AND BEYOND: DEFINING THE LIMITS TO DOMESTIC INFLUENCE ON UNITED STATES MIDDLE EAST POLICY. By Mitchell Geoffrey Bard. New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction Publishers, 1991, 313 pp.

This is a serious analysis of the influence of the pro-Israeli lobby on American foreign policy. The author analyzes a series of major cases when the lobby tried to get its way over the opposition of the president. The mixed record of wins and losses leads Bard to some plausible conclusions about conditions that favor the lobby. The most original part of the book consists of a statistical review of more than 600 cases since the Truman era in which the lobby tried to influence policy. More than 60 percent of the time it got its way, usually with the support of the president. But when the president took the opposite side of an issue, the lobby "won" only 27 percent of the cases. Depending on one's preconceptions, this may seem like a lot or a little. Regardless, it is good to have the data presented clearly. Bard avoids the temptation to exaggerate or downplay the role of the lobby, typical failings of most such studies, but he clearly respects the influence of this most powerful of lobbies, for which he now works.

THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE SYRIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT. By Helena Cobban. New York: Praeger, 1991, 182 pp. $19.95 (paper, $9.95).

During the period of intense superpower rivalry in the Middle East from 1978 to 1989, the phenomenon of the "tail wagging the dog" was very much evident in relations between the Soviet Union and its client, Syria, and the United States and its client, Israel. In both cases, the two clients extracted a great deal of military and economic aid while returning little in the way of political obedience. Cobban expertly analyzes the two superpowers and their clients. While her analysis of the limits of U.S.-Israeli

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"strategic cooperation" will not make partisans of Israel happy, she makes a number of very persuasive points. Robert O. Freedman

POLITICAL VEGETABLES? BUSINESSMAN AND BUREAUCRAT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EGYPTIAN AGRICULTURE. By Yahya M. Sadowski. Washington: Brookings, 1991, 396 pp. $32.95 (paper, $12.95).

The vegetables in the title are both real and figurative. Why does Egypt have such a hard time reforming its agricultural sector? Why are there so many disincentives in the way of development? The answer, Sadowski argues, stems from the relative weakness of politicians compared to the surprising strength of businessmen and bureaucrats who profit from the system of subsidies and price controls. Political will is not the problem. Egyptian politicians know that they must change the system. They are not "political vegetables," apathetic about the economic mess, but they do not have many allies where it counts. In conditions of "crony capitalism," businessmen may well be defenders of the old system instead of reformers and entrepreneurs. This book challenges much conventional wisdom about development in Third World countries generally, and the author's detailed evidence from the Egyptian case commands attention.

MAJESTIC FAILURE: THE FALL OF THE SHAH. By Marvin Zonis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, 350 pp. $29.95.

This psychobiography maintains that the shah of Iran was the primary architect of his own downfall. Zonis depicts a weak personality characterized by "narcissistic grandiosity." The author convincingly describes the deterioration of the shah's personal and physical circumstances that rendered him indecisive and dependent in the face of the mounting internal challenges in 1978. Some readers may be put off by the emphasis on the shah's personality, but no one who dealt with the shah in those momentous days of the revolution could fail to be struck by his odd behavior. Where the author seems less on the mark is in his discussion of how the United States contributed to the shah's fall. He argues that Nixon gave the shah too much support, and Carter not enough. The policy recommendations with which the book concludes are less original than the core.

NO TRUMPETS, NO DRUMS: A TWO-STATE SETTLEMENT OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT. By Mark A. Heller and Sari Nusseibeh. New York: Hill and Wang, 1991, 135 pp. $19.95.

This book is both a remarkable political document and a sophisticated analysis of the core issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Its special interest stems from the identity of its authors—an Israeli who is a committed Zionist and a Palestinian who openly supports the PLO. Admittedly, both authors represent "moderate" views within their respective communities, but it is nonetheless noteworthy that they have been able to agree on so much. As a political realist, Nusseibeh accepts certain asymmetries in Israel's favor; Heller, from a long-standing conviction that Israel's security requires it, supports the creation of a Palestinian state subject to stringent security restrictions. If peace talks ever get underway, this is just the sort of thinking that will be required. Ahead of their time, no doubt, the authors show courage and imagination in seriously tackling issues others ignore.

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SADDAM HUSSEIN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. By Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi. New York: The Free Press, 1991, 307 pp. $22.95.

A political biography seems to invite the reader to get inside the mind of its subject. This attempt falls short of that goal, but is nonetheless a useful account of how Saddam came to power and how he behaved at various moments in his political career. The authors are on track when they reject the simplistic notion that Saddam is crazy, and they remind us that on many occasions he has shown an adaptability when his personal survival required it. But we do not get much insight into why he behaves as he does. The authors refer frequently to his "insecurity," but most leaders in the Middle East are insecure, and not all are like Saddam. Unfortunately the authors frequently write as if they know what Saddam was feeling or thinking. Surprisingly they see his decision to go to war with Iran in 1980 as forced upon him, a view Saddam has always been eager to promote, but which many dispute.

THE ASCENDANCE OF ISRAEL'S RADICAL RIGHT. By Ehud Sprinzak. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, 392 pp. $27.50.

The "radical right" in this solidly researched book is not the current Israeli government, but rather the extremist fringe whose core consists of the settlers, whose parliamentary expressions are the new parties of Tehiya, Tzomet and Moledet, and whose most dynamic personality is Ariel Sharon. More than twenty percent of Israelis sympathize with the views of the radical right on how to deal with the Palestinians, that is, transfer or deportation. Sprinzak traces the origins of the far-right ideology back to the 1930s, but it is the settlers who are now most drawn to extreme views out of self-interest. He concludes that the radical right will not be able to stand in the way of a peace settlement, about which he seems to be unduly optimistic.

TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST. By Philip Robins. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991, 130 pp. $14.95.

An excellent essay on the neglected topic of Turkey's relations with its Middle East neighbors. Without wasting words, Robins covers a wide range of issues—Kurds, water, Islam—that bedevil Turkey's ties with Syria, Iraq and Iran, as well as other Middle East countries. Anticipating that Turkey will not win full membership in the European Community, the author sees Turkey left with a growing but troubled involvement in Middle East issues. More than a primer, but that as well, this book should help bring Turkey back into our consideration of Middle East developments.

THE OUTLAW STATE: SADDAM HUSSEIN'S QUEST FOR POWER AND THE GULF CRISIS. By Elaine Sciolino. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1991, 320 pp. $22.95.

As instant histories go, this one is readable and generally reliable. The author has been to Iraq often enough to convey a sense of what Saddam's regime is like, but the story does not go much beyond well-known anecdotes. If, as the author implies in the conclusion, there is a little bit of Saddam Hussein in every Iraqi, then we need more than an account of how terrible Saddam is. But can such a sweeping condemnation of a whole people really be supported? At a minimum, one needs more of a sense for the history and culture of the country. The most original parts of the book

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have to do with American policy toward Iraq. Unfortunately there are no notes to tell us from where such tidbits as Gorbachev's verbatim conversation with Secretary Baker in early November 1990 might have come.

THE TURBULENT GULF. By Liesl Graz. New York: I. B. Taurus & Co., 1990, 312 pp.

A talented Swiss journalist had the bad luck of completing a book on the Persian Gulf in May 1990, just months before Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. An otherwise readable journalistic account of the region's politics now seems strangely dated. There are still useful observations and anecdotes, but little in the way of profound analysis. The author is fairly optimistic about prospects for Gulf Cooperation Council states. But from the perspective of 1991, she tries too hard to be fair to Saddam.

THE INTIFADA: ITS IMPACT ON ISRAEL, THE ARAB WORLD, AND THE SUPERPOWERS. Edited by Robert O. Freedman. Miami: University of Florida Press, 1991, 417 pp. $49.95 (paper, $19.95).

A conference volume of high, albeit uneven, quality. Nearly half of the articles deal with how the intifada has affected Israel. It is surprising and regrettable that not a single Palestinian or Arab author contributed to the volume. It is nonetheless a worthy effort.

BA'TH V. BA'TH: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAQ, 1968–1989. By Eberhard Kienle. New York: I. B. Taurus & Co., 1990, 238 pp. $49.50.

Why have the two most ardently pan-Arabist regimes in the Middle East, those in Damascus and Baghdad, been such bitter enemies? This analytically sophisticated book looks for the reasons in the nature of the states. Rule by narrow cliques that depend on patronage has meant that the regimes lack legitimacy and fear their populations may be manipulated by outside forces. The narrative chapters highlight the intense conflict between Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein, leaving the reader with the impression that Syria is the more vulnerable of the two. Were the book to take into account recent events, Iraq would look considerably more threatened with disintegration. This is a valuable study, marred, however, by poor editing.

THE IRAQI REVOLUTION OF 1958: THE OLD SOCIAL CLASSES REVISITED. Edited by Robert A. Fernea and William Roger Louis. New York: I. B. Taurus & Co., 1991, 232 pp. $49.50.

A conference was convened in 1989 to discuss the Iraqi revolution of 1958, with emphasis on Hanna Batatu's massive book on "The Old Social Classes." This volume includes the conference papers, and most of the authors make worthy contributions, especially Louis, Khalidi, Owen and Axelgard. Batatu's own conclusions are especially interesting, including his rather optimistic assessment of Iraq's national integration. A book for specialists.

PALESTINIANS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN: SQUARING THE TRIANGLE. By Raphael Israeli. New York: Praeger, 1991, 206 pp. $45.00.

The author professes to have engaged in a prodigious amount of research, but ne'er a footnote do we see. The reader is instead exposed to

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an argument not dissimilar to that of Ariel Sharon: Jordan is Palestine, and a Palestinian state centered in Amman, with or without some role for King Hussein, should be able to negotiate a border with Israel somewhere between the old 1967 lines and the Jordan River. All other alternatives are dismissed as unrealistic. At worst the text reads like an anti-PLO diatribe. Despite the title, the triangle has not been squared—nor is it clear what that means. A disappointing contribution to an important topic.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972–1990. By David Shambaugh. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1991, 326 pp. $35.00 (paper, $25.00).

This path-breaking study of China's "America watchers" concludes that there is a large perception gap in U.S.-China relations. American policy-makers, says the author, were simply deluding themselves by thinking that China had become a "friend" or a quasi-ally. On the Chinese side, national disunity and impotence in the face of imperialist aggression for more than a century have left an indelible mark; great power chauvinism, interference in their internal affairs and so on should not be regarded as mere propaganda. In sum, both sides are imbued with a severe case of cognitive dissonance, wishful thinking, misinformation and misperception. Mutual understanding has improved considerably since 1972 but much still needs to be done.

SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ERA. By Clark D. Neher. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1991, 240 pp. $48.50 (paper, $18.95).

This volume fills a gap. It is one of the few broad, timely surveys of Southeast Asia now available, and it contains much historical and cultural perspective. There are chapters on each country in the region, with sections on institutions and social groups, economic development, the nature of the state, foreign policy, democratization, and conclusions. The author is a professor of political science at Northern Illinois University who taught for seven years in Thailand and the Philippines.

THE CHINA CHALLENGE: AMERICAN POLICIES IN EAST ASIA. Edited by Frank J. Macchiarola and Robert B. Oxnam. New York: Academy of Political Science, 1991, 195 pp. $14.95 (paper).

This is the best collection of essays on post-Tiananmen China yet available. There are solid chapters on China's role in the world economic system, its policies toward Asian neighbors and on Chinese-American relations. Among the highlights are a sober and balanced account of Sino-U.S. relations by former U.S. Ambassador to China Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., a very informative survey of China's relations with neighboring Asian countries by Robert Scalapino, and essays by Denis Fred Simon and David M. Lampton that, in different ways, shed light on the emergence of a "Greater China" economic zone encompassing the People's Republic, especially the coastal provinces, Taiwan and Hong Kong. The papers were written for a January 1991 Asia Society conference in Racine, Wisconsin.

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IN THE SHADOW OF THE RISING SUN: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC DECLINE. By William S. Dietrich. University Park (PA): Penn State Press, 1991, 343 pp. $24.50.

This book provides a fair and comprehensive analysis of America's economic problem and forcefully contends that the problem can be solved only by adopting an industrial policy. The book explains what industrial policy is, how Japan used it to overtake the United States in many leading technologies and what the dangers are of continuing the present course of economic drift while clinging to "obsolete beliefs" of laissez-faire and so-called free trade. The author is president of a steel corporation and a recent Ph.D. in political science and he writes from a unique experience and perspective. For anyone seeking to get a handle on the debate over America's economic decline, this volume should be read with care.

BROTHERS AGAINST THE RAJ. By Leonard A. Gordon. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, 807 pp.

A detailed, richly researched but largely uncritical biography of Subhas Chandra Bose and his older brother Sarat who were among the most important leaders of the Indian struggle for independence from Britain.

Africa

Gail M. Gerhart

MK: THE ANC'S ARMED STRUGGLE. By Howard Barrell. London and New York: Penguin Books, 1990, 76 pp.

This compact and fascinating book is the most authoritative study to date on the guerrilla war waged against the South African regime by the African National Congress. It traces the history of the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, from its founding in 1961 through the lean years prior to the 1976 Soweto uprising. It also goes on through the critical decade of the 1980s that brought South Africa to political deadlock and the current moves toward a negotiated settlement. The author, a South African journalist turned academic, argues that the ANC came too little and too late to an appreciation of the need to work politically inside South Africa to lay an organizational base for a guerrilla-supported popular insurrection.

THE CAPE OF STORMS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA. By Anthony Hazlitt Heard. Fayetteville: Arkansas University Press, 1990, 275 pp. $21.95 (paper, $11.95).

Between the suppression of South Africa's crusading left-wing press in the 1950s and the emergence of its outspoken "alternative media" in the 1980s, there was an era of South African journalism monopolized by pro-apartheid Afrikaans newspapers and a business-as-usual English press that expressed cautious criticism of the government but took precautions never to go too far. Heard, whose career as reporter and editor at the *Cape Times* spanned this era, has produced a lively memoir that delves, inter alia, into the slowly evolving mix between state-imposed controls and media self-censorship. The book ends with Heard's dismissal following his bold 1985 decision to flout the law by publishing an interview with Oliver Tambo, president of the then-illegal African National Congress.

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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SENEGAL UNDER STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT. Edited by Christopher L. Delgado and Sidi Jammeh. New York: Praeger, 1991, 219 pp. $45.00.

Senegal entered the 1990s battling against the familiar catalogue of ills that afflict African economies dependent on the export of primary products. More atypical in the political realm, the country has led the continent in turning from one-party rule to democratic pluralism. This useful collection by Senegal experts explores the country's economic decline to about 1986 and offers a variety of explanations that emphasize the exigencies of Senegalese politics. In the 1960s the country's leaders could rely on a relatively stable and popular system of rule revolving around patron-based distributional networks. In the current era of economic restructuring imposed by multilateral lending agencies, however, leaders must struggle to hold together a far less tractable coalition of urban and rural interests. The prefab prescriptions of structural adjustment programs—that smuggling must be curbed, industries privatized, etc.—threaten these fragile new political arrangements. Although the authors tend to include more on the economic than the political side, there is an admirable effort to interrelate the two.

THE ANTI-POLITICS MACHINE: "DEVELOPMENT," DEPOLITICIZATION, AND BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN LESOTHO. By James Ferguson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 320 pp.

Starting with a devastating deconstruction of a 1975 World Bank report on Lesotho, this book presents a provocative analysis of international development aid as it was applied to one large-scale project in Lesotho's Thaba-Tseka district between 1975 and 1984. The book comes to two main conclusions. First is that the distinctive discourse and conceptual apparatus of development experts, although good for keeping development agencies in business, screen out and ignore most of the political and historical facts that actually explain Third World poverty—since these realities suggest that little can be accomplished by apolitical "development" interventions. Second, although enormous schemes like Thaba-Tseka generally fail to achieve their planned goals, they do have the major unplanned effect of strengthening and expanding the power of politically self-serving state bureaucracies. Particularly good is the discussion of the "bovine mystique," in which the author contrasts development experts' misinterpretation of "traditional" attitudes toward uneconomic livestock with the complex calculus of gender, cash and power in the rural Lesotho family.

CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN AFRICA: NIGERIA, ANGOLA, ZAIRE. By Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe. New York: St. Martin's, 1990, 195 pp. $59.95.

This book examines the international dimensions of the Biafra war of secession, the Angolan civil war and, more briefly, the two Shaba invasions of 1977 and 1978. The author discusses the motives behind intervention by external powers and how these interventions shaped the outcome of each conflict. He relies entirely on previously published sources, but his comparative treatment is informative, despite a somewhat contrived attempt to schematize the findings into general theorems in the book's conclusion.

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DISENGAGEMENT FROM SOUTHWEST AFRICA: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA. Edited by Owen Ellison Kahn. New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction, 1991, 256 pp. $39.95.

This book brings together papers presented at a December 1988 conference on the Angolan-Namibian negotiations that were then moving toward their conclusion. While the book's contributors can be forgiven their lack of inside information—what really happened in the battle for Cuito Cuanavale, for example, or how the actual peace negotiations progressed—the heavily overlapping papers mainly recycle media information, spiced in some cases with vague speculation and flagrant political biases. We learn that there was "a peaceful transfer of power" in Namibia, which would surprise most Namibians who survived the long independence war, and that UNITA's headquarters was in Jamba, although the book's map of Angola fails to show it. But we learn little new about what determined the foreign policies of the participant governments. Angola's government gets only passing mention, as does the history of the American role in the carnage. The most informative piece is by Vernon Aspaturian, who traces in interesting detail the Soviet Union's evolving calculations regarding Third World conflicts.

ERRATUM

Fall 1991

1. The title of the book by Franz Michael and others reviewed on p. 187 should be *China and the Crisis of Marxism-Leninism.*

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Edited by Janis A. Kreslins

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

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

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